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THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS
AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
IN
CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND PREPAREDNESS

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IN

CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND PREPAREDNESS

By

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INTRDDUCTION

A Summary of Conclusions

INTRODUCTION: A Summary of Conclusions

In the pages to follow, we present findings from an exploratory investigation of the use of volunteers and voluntary organizations in civil defense programs at the local community level. The empirical data, which should be regarded as preliminary, were gathered from two sources: (1) a comparative community field study, located in the Midwest, of actual local program operations and local leadership views on civil defense and related national and local issues; (2) a questionnaire survey of local civil defense directors in three Midwestern states. We focussed on community leadership attitudes on the assumption, well documented in the relevant literature, that programs which span the total community are effective to the degree that they succeed in enlisting at least the moral support of established local leaders. We surveyed local civil defense directors, in order (a) to make inter-group comparisons between local directors and community leaders, and (b) to make internal comparisons, with particular reference to differences between paid professional directors on the one hand, and unpaid volunteer directors on the other.

Section I of this report sets the stage for the empirical data by digesting and interpreting the existing literature on voluntarism as a general social phenomenon. In that section, we discuss (a) the social conditions which give rise to voluntary organizations and promote individual voluntarism; and (b) the goals and typical structure of voluntary organizations in contemporary American society. Where data exist, we have centered attention on civil defense specifically, or on organizations having analogous programs or problems. We have included this section on the assumption that if the program continues to make

extensive use of volunteers, a thorough survey and interpretation
of these materials might provide useful reference for organiza-
tion and training purposes.

Section II reports our findings from field studies of five
communities in two Midwestern states. In three communities, we
interviewed selected groups of local decision-makers, as well as
those persons most directly engaged in the administration and
interpretation of civil defense. In Section III, we present some
comparisons, based on two mail surveys, between community leaders
in the five field-study communities and the local civil defense
directors in our three-state sample. Section IV deals exclusively
with the survey of local directors, comparing paid versus volunteer
directors on various criteria of local program effectiveness.
And in Section V, we present a set of concrete recommendations,
deriving from both the empirical data and the survey of literature,
for alternative modes of civil defense organization.

In general, our impression is that primary reliance on
voluntarism is unlikely, at this time, to promote maximum
effectiveness in either the conduct or the interpretation of
civil defense at the local community level. The available survey
data on voluntary participation in civil defense over a twenty
year period show quite clearly that state willingness to partici-
pate in civil defense activities declined sharply from 1941 to
1961, with a temporary upsurge during the Korean war. These
data suggest further that the social composition of civil defense
volunteer groups has transformed it, during the same period, from
a white-collar, middle class "community service" organization,
functioning with equal effectiveness in towns and cities of all

sizes, to a program dominated by blue-collar volunteers and paid
government employees, tending to function effectively only in
large metropolitan areas. And finally, recent surveys indicate
that favorableness toward the current core of civil defense
policy, the fallout shelter program, is greatest among those
groups in the population which the literature on voluntarism
shows to be least likely to participate in voluntary organizations.

From this, it is reasonable to infer that the educated
white-collar middle class, which in America typically provides
the consistently reliable nucleus of community service programs
and organizations, has pulled away from civil defense, to be
replaced by, in some areas, a virtual vacuum, in others by persons
peripheral to the community's decision-making centers. If this
is so, a further inference is that civil defense as a community
activity has lost both salience and prestige. Since there is
much evidence in the literature on voluntarism to suggest that a
prime motive for participation in voluntary organizations is the
desire for upward social mobility, a low-prestige program is in
a poor position to compete for a stable corps of conscientious
volunteers at the local community level, particularly in the
absence of a clearly perceived need for the program.

Our summary interpretation of the literature on voluntary
organizations, as it applies to civil defense, is, briefly, that
in the absence of clear and present danger, civil defense as a
voluntary organization confronts the dilemma indigenous to any
national program for which the need is only sporadically apparent
locally. Reliance upon volunteers for staffing such a program
results in unevenness in both the level of participation and

the quality of task performance, since tasks must be justified
to most volunteers in terms of ultimate goals, and the goals
must be sufficiently compelling to attract and hold volunteers,
in the first instance. After World War II and after Korea, it
was unlikely that civil defense volunteers could be retained, in
the absence of a statement of highly salient new goals. Currently,
civilian protection against nuclear attack doubtless represents
such a goal for many volunteers. But the attractiveness of that
goal, and the need for voluntary activity to attain it, have been
seriously questioned in the mass media and elsewhere; hence, a
marked disposition among the laity to render unto Caesar (i.e.,
the federal government) total responsibility for the entire civil
defense effort.

A further obstacle to effective administration of civil
defense as a chiefly voluntary organization resides in the hard
fact that if local programs are to carry out national policy on
a uniform basis, they cannot use volunteers as decision-makers,
but only as rank and file. This built-in constraint may render
the program uninteresting to local activists accustomed to exerting
substantial influence on organization policy. The organization may
therefore be left in the hands of persons who are "assigned (by
local government, for example),in which case they are not true
volunteers, and the problem becomes one of persuading local
governments of the program's validity; or of persons who partici-
pate because they feel a threat not felt by most of the community,
in which case the program assumes a "fringe" or "social movement"
character, with subsequent loss of prestige.

Our own empirical data, although by no means conclusive, tend by and large to support the above generalizations. As detailed in Section II, extensive interviews with selected members of "The Establishment" in five widely varying communities show these local leaders to be, with rare exceptions, inactive in civil defense, ill-informed about its program, and dubious with respect to its objectives as they perceive them. The general attitude toward fallout shelters was negative, although seldom aggressively so; the tone was, rather, one of indifference - a disinclination to be "bothered". We found that the question of need for a strong shelter program has not been answered to the satisfaction of the majority of our respondents (nor can it be, in any conclusive way). Second in importance, for these community leaders, is the problem of cost, whether privately or publicly defrayed; and closely related in the third major reservation, adequacy of construction specifications, or know-how. We explored correlates of these and other general shelter attitudes in considerable detail, but in this introductory chapter, we shall merely summarize our interpretations of this analysis, as follows:

1. If cost and know-how criticisms could be adequately met, it is likely that much of the negativism we encountered would be vitiated.

2. Appeals for a strong shelter program which are based largely on considerations of sheer personal survival may be missing the mark, and might even boomerang. It appears likely that discussion of the need for a shelter program would have greater impact upon this group-minded segment of society, if civil defense were presented more clearly and precisely in the broad context of overall Cold War strategy and objectives.

3. Since those respondents most likely to predict eventual nuclear war are also most likely to repudiate the shelter program, the so-called "scare" approach to the need for shelters may be mustering negative rather than positive attitudes toward the program.

4. Apathy, rather than outright hostility, appears to be the prevailing attitude toward shelters, among these community elites. Thus, while it is doubtful that, in the absence of a concrete emergency, many of these leaders could be persuaded to take an active part in civil defense, it seems equally doubtful that serious resistance would greet a solidly administered, clearly interpreted program.

We found that these community leaders are on the whole more favorably disposed toward their local civil defense programs than they are toward the federal program as they define it. While it is true that civil defense at all administrative levels has always maintained a dual responsibility for both natural and man-made disasters, including armed enemy attack, this fact seems all but unknown to the local leaders we interviewed. A strong federal emphasis in recent years on the fallout shelter program appears to have come across as an exclusive emphasis, with the consequence that many community leaders make a distinction between the federal program on the one hand, and the local program on the other. Generally speaking, we found that where the local program has maintained a natural disaster emphasis, or an emphasis on man-made disasters not associated with enemy attack, it is supported by the community leadership group. Where, on the other hand, the local program is identified with the federal fallout shelter program, it tends to be regarded with indifference or impatience.

It should be noted that this federal-local program distinction was made not by the researchers but by the respondents, who appeared, on the whole, more confused than condemning. This confusion is reflected in our finding that even though the civil defense program at the federal level tends to be misperceived, civil defense is nevertheless felt by a plurality of our respondents to be a federal responsibility. From this finding; from our findings with respect to shelter attitudes; and from our detailed examination of the five local civil defense programs in actual operation, we have arrived at these tentative conclusions:

1. The federal fallout shelter program may have been both undersold and oversold: undersold in the sense that its relationship to overall Cold War strategy has been made insufficiently clear, and problems of cost and construction appear unresolved; oversold in that it has come to be seen as the exclusive focus of the federal agency, so that general disaster functions are perceived as an essentially local emphasis.

2. In non-crisis periods, or in non-disaster areas, crisis and disaster oriented programs experience profound difficulty in enlisting that sustained support from community leaders and decision makers which seems necessary to the continuous and efficient operation of civil defense as a volunteer-based program. Even though the leaders we interviewed were inclined to express preference for a natural disaster civil defense orientation, we doubt that the recent OCD shift to a more balanced emphasis will alone guarantee the development of a continuously functioning, reasonably uniform federal-local program.

3. Civil defense volunteers in the communities we visited
tended to come largely from voluntary organizations on the
periphery of the power structure, or from city government personnel
who are not, strictly speaking, volunteers. Thus, civil defense
tends frequently to be regarded as a "fringe" operation, lacking
solid integration into the total life of the community.

4. Where civil defense is formally incorporated into local
government, it seems to fare slightly better than where this is
not the case. But it was our impression that local government
officials are reluctant to place the program high on the priority
list, because of what they regard as excessive cost relative to
articulate public demand.

5. A civil defense program which assumes, as it must, the
possibility of armed enemy attack using nuclear weapons, is by
definition a national, not a local program. To the degree, there-
fore, that the shelter program is a central objective, the federal
agency cannot rely upon volunteers or quasi-volunteers, who must
be recruited in the context of a local leadership climate which
tends to remain indifferent to the catastrophe until it actually
appears or is seriously threatened.

Our community studies gave us the further impression that
part of the problem of civil defense at the local level resides
in a failure of communication between opinion leaders and civil
defense personnel. Since, in the first instance, local directors
are the principal purveyors and interpreters of the civil defense
program, their efforts to persuade their local "publics" of the
need for such a program might be materially hampered by
difficulties in assorting on a reasonably equal basis with key

members of the power elite, through whom messages of community-
wide significance are frequently filtered. If, for example,
there are marked differences in social background characteristics,
or in attitudes on critical issues whether or not related to
civil defense, barriers to communication might arise that have
little to do with the intrinsic merits or demerits of the program
itself.

We therefore compared questionnaire responses of our five-
city sample of community leaders with those of our three-state
sample of local directors, and these findings are reported in
Section III. To summarize briefly, our evidence suggests that
where civil defense places primary responsibility on uncompensated
non-professionals for administering local programs, difficulties
in communication with the established leaders may indeed ensue,
arising from the following kinds of disparities:

1. Differences in education of both the formal and informal
variety, with community leaders the more "cosmopolitan", civil
defense directors the more "parochial".

2. Differences in patterns of participation in local
voluntary organizations, together with differences in motives
for such participation.

3. Differences in orientation to critical national and
international issues, with community leaders the more pragmatic
and cognitive, civil defense directors the more ideological and
moralistic.

4. Differences in perception of the Communist threat, both
at home and abroad, and of the threat of large-scale war, at
least in the foreseeable future.

The data presented in Section IV suggest that these differences tend to be minimized, where local programs are administered by civil defense professionals, whose backgrounds, experiences, and social attitudes more closely approximate those of the community leaders with whom they must communicate. On the basis of comparisons within our three-state sample of local directors, we found that full-time paid professionals, whose previous occupations were white collar rather than blue collar, and who have had volunteer experience prior to assuming their present civil defense positions, are by far the more successful in the conduct of their local programs.

Without recapitulating here our actual findings, we suggest, on the basis of this preliminary evidence, that the paid professional's superior effectiveness may be due in part to his more pragmatic, less ideological orientation toward his program; to his greater skills in the area of community participation and organization; to his higher level of formal education; to his white collar, middle class occupational background; and to his more "complex" and "cosmopolitan" view of socio-political reality. We suggest conversely that the volunteer local director may be motivated by considerations which are at best peripheral to the program's central goals and tasks, and which at worst lend to the program an aura of overzealousness and exaggerated emotionalism.

Our overall recommendation, then, presented in Section V in the form of concrete organizational alternatives, is that the Office of Civil Defense modify its present administrative procedures in such a way that (a) local directors themselves are "professional-ized", in areas where this is financially feasible; and (b) pro-

fessional coordinators under state or federal auspices are provided
in areas which cannot support full time directors at the local
level. We recommend further that key members of the established
leadership groups in local communities be formally incorporated
into the program in a chiefly advisory capacity, so that they
may be continuously informed of federal policy and help to modify
it in accordance with local needs and conditions.

SECTION I

Voluntarism: An Interpretation of the Literature

by

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1. Prologue on Voluntary Organizations

In this report, we are not concerned with groupings along class, age, sex or ethnic lines nor with social structures into which persons are born, such as the family, the state, the church and the community.[1] We deal specifically with voluntary groupings, defining a voluntary organization as:

> 1. An organization in which membership is defined and neither theoretically nor actually includes everyone. That is, it is a private organization which specifies what kind of members it will accept and under what conditions they may remain members.
> 2. An organization which has limited and clearly specified purposes, excluding purposes of personal profit.
> 3. An organization in which entering the organization and leaving the organization is voluntary on the part of the member.
> 4. An organization which is formally organized; that is, there are offices to be filled in accordance with stipulated rules.
> 5. One of two basic classes of voluntary organizations: (a) those organized for the sociable or expressive purposes of the members themselves; (b) those directed towards an outside purpose, such as social welfare or social reform.

Organizations of this type do not occur in all societies and they are more common in some societies than in others. For example,

they are almost unknown in preliterate societies.[2] But as a rural society becomes urban, voluntary organizations proliferate. In large measure, this proliferation is a result of the weakening of family and clan ties by the daily dispersal to work and the associated changes in social life. Individuals meet others from outside the traditional boundaries of family and clan, and become subject to new authority in the urban marketplace. These in- dividuals become socially and sometimes physically separated from family and clan; and their individual and social needs begin to be taken over by other than family and clan organizations. In consequence, there is a mounting dependence on voluntary organiza- tions and on government.[3] In Western culture, guilds were the first voluntary organizations to develop, serving as occupational associations, but also fulfilling charitable and educational functions. Initially, they were overlayed with religious values and supported by religious organizations.[4] In contemporary Africa, tribal associations were the first voluntary organizations to develop in the new cities, and they have become modified along the same lines.[5]

Typically, these first urban voluntary organizations served multiple purposes at the time of their formation, including sociability, mutual aid, religion and education. Membership is usually defined by earlier tribal, clan or family ties, and persons torn from the same clans band together; further, the organization is frequently sustained by a common religious outlook, sometimes serving as the context for performing the old religious rites or new ones. Standards of conduct are frequently regulated by these organizations and deviance is punished by expulsion.

As time passes, there is a tendency for the old multi-purpose voluntary organizations to become more specific in their functions or to be replaced by new more limited organizations.[6] Thus, one organization for mutual aid, another for sociability and sports, another for education and still another for religious celebration become typical, and membership in these is less likely to be defined by clan of origin than by current work situation, economic class, or other characteristics stemming from the current milieu. Anthropologists studying this progression suggest that some organization in the traditional culture must be available for modification into the initial urban voluntary organization, and where it is available the proliferation of voluntary organizations proceeds unhindered. Where it is not available, proliferation is impeded, but the organizations eventually develop, as models are provided by other cultures.[7]

Voluntary organizations, then, are products of urbanization. An early sociologist, George Simmel, saw voluntarism as a substitute for the close personal ties of a rural and more tightly-knit society.[8] At the outset, for the migrant, this may be so, but no systematic evidence is available to substantiate the point. Certainly, however, where sudden urbanization has occurred, both membership in such organizations and the number of such organizations has been reported as drastically increasing. Nevertheless, in American society it has been well documented that those persons most likely to belong to voluntary organizations are those who are the most thoroughly integrated into the society rather than the migrants seeking close ties. Those most likely to join and participate actively in voluntary organizations are middle aged

middle and upper class persons who are married and have dependent children, and persons who live in small cities and suburbs rather than in small towns or the center of the largest cities.[9]

To explain this anomaly, we suggest that voluntary organization membership is more characteristic of those actively seeking not just survival but economic and social success, and that this membership contributes in some way to that success. Individuals may seek membership or leadership positions in voluntary organizations in order to establish a new status separate from their economic or occupational statuses. This new status may provide prestige and even economic opportunities not otherwise available to the individual. Voluntary organization membership may even be sought solely to advance the economic status of the individual. For example, professionals and businessmen wishing to establish themselves in a new community typically join voluntary organizations to establish their identity in a community for business purposes. For groups of people voluntary organizations serve as a new locus of power for the political and economic advancement of group members, or to enhance group prestige.[10] Occupational organizations, including labor unions, and ethnic organizations have been examples in American society.

Once economic success, prestige or political power (or all of these) is achieved, continuing membership and participation in that organization or another organization supporting the status quo may be essential for the participants. There is some indication that once the interests have been achieved, however, there is a lessened tendency to belong or participate actively in the organization which waged the battle.[11] Current "apathy"

among labor union membership may be a case in point. On the other hand, participation may shift to other kinds of voluntary organizations - for example, from special interest organizations to expressive and sociability organizations - that is, participation may shift from occupational, political and ethnic special interest or social reform organizations to humanitarian societies, community service and "business ethics" organizations, and literary societies. In fact, voluntary organization membership among the aspiring frequently takes the form of special interest and social reform organizational participation, while voluntary organization membership among the establishment frequently takes the form of community service, literary and sociability organizational participation.

In other words, voluntary organizations are one of a number of ways of advancing group and individual interests, and groups which have successfully advanced their interests by organizing usually continue to participate heavily in voluntary organizations, although the types of organizations they belong to may shift. For others, beginning to aspire, the tendency is to adopt the same technique (forming voluntary special interest organizations) if the alternative is open to them. If it is not - for example, if they are illegal or if they do not lead to social success -- attempts to achieve individual or group goals by illegitimate means - by crime, subversion or revolution - tend to increase.[12]

The suggestion that voluntary organization membership shifts after higher status is achieved is supported by the finding that adult children of upwardly mobile parents in the United States participate more frequently in sports and hobby organizations than do others at the same status level, but do not differ from their

cohorts in any other type of membership.[13] The suggestion that
voluntary organization membership is typical only of the Establish-
ment and the Aspiring is supported by the finding that membership
in voluntary organizations is virtually absent among the lowest
status groups in societies where a large number of voluntary
organizations exist. The only type of voluntary organization
membership typically found is labor union membership, a special
interest and social reform organization. Instead, individuals
in the lowest economic status groups tend to participate in
informal social clubs.[14]

We further suggest that a large number of voluntary organiza-
tions, especially special interest organizations, serves as a
dynamic element in instituting social change in a democratic
society, with each of these organizations waging their own battles
for change that will advance their own interests and change that
will, according to their beliefs, benefit the society as a whole.[15]

But the vast numbers of voluntary organizations in the
United States cannot be wholly explained by the upper class desire
for status protection or middle class desires for status advance-
ment.[16] Arnold Rose has suggested that this proliferation is a
result of cultural pluralism as well as urbanization.[17] We might
develop his argument further by suggesting that both urbanization
and cross-national migration result in a society composed of many
divergent subcultures. The pursuit of economic goals and the ful-
fillment of sociability needs tends - at least initially - to take
place within the subculture. Thus, the more aspiring subcultures,
the more voluntary organizations. Ethnic subcultures in the
United States did organize to achieve common goals, and an initial

core of that organization in many cases was the church, already organized when the group arrived, becoming modified to suit additional group purposes, especially mutual aid and education, as well as sociability. Here again, the tendency was for more specific organizations to evolve, and a number of organizations for each ethnic group became common, the women's organizations tending to remain attached to the church. As language ties and personal contact with the traditional society weaken, the ethnic qualification for membership in these organizations weakens. As the group achieves its goals, the organization becomes obviated, and unless new goals are proposed and agreed upon, the organization dies. In fact, membership in ethnic organizations was characteristic in general only of the immigrant himself. His children eschewed the organization, and their children hardly knew it existed. The vast numbers of voluntary organizations at the turn of the century were probably heavily weighted with ethnic organizations, but of course the current horde cannot be so explained.

For that explanation we look towards the process of urbanization in the United States, dating most notably from the onset of the Twentieth Century. In the United States, however, urbanization was not accompanied by a proliferation of voluntary organizations based on the models of the earlier rural society. For one thing, the length of time American rural communities existed was quite brief historically, and the members of the rural society did not have much time to develop strong identifications with divergent rural subcultures. In many areas, the urban shift followed first settlement upon the land by only a generation or two. Thus, where the first voluntary organizations were not ethnic, they were formed

around new interests stemming from the new urban social and
economic conditions. In addition, the small town-based fraternal
organizations were popular, serving to provide sociability,
mutual aid, and, importantly, <u>civic</u> <u>service</u> within the context
of quasi-religious celebrations and support. Here, the new civic
identification may have been a substitute for the older rural
or ethnic identifications. With the decline in rural and small
town populations, and with the rise in cosmopolitan orientation,
the fraternal organizations are undergoing losses in membership
(only older persons now tend to belong), and more specific
organizations have taken up the slack, especially in the larger
towns and cities (younger people belong to Little League Baseball
or Bowling clubs, business or trade organizations and civic clubs).[18]

Of course, the formation of "associations" or <u>informal</u> mutual
aid groups on the American frontier has often been noted, but most
of these were loosely organized around a single purpose and hence
ephemeral.[19] The small town fraternal organization was probably
the most long-lived since it served several purposes. We could
speculate that the civic voluntary organization was a more urban
modification of this basic structure, and it is in fact the case
that fraternal organizations find their greatest membership in
small towns and civic organizations have their greatest membership
in medium-sized cities. The most highly specific organizations -
for example, business and professional organizations, labor unions,
political organizations and literary societies - are characteristic
only of the largest cities.

To summarize: We have said that voluntary organizations
represent an attempt by urban people (or recently migrant people)

to meet their own needs privately. They organize to help one
another, to socialize, or to wage a common battle, excluding
outsiders, and the needs that organization serves are those unmet
by the primary social institutions. They fill the void created
by migration or changes in traditional institutions, and they
serve needs created _de novo_ by the new social conditions.
Typically, an organization from the traditional society is modified
to serve these purposes, and initially that organization serves to
meet the whole array of these residual needs. But the tendency is
for more specific organizations to develop to serve each of these
needs separately.

In American society, the tremendous number of voluntary
organizations resulted from pluralism - the many divergent ethnic
subcultures - and from a more recent process of urbanization .
Membership in organizations has shifted from a primarily ethnic
to a primarily social-class base, and those organizations having
the greatest popularity range from the multi-purpose fraternal
organization in smaller communities to the limited purpose organiza-
tion in the larger cities.

But we have emphasized that these voluntary organizations are
private. They represent an alternative to public fulfillment of
certain individual social needs. Of course, in some urban, even
pluralistic, societies, the proliferation of private voluntary
organizations does not occur, as, for example, in totalitarian
states, most notably in Russia. There, in the post-revolutionary
period voluntary organizations _did_ proliferate, but these were
organized in support of government purposes and plans, led and
directed by members of the Communist Party.[20] In this case,

voluntarism became attached to government rather than organized to pursue private ends. The tendency there was for voluntary organizations to become integrated into the State, especially those organizations based on divergent economic and political interests.

Analogously, social functions served ordinarily by private voluntary organizations tend to become integrated into government in the United States in times of crisis. For example, social welfare functions were taken over by government from private voluntary organizations during the Depression of the 1930's, although some of these functions remained with voluntary organizations. Emergency protection and price, wage, production and other kinds of stabilization were taken over by government during wartime, the stabilization being previously left to normal market forces and emergency protection existing only in a skeletal way previously in Red Cross and the usual local government fire and police services. In other words, times of crisis in American society generally result in the integration of social functions into government, when these functions had previously been left to private voluntary organizations or individual action. Furthermore, there is evidence that this process is typical in democratic societies under stress.[21] When the society's survival itself appears threatened, functions previously left by the democratic state to optional individual or group action are assumed by more predictable and reliable agents.

We might note parenthetically here that the current controversy over a Federal fallout shelter program is centered on this very point. Surveys indicate that those who state a belief that American

society is threatened by Communism and Russia are more likely
to favor such a program and those who denigrate the threat oppose
the program. Our own data, to be discussed in a later section,
suggest an important qualification to this apparently straight-
forward and logical relationship.

On the following pages, we will take a closer look at
voluntary organizations in American society, including some survey
results on who belongs to these organizations and how these
organizations differ in the characteristics of their members.
Then we will discuss civil defense as a voluntary organization,
presenting survey results on civil defense participants in 1941
and 1953. Since comparable results for civil defense participants
were not available for 1963, we will turn in another section of
this report to a survey of a selected group of participants, the
local civil defense director in three Midwestern states. In con-
cluding this section of the report, we will turn to an examination
of how voluntary organizations run themselves, using as illustra-
tions a few case histories of voluntarism both within private
organizations and within government, summarizing the pros and cons
of voluntarism from their experience.

II. Voluntary Organizations in American Society

We have just said that urbanization and cultural diversity (pluralism) create and maintain voluntary organizations, and we suggested that the large number of voluntary organizations in American society are based upon these conditions. American society may, in fact, be unique in having so many voluntary organizations and such widespread membership in them. We have also observed that membership is most widespread among the Establishment and the Aspiring - the upper and middle classes - in American society and in other societies as well. But thus far, we have offered no evidence to substantiate our statements, nor have we elaborated much upon them. Unfortunately, data are not available which will allow us to compare American society with other societies in terms of the number of voluntary organizations or the characteristics of members. And all we have to lend weight to our statements regarding the unique nature of the American case in the past is the prior statement of certain European observers. We do, however, have some data on the American case at the present time, and we will present that data in this section.

Since no study of voluntary organizations in American society has proceeded without taking note of the classic observation of Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, let us also present that statement here:

"In no country in the world has the principle of association been more successfully used or applied to a greater multitude of objects than in America. Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions constantly form associations."[1]

Seventy years later in 1911, Lord Bryce said,

"Associations are created, extended, and work in the United
States more quickly and effectively than in any other country."[2]

And regarding the decade of the Twenties, the American
historians Mary and Charles Beard said:

"The tendency for Americans to unite with their fellows for
varied purposes now became a general mania....it was a rare
American who was not a member of four or five societies....any
citizen who refused to affiliate with one or more associations
became an object of curiosity, if not suspicion."[3]

How accurate these statements are we do not know. We suspect
that the early associations in many cases tended to be informal
groups of neighbors undertaking to accomplish some pressing common
task, and later as towns and cities grew they became formally
organized.[4] Apparently, the earliest formal associations or
voluntary organizations were mutual aid societies, frequently
organized on an ethnic basis, trade and marketing organizations
and fraternal societies.[5] But here again there is no conclusive
evidence available.

The cultural basis for this proliferation of voluntary
organizations has been attributed to those activist, egalitarian
and humanitarian values typical of American society. In his text
on American society, Robin Williams lists these as major value
themes and further sees the volunteer worker as providing evidence
for the predominance of what he terms "humanitarian mores" in the
society.[6] Bernard Barber also views members of voluntary organiza-
tions as activists who choose to spend their leisure time pursuing
their interests in organized group activity.[7]

Max Weber saw this cluster of values as typical of certain individuals in societies undergoing economic expansion. One form of economic expansion, industrialization, usually creates the urbanization which we have said was necessary for the proliferation of voluntary organizations. As Weber says, expanding opportunities create activism, and self interest, and since the "new entrepreneurs" represent individuals rising in status, egalitarian values are common among them.[8] Perhaps because of their recent lower status, or religious principles, these groups in Western societies were relatively sympathetic and generous towards those not so successful. Of course, in the American case, social conditions on the frontier may have fostered mutual helpfulness and humanitarian values.

In any event, with economic expansion and sudden drastic shifts in the fortunes of many, the number of Aspiring remains at a high level. Also, as total wealth increases, the ranks of the Establishment are swelled, and voluntarism.

But apart from the societal _values_ which voluntary organizations might reflect, those organizations can be said to serve certain functions or purposes for the society as a whole. We might summarize these functions as follows:

1. Membership in voluntary organizations serves to teach citizens something about their society; that is, it helps create an "informed citizenry." Furthermore, such membership serves as a training ground in democratic methods, providing citizens with practical experience in democracy.[9]

2. Voluntary organizations serve as "interest groups" or "pressure groups" which an individual joins in order to enhance and protect his own interests. The large number of these

organizations in a democratic society assures the representation of differing interests in the struggle for influence and power.[10]

3. Voluntary organizations constitute a dynamic force in the society, working to effect reform and change because they present conflicting group interests which must eventually become resolved.[11]

4. Voluntary organizations serve to disseminate and influence opinions among their membership;[12] and

5. Voluntary organizations serve to promote human fellowship.[13] Both fellowship and opinion sharing take place across a larger and more diverse group when they take place within voluntary organizations rather than solely within neighborhood, family or work associations. That is, voluntary organization membership spreads contact and communication across the social unit, bringing individuals into contact with others whose backgrounds, residence and beliefs are in many cases different from their own. Thus, such membership may promote greater tolerance for persons different from oneself, and greater tolerance for views different from one's own.[14]

6. Voluntary organizations serve to train or socialize the young. In Europe, these organizations have served especially to teach political ideologies, but this function has not commonly been served by voluntary organizations in the United States.[15]

7. Voluntary organizations fulfill functions or goals which are not regarded as central to the maintenance of the society. Theirs are the functions left to optional and voluntary action. As these functions become critical to the maintenance of the society, they are taken over by other institutions, especially government. For example, in wartime government functions

expand radically, taking over many functions previously left to voluntary organizations and individual action.[16]

8. Voluntary organizations provide individuals with a means for establishing and changing statuses within the major institutions. For example, voluntary organizations for young people--athletic teams, fraternities, social clubs--assist them in establishing their status as independent adults. Voluntary organizations in social welfare assist married women in establishing a community status independent of their family status. Individuals aspiring towards a higher economic status in the community also tend to use voluntary organizations to aid in the transition, as we have noted earlier. Here, the small businessman, lawyer and young professional is likely to use community service organizations to provide business contacts, while a blue collar person may be more likely to use unions or farmers organizations in order to advance his economic status.

Of course, some individuals who are establishing and changing statuses do not use voluntary organizations to assist them in the transition. Some young people do not join; some married women do not join; some small businessmen do not join. A more important exception are certain groups of people who are making status changes but do not make use of voluntary organizations in doing so. For example, recently divorced persons do not tend to join;[17] unemployed persons do not join;[18] recently retired persons typically do not join;[19] and persons recently migrating from one town to another do not join in unusual numbers.[20] These exceptions lead us to draw an important conclusion regarding how voluntary organization membership assists individuals in changing statuses. The

conclusion is that only some status changes are eased by the assumption of a public community status, separate from occupational and family statuses, and joining voluntary organizations is therefore limited primarily to those cases.

The fact that few recently divorced, unemployed and retired persons join and participate in voluntary organizations leads us to suspect that some status changes occur only in private. Breaking family ties, losing a job and being retired constitute a withdrawal from statuses in the major societal institutions, and they typically result in withdrawal from voluntary organizations as well. On the other hand, entering the major institutional statuses by coming of age, completing training and having children involve entering the mainstream of community life and result in greater involvement in voluntary organizations.

The case of the residentially migrant is also illuminating. Here, the act of moving may not constitute a withdrawal from statuses in the major institutions, but frequently connotes the opposite - being promoted in one's occupation. However, movement from one community to another usually results in a reduction in voluntary organization membership. A possible explanation is that many who move do not wish to establish a public status in the new community. For example, migrants to the cities from rural areas may prefer to retain their rural identities and do not wish to associate themselves with the city, thereby rejecting voluntary organizations in the cities which might assist them in establishing an urban community status. Cosmopolitans, moving from city to city frequently, may not wish to become attached to any particular city because they intend to move again before settling permanently.

Thus, those who reject the <u>community</u> (the residentially migrant, the poor and the ethnic minorities) reject community voluntary organizations; those who reject a <u>public</u> status (the unemployed, the divorced and those who have left the public arena by retirement) reject joining voluntary organizations as well. Those entering the mainstream of community life tend to join voluntary organizations just as they tend to vote more frequently.[21] The greatest joiners are therefore married persons with school-age children, professionals, businessmen, and middle-class persons aspiring to higher economic or community status.[22] After children are grown, after retirement, after failure to advance economically, or after failure to achieve a recognized community status, joiners begin to leave the public arena and curtail their membership and participation in voluntary organizations. Meanwhile, those who never wished to enter the public arena have been left untouched by voluntary organizations.

With this background on the functions served by voluntary organizations in society, let us turn to the individual goals and purposes which such membership serves. This discussion in the voluntary organizations literature is usually termed, "individual motives for joining."[23] As Sills points out in his study of volunteer workers for the National Foundation (for Infantile Paralysis),[24] it is not always accurate to attribute the membership of any particular individual to any of these "societal functions" or even to commitment to "organizational goals." For one thing, such an explanation tends to ignore other possible influences on behavior. Sills finds, for example, that many individuals join because of their personal contact with the

organization, including contact through friends and relatives.
He also indicates that there are "trigger events" which affect
joining, such as being asked to join by a close friend or
occupational associate. Such joining may neither reflect status
considerations nor the desire to identify with societal or even
organizational goals, but simply a desire to please the friend.

In asking individuals about why they joined, however, Sills
does find many giving status motives. This statement of status
motives takes many of the forms we have just discussed. For
example, many indicate they have joined in order to fulfill job
obligations -- insurance agents and executives of leading
businesses in a community say they are expected to participate
because of the occupational position they hold. We see here
the motives of the Establishment in joining to maintain a
community status equivalent to their economic status.[25] Others
gave as motives a desire to advance their personal status or
reputation in the community. For example, lawyers and small
businessmen regard such participation as a form of publicity.
Of these, the Aspiring, Robin Williams has noted,"...through
the opportunities provided for personal acquaintance, knowledge
of business opportunities and the like,...for young professionals
or businessmen, membership may be a sine qua non for success..."[26]

Sills also finds many who give motives which he terms a
"search for identity," including in this group those who join
to seek some creative outlet for their energies. These motives
are more frequently given by women.[27] In this motive we might
also see Simmel's idea of voluntary organization membership as
a substitute for the close personal ties of a rural society,[28]

or, we may be seeing what we have termed the function of voluntary
organizations in assisting individuals to establish and change
statuses. As Bradford Smith summarizes,

"The individual who is organically related to his community
through such group activities, loses the sense of isolation and
apartness and comes to think of himself as integrated into the
whole society with which he has so many overlapping points of
contact...Mutual voluntary service is the means by which the active
citizen realizes his position in society, satisfies his need for
achievement and develops a sense of security and mutual respect."[29]

At this point let us turn to some current data on voluntary
organization membership. Our data here are drawn from three sur-
veys of the American adult population. Two of these surveys are
from the mid-Fifties and were recently analyzed by Hausknecht in
order to establish the extensiveness of voluntary organization
membership. An additional survey from 1960 is also included in
our analysis here in order to extend and clarify Hausknecht's
findings.[30]

The Frequency of Voluntary Organization Membership

The image of Americans as "joiners" has, as we have noted,
gained wide currency among commentators on the American scene.
However, Americans have not lived up to this image and
allegations of "mass apathy" have been a recent cry. As we see
in Table 1, this allegation is well-founded in that a large per-
centage of the American population do not belong to any voluntary
organization. Two of our three surveys show that only slightly
more than half of the American public belong to any voluntary organ-
ization, and our third survey shows that only 36% belong to any or-
ganization when union membership is excluded. Thus, only a bare majority

Table 1: Membership in community voluntary organizations for three National Cross-sections of American adults, 1954, 1955 and 1960.

	Percentage of adults who were themselves members of organizations		
	AIPO 625 Feb. '60	NORC 367 1955*	AIPO 352 1954
No organizational membership	45%	64%	45%
One organizational membership	32%	20%	30%
Two organizational memberships or more	23%	16%	25%
Total N	(2985)	(2379)	(2000)

* Percentages for NORC Survey excludes union membership.

of Americans belong to any organization, and only about a fourth of the adult American population belong to two or more organizations.

Although the data on types of organizations is quite scattered, our examination suggests that the most popular organizations are church organizations, civic organizations and occupational organizations, including unions,[31] farm organizations and professional societies. Lodges and fraternal organizations are almost equal to these in total membership, with veterans organizations, social and recreational organizations, political organizations and cultural and educational organizations trailing in decreasing order of popularity. (Table 2).[32]

Table 3 presents the data on membership patterns for racial and religious subgroups in the American population. We see here that Negroes are somewhat less likely than whites to report membership in any organization, and those who do report membership are likely to belong to only a single organization. This single organization is most likely to be the church (55% of all Negro organization membership is church membership) or a civic organization (20% of all Negro organization membership is in civic organizations). Among religious subgroups, we find that Catholics are less likely to be organization members than Protestants or Jews. The differences between Protestants and Jews are not consistent in our three surveys, however, with two surveys showing Protestants to be greater joiners than Jews and the third survey showing the reverse.

Men and women are about equally likely to be members of organizations. (Table 4). However, organization membership varies

Table 2: Types of voluntary organizational memberships for American adults from two National Cross-sections, 1955 and 1960.

| | Percentage of adults belonging to any organization who reported membership in each type of organization | | | |
	AIPO 625 Feb. '60	NORC 367 1955	AIPO 517 July '53	NORC 335 1953*
Veterans organizations	17%	14%		
Civic organizations	40%	38%		
Political organizations	6%	4%		
Lodges and fraternal organizations	21%	31%		
Church	78%	25%		
Occupational organizations:				
Professional, business and farm organizations	16%	9%		
Unions	5%	(Not given)	22%	23%
Cultural, educational and alumni organizations	6%	4%		
Sports and Social organizations	6%	16%		
Total	(1333)	(853)		

* Data given are based on memberships of any family member.

Table 3: Voluntary Organizational Memberships of racial and religious subgroups based on National samples.

| | Per cent of adults who were members of any organization | | | Percent of adults who were members of two or more organizations |
	AIPO 625 Feb. '60	NORC 367 1955	AIPO 352 1954	AIPO 625 1960
Whites	56%	37%	55%	25%
Non-whites	53%	27%	54%	12%
Protestants	60%	37%	58%	25%
Catholics	45%	31%	49%	17%
Jews	51%	55%	52%	12%
Total Number in sample	(2981)	(2379)	(2000)	(2981)

Table 4: Voluntary Organization Membership for Age and Sex Subgroups based on National Samples.

	Per cent of adults who were members of any organization			Per cent of adults who were members of two or more organizations
	AIPO 625 1960	NORC 367 1955	AIPO 352 1954	AIPO 625 1960
Men	55%	36%	54%	23%
Women	55%	36%	57%	23%
Age: under 30	39%		46%	16%
Age 30 - 39	56%	(comparable categories not available)	59%	25%
Age 40 - 49	64%		59%	29%
Age 50 - 59	59%		58%	24%
Age 60+	56%		56%	20%
Total Number in sample	(2981)	(2379)	(2000)	(2981)

by age, with membership most common among adults in their 40's. Membership for persons under 30 is considerably less common than it is among older persons, but there does seem to be a tendency for organization membership to taper off among the aged. Since the population is growing both younger and older, these data lend some weight to the argument that voluntary organizations are on the decline in American society.[33] However, panel data would be required to establish such a conclusion.

Our surveys show a direct relationship between social and economic status and voluntary organization membership, as other studies have also indicated. Voluntary organization membership is most common among the most highly educated and among professionals, proprietors and managers. (Table 5). This finding parallels the findings of Wright and Hyman and of Hausknecht, who demonstrated that the proportion of organization members increases with each income level.[34] Participation among farm owners is also at a relatively high level.

Membership in voluntary organizations does not vary between the regions of the United States, as shown in Table 6A, although the data show that there may be some tendency for membership to be less common on the Pacific Coast. Membership does vary by city size, however, with membership most common among adults living in small and middle-sized cities, including suburbs, and least common among adults living in the central city in large metropolitan areas. This finding seems to contradict our suggestion that voluntary organization membership is a result of urbanization. However, these surveys have unfortunately classified communities by size regardless of their relationship to major metropolitan areas.

Table 5: Indices of Social Stratification and Voluntary Organization Membership based on three National Samples.

	Per cent of adults who were members of any organization			Per cent of adults who were members of two or more organizations
	AIPO 625 1960	NORC 367 1955	NORC 352 1954	AIPO 625 1960
Grades completed:				
8th grade or less	49%	23%	44%	14%
9th grade-11th grade	54%	33%	53%	24%
High School graduate	57%	43%	64%	27%
Some college	70%	54%	70%	36%
College graduate	67%	61%	78%	38%
Occupation of chief wage earner:				
Professional	66%	53%		34%
Proprietors & Managers	67%	53%	(Not	28%
Clerical & Sales	60%	41%	Given)	26%
Skilled and Semi-Skilled	48%	22%		20%
Unskilled	49%	21%		18%
Farmers	67%	42%		27%
Service Workers	51%	27%		16%
Not in labor force	55%	23%		21%
Total Number in Sample	(2981)	(2379)	(2000)	(2981)

Table 6A: Urbanism, Regionalism and Voluntary Organization
Membership from two National Samples.

	Per cent of adults who were members of any organization		Per cent of adults who were members of two or more organizations
	AIPO 625 1960	AIPO 352 1954	AIPO 625 1960
City size:			
Farm	62%	58%	24%
Towns under 2500	60%	56%	26%
2500-10,000	68%	68%	35%
10,000-50,000	72%	60%	35%
50,000-100,000	56%		20%
100,000-500,000	48%		21%
500,000+	45%		15%
50,000-250,000		53%	
250,000 and over		47%	
New England & Mid-Atlantic	54%		23%
Midwest & Rockies	58%	(Not	23%
South	57%	given)	22%
Pacific	48%		24%
Total Number in sample	(2981)	(2000)	(2981)

Thus, a suburb of 10,000 population would be included in the same category as isolated cities of the same population. The NORC survey reported by Wright and Hyman, however, classifies place of residence according to the degree of urbanization of the county. Three types of counties were examined: (1) highly urbanized counties, those with at least one city of 50,000 population or more; (2) moderately urbanized, with at least one city of 10,000 to 50,000 population; and (3) least urbanized, having no city of 10,000 or more. An examination of the membership of residents of these three types of counties revealed that 57 per cent of the families who live in highly urbanized counties have members in at least one voluntary organization, 53% of those in moderately urbanized counties, and 41 per cent of those living in the least urbanized or predominately rural counties. Thus, some correlation appears between the degree of urbanization and voluntary organization membership, although the difference between the least urban and the most urban is not great.[35]

Looking at some indices of integration into the community, we see in Table 7 that home owners are more likely to be organization members than renters. The findings are more striking regarding voting in relation to organization membership--voters are considerably more likely to be members of organizations than are non-voters. We might note parenthetically here that Republicans are somewhat more likely to be organization members than Democrats or Independents, but this finding is probably the result of the higher social status level of Republicans as a group, the Democratic ranks including more working class people and Catholics, both of whom are less likely to be organization members.

Table 6B: **Urbanism and Voluntary Association Membership, 1953**

	Place of Residence								
Per Cent of Families Whose	Metropolitan Counties (with city of 50,000 or more)			Other Urbanized Counties (with City of 10-50,000)			Primarily Rural Counties (Have No Town of 10,000)		
Members Belong to:	Urban Residence	Rural Non-farm	Rural Farm	Urban	RNF	RF	Urban	RNF	RF
No organization	42	40	67	46	46	53	54	52	70
One organization	33	37	21	36	34	28	27	24	21
Two or more organizations	25	23	12	18	20	19	19	24	9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Cases	1,394	193	48	294	115	134	110	264	252

Source: Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman. "Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Evidence from National Sample Surveys." American Sociological Review, 23 (June 1958), p. 290; Data from NORC Survey 335 (1953).

Table 7: Interests and Integration as Associated with Voluntary Organization Membership: Evidence from three National Samples.

	Per cent of adults who were members of any organization			Per cent of adults who were members of two or more organizations
	AIPO 625 1960	NORC 367 1955	AIPO 352 1954	AIPO 625 1960
Owns home	61%	43%	(Not	28%
Rents home	44%	25%	given)	13%
Married		38%	57%	
Single	(Not	28%	44%	(Not
Widowed		30%	53%	
Divorced or separated	given)	27%	46%	given)
Voted in last presidential election (1956)	61%	(Not	(Not	26%
Did not vote	42%	given)	given)	16%
Total Number in Sample	(2981)	(2379)	(2000)	

Looking at family integration, we see that married persons are more likely to be members than persons who are single, with widowed and divorced persons falling in between these two groups.

These findings taken together have led us to conclude earlier that participation in voluntary organizations is most common among persons participating most intensively in other primary societal institutions. Thus, individuals belonging to groups who already have substantial power and status and are in the vanguard of participation in the major institutions are also the major participants in voluntary organizations. Those less likely to be organizational members are the disadvantaged economically, members of minority groups and individuals of lower power and responsibility in the society as a whole.

Now that we have a clearer idea of what Americans are likely to join an organization of any kind, let us look at the kinds of organizations different Americans are likely to join. As we see in Table 8, men are more likely than women to belong to veteran's organizations, fraternal organizations and occupational organizations. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to join civic organizations, churches and cultural and educational organizations. It is also notable that organizational membership among men is more diversified than it is among women.

We see in Table 9 that organizational membership among Negroes is somewhat less diversified than organizational membership among White persons. Negroes are more likely than Whites to belong to churches and political organizations, but White persons are more likely than Negroes to belong to all other types of organizations except civic organizations where both groups are about equally likely to belong.

Table 8: Types of voluntary organization membership for American Men and Women reporting any organization Memberships, 1960.

	Per cent of all organizational memberships in each type of organization (AIPO 625,1960)		
	Men	Women	Total
Veterans	12%	6%	(221)
Civic	16%	26%	(530)
Political	2%	4%	(79)
Lodges	18%	5%	(274)
Church	34%	48%	(1046)
Economic	12%	5%	(210)
Cultural	2%	4%	(83)
Sports & Social	4%	2%	(81)
Total Number of organizational memberships	(1202)	(1322)	(2524)

Table 9: Types of voluntary organization membership for American Racial subgroup members reporting any organizational membership, 1960.

| | Per cent of all organizational memberships in each type of organization (AIPO 625, 1960) | | |
	White	Nonwhite	Total
Veterans	9%	3%	(221)
Civic	21%	19%	(530)
Political	3%	9%	(79)
Lodges	11%	9%	(274)
Church	40%	55%	(1046)
Economic	9%	4%	(210)
Cultural	3%	2%	(83)
Social & Sports	4%	*	(81)
Total Number of organizational memberships	(2265)	(259)	(2524)

* less than 1%.

Looking at the different age groups, we see that older persons are more likely to belong to churches and lodges,and young adults are more likely to belong to civic organizations. (Table 10). Young adults, especially those under 30, are the only group likely to belong to cultural and educational organizations. Since some of this membership is a direct result of current school attendance, this finding is not surprising. It is also not surprising to find that persons in their forties and persons in their sixties are the most likely to belong to veteran's organizations, since it was these age groups who participated in World Wars I and II.

As we see in Table 11, the most highly educated adult is the most likely to belong to civic organizations, occupational organizations (exclusive of unions) and cultural and educational organizations. The adult with less education is more likely to belong to churches, lodges and veterans organizations. Among the various occupational groups, we see that professionals are the most likely to belong to occupational organizations and to cultural and educational organizations and that professionals are the least likely to belong to veterans organizations. Farmers, along with professionals, are likely to belong to occupational organizations, but farmers are the only occupational group unlikely to belong to civic organizations. Skilled workers, laborers, service workers along with farmers are more likely to belong to churches than are white collar and professional workers.

Also, as we see in Table 12, people in small towns and rural areas are the most likely to belong to churches and veterans organizations.

Table 10: Types of voluntary organization membership for Americans of various ages who reported any organizational membership, 1960.

	Age: Under 30	Per cent of all organizational memberships in each type of organization (AIPO 625, 1960)				
	Under 30	30-39	40-49	50-59	60 +	Total
Veterans	5%	7%	10%	7%	13%	(220)
Civic	23%	27%	26%	16%	12%	(530)
Political	1%	3%	4%	4%	2%	(79)
Lodges	6%	10%	10%	13%	14%	(274)
Church	45%	34%	38%	48%	47%	(1046)
Economic	7%	11%	7%	8%	8%	(210)
Cultural	10%	4%	1%	1%	3%	(83)
Social & Sports	3%	4%	4%	3%	1%	(81)
Total number of organizational memberships	(290)	(550)	(643)	(439)	(556)	(2523)

Table 11: Types of voluntary organization membership and Indices of Social Stratification, 1960.

Per cent of all organizational memberships in each type of organization --
Adult organizational members only. (AIPO 625, 1960).

| | Occupation of Chief Wage Earner | | | | | | | | Grades Completed: | | |
	Professional	Proprietor or Manager	Cler- ical or Sales	Skilled or semi- skilled	Un- skilled	Farmer	Service workers	Not in labor force**	8th grade or less	9th grade through high school	Some college including college graduates
Veterans	3%	10%	11%	10%	6%	7%	8%	11%	10%	7%	6%
Civic	24%	24%	23%	22%	28%	16%	25%	13%	16%	29%	21%
Political	3%	4%	6%	2%	1%	3%	2%	4%	3%	4%	3%
Lodges	10%	13%	13%	13%	7%	6%	5%	12%	12%	10%	9%
Church	31%	36%	37%	42%	49%	48%	54%	49%	49%	36%	35%
Economic +	18%	9%	4%	4%	5%	19%	4%	5%	4%	13%	13%
Cultural	6%	3%	2%	4%	*	1%	2%	4%	1%	2%	9%
Social & Sports	5%	*	5%	4%	4%	1%	*	3%	2%	4%	4%
Total number of organiza- tional member- ships	(379)	(211)	(382)	(668)	(113)	(275)	(123)	(373)	(734)	(1216)	(571)

* less than 1 %   ** Includes students, retired persons and unemployed persons.

+ excludes unions.

Table 12: Urbanism and types of voluntary organization membership, 1960.

Percent of all organizational memberships in each type of organization— Adult organizational members only. (AIPO 625, 1960).

	Farm residents	Towns under 2500	Towns 2500 - 10,000	Cities 10,000- 50,000	50,000- 100,000	100,000- 500,000	500,000 +
Veterans	10%	11%	8%	7%	7%	9%	8%
Civic	16%	24%	20%	17%	16%	19%	25%
Political	2%	2%	2%	3%	16%	1%	4%
Lodges	4%	9%	8%	18%	4%	11%	14%
Church	51%	41%	47%	36%	44%	45%	36%
Economic	15%	8%	6%	10%	13%	7%	7%
Cultural	1%	3%	2%	7%	1%	5%	2%
Social & Sports	2%	3%	7%	3%	*	3%	3%
Total Organizational memberships (N= 2524)	(253)	(610)	(323)	(324)	(108)	(315)	(591)

The findings on types of organizational membership most common among the various religious groups are again contradictory in some respects, but the surveys agree in showing that Protestants and Catholics are more likely to belong to veterans organizations than are Jews, and Jews are more likely to belong to lodges and fraternal organizations than are Protestants and Catholics. No clear difference between Protestants and Catholics are shown.

The Composition of the Different Types of Organizations.

We have just looked at the types or organizations most popular with various subgroups of the American population. This examination does not give us an accurate picture of the total membership of any of these types of organizations, however, since these subgroups are not equally distributed in the population as a whole. Thus, while church membership is most popular among Negroes, Negroes constitute a very small proportion of all church members. Skilled and semi-skilled industrial workers are the most numerous occupational groups in the nation and regardless of the relative popularity of different types of organizations among them, they will probably represent a sizeable portion of all members of most types of organizations.

If we wish to compare the composition of the various types of organizations with our data, however, we are considerably limited by the fact that these survey samples do not give us equal samples of the membership of each of the types of organizations. Thus, we have very few members of cultural and educational organizations and a large number of church members. And, as we have indicated before, union membership is not included here.

We can however, despite our inadequate samples, give some tentative picture of the composition of these different types of organizations, and have presented in Table 13 a summary of the characteristics of members in the different types of organizations we have discussed. In this table we see that veterans organizations are composed primarily of men, having most of their members in their forties and sixties, and a concentration of skilled and semi-skilled workers and clerical and sales workers. Civic organizations have a greater proportion of women than men, and they have a preponderance of persons in their thirties and forties and of persons in all white collar occupations, including professionals, as well as a large proportion of skilled and semi-skilled workers.

Political organizations have a larger percentage of women than men, have about equal membership at all ages from the thirties through the sixties, and a majority of professional and white collar persons. Lodges are primarily men's organizations with most members in the older age groups and in skilled and semi-skilled jobs. Churches and church organizations as a whole have a larger percentage of women, and their membership is scattered evenly across all age groups with the exception of the youngest age group where membership is not as common. Churches also seem to have the largest percentage of their members in the skilled and semi-skilled worker categories, following the distribution of the labor force as a whole.[36]

Economic and occupational organizations are men's organizations with membership most common among professionals and farmers. Cultural and educational organizations are mostly women's organizations, with the largest proportion of their members in the youngest

Table 13: The Composition of Various Types of Voluntary Organizations; Evidence from a National Cross Section, 1960. (AIPO 625, 1960).

A.

Per cent of all members of each type of organization who are:

	N	Men	Women	Age under 30	Age 30-39	Age 40-49	Age 50-59	Age 60+
Veterans	(220)	65%	35%	7%	18%	29%	13%	33%
Civic	(530)	35%	65%	13%	28%	32%	13%	13%
Political	(79)	37%	63%	5%	23%	30%	23%	17%
Lodges	(274)	77%	23%	6%	19%	24%	21%	28%
Church	(1046)	39%	61%	12%	18%	23%	20%	25%
Economic +	(210)	70%	30%	10%	30%	20%	17%	20%
Cultural	(83)	31%	69%	34%	28%	10%	7%	19%
Social & Sports	(81)	59%	41%	11%	26%	31%	18%	10%
Total number of organiza-tional member-ships	(2524)	(1202)	(1322)	(290)	(550)	(643)	(439)	(556)
	48%	52%		11%	22%	26%	17%	22%

+ excludes unions.

Table 13. The Composition of Various Types of Voluntary Organizations; Evidence from a National Cross-Section (AIPO 625, 1960).

B.

Occupation of chief wage earner in family.

	Professional	Proprietors and Managers	Clerical and Sales	Skilled and Semi-Skilled	Unskilled	Farmers	Service workers	Not in labor Force
Veterans	5%	10%	19%	31%	3%	9%	5%	19%
Civic	17%	9%	17%	27%	6%	8%	6%	9%
Political	16%	11%	27%	13%	1%	9%	3%	20%
Lodges	14%	10%	18%	31%	3%	6%	2%	15%
Church	11%	7%	13%	27%	5%	13%	6%	18%
Economic +	32%	9%	7%	14%	3%	24%	2%	8%
Cultural	29%	7%	9%	30%	*	4%	4%	17%
Social & Sports	21%	1%	22%	36%	5%	3%	*	12%
Total number of organizational memberships	(379)	(211)	(382)	(668)	(113)	(275)	(123)	(373)
	15%	8%	15%	26%	4%	11%	5%	15%

+Excludes unions

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age group and from families where the chief wage earner is a professional or a skilled or semi-skilled worker. Social, recreational and sports organizations have a preponderance of men, especially men between thirty and fifty, drawing membership about equally from all occupational groups.

In these last few pages we have given a summary of the data on what Americans are likely to belong to voluntary organizations, and we have reviewed the kinds of organizations most popular with Americans of different social characteristics. Finally, we have attempted to give a sketch of the composition of different types of voluntary organizations, using the survey data available to us. Part of our reason for undertaking this summary was to place in perspective the data regarding participation in civil defense for two time periods -- in July 1953, at about the time these surveys on voluntary organization membership were taken, and on December 10, 1941.[37]

This earlier survey took place at a time of great threat, immediately after the declaration of war, when local civil defense programs had been established only a few years. The 1953 survey took place at a time of relaxing tensions, about six months after Eisenhower took office and about four months after Stalin's death. This was a time of negotiation over peace talks, but also a time when there was considerable fear regarding Communist infiltration in this country, during the height of the influence of Senator McCarthy. At this time, the Ground Observer Corps was operating as a civil defense corps, using volunteers in the observation and spotting of enemy planes. It was also at this time that the Project East River report was issued, bemoaning public apathy over civil defense, and it was shortly after this survey was taken that

Russian Premier Malenkov declared that the United States no longer had a monopoly on the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.[38] In both 1941 and 1953, national civil defense volunteer programs were in effect. That is, the primary volunteer tasks in civil defense were related to national civil defense goals, primarily the goal of protection against enemy attack. Of course, from 1946 to 1950, no national civil defense program or organization was in existence. From these survey data and from other official OCD reports, we will now trace the trends in civil defense participation over the past twenty years. We will begin by looking at the popularity of civil defense participation among all Americans over this time period.

In 1941 our national survey sample shows that almost 20% report they are participating or signed up for participation in civil defense. In 1953, only about 8% of our sample reports such participation. (Table 14). It is of course quite likely that our 1941 survey estimate is inflated due to the crisis condition pre- vailing at the time of the survey, leading many people to state an intention to participate rather than to report real participation. This survey estimate can best be regarded as an indication of the number of Americans highly interested and favorable towards civil defense, including those actually participating in the program. As an estimate of participation of adult civilians in the war period as a whole, it is undoubtedly a high estimate in light of the available information from OCD regarding the number of partici- pants. The estimate given by OCD as of December 31, 1943 was 6 million volunteers,[39] and for the total war period, the number of CD volunteers was estimated at 11 million.[40] These OCD estimates include volunteers in all government programs, including war service boards and committees, the Citizens Service Corps and Junior Service

Table 14: Participation in Civil Defense for Sex, Race and Age
Subgroups of American adults -- Evidence from two
national cross sections, December 10, 1941 and July
1953.

Per cent of adults in each subgroup who
reported they were participating or signed
up for participation in civil defense.

	AIPO 215 1941	AIPO 517 1953
All respondents	19.5%	7.7%
Subgroups:		
Men	18% *	7.6%
Women	20%	7.8%
White	20%	8%
Non-white	4%	4%
Age		
under 30	19%	6%
30 - 39	18%	9%
40 - 49	21%	10%
50 - 59	20%	7%
Age 60 +	14%	5%
Total Number in sample	(3096)	(1545)

* This cell should be read as follows: 18% of all men in the
1941 national sample reported that they were participating
or signed up for participation in civil defense.

Corps. Thus, from these figures, we may conclude that the percentage of American adult civilians who were volunteers in civil defense and related programs was about 6% in 1943 and about 11% for the total war period.

The trend in civil defense participation <u>during the war</u> was probably roughly similar to the trend in Red Cross participation, for which records are available.[41]   That trend shows a slow increase in participation from 1939 through 1941, and a sharp rise in participation continuing throughout the war period, declining again in 1946. This trend may be seen in the following table:

Year	Number of Red Cross Volunteer Personnel[41] (in millions)	U.S. Adult Civilian Population (in millions)[42]	Per Cent of adult civilian population participating
1940	1.12	101.1	1.1%
1941	2.0	101.1	1.9%
1942	3.0	100.2	2.9%
1943	6.5	96.1	6.8%
1944	5.0	94.9	5.3%
1945	7.5	95.2	7.9%
1946	4.6	105.5	4.4%

Scattered reports are available on the number of volunteers in civil defense during the <u>postwar</u> period. These official agency estimates indicate that the peak in CD volunteerism occurred during the Korean War when the Ground Observer Corps was in operation as a civil defense volunteer organization. (The GOC was established in July 1952 and dissolved in January 1959).[43]

Year	Number of CD volunteer personnel (in millions)[44]	U.S. Adult civilian population (in millions)[42]	Per Cent of population participating in CD as volunteers
1943	6.0	96.1	6.2%
1951	1.87	110.9	1.6%
1952	4.0	111.7	3.5%
1953	4.5	112.9	3.9%
1959	2.3		
1960	1.9	122.3	1.5%
1961	1.9		

These three most recent estimates were obtained by mail canvas surveys, conducted by the Bureau of the Census, of civil defense directors in all state governments, all major counties and municipalities and a random sample of smaller counties and municipalities. The 1961 survey shows that 2.84 million persons had civil defense assignments in local governments in June of 1961. A small number of these were doing full-time civil defense work for which they were paid (3,772 individuals), and a slightly larger number (926,000 individuals) were government employees with civil defense assignments added to other governmental respon-sibilities, such as police and fire duties. The remainder of those reported here, roughly 1.9 million Americans, may be regarded as volunteer civil defense participants. This group would constitute only 1½% of the American adult civilian population in 1961, and stands in contrast to both the 1953 and 1941 survey estimates and the 1953 and 1943 official OCD estimates on voluntarism.

While comparing these various estimates with one another is not strictly legitimate, due to the very different sources of information, the trends which these estimates show are probably roughly accurate. We may therefore probably conclude that the percentage of civil defense volunteers in the American population was highest during World War II, fell sharply immediately after the war, to rise again during the Korean War and fall again in the late Fifties. At the present time, the percentage of CD volunteers seems to be at its lowest ebb since the immediate post-World War II period.

At this point we will return to our data from both the 1941 and 1953 national surveys in order to estimate the popularity of civil defense participation among various subgroups in the American population. As we see in Table 14, participation in civil defense is similar to participation in voluntary organizations generally in that men and women are about equally likely to participate in civil defense, whites are more likely to participate than non-whites, and participation is more common among persons in their forties than at any other age level.

We also observe that in 1941, participation was most common among those with some college training and among professional, managerial and white-collar personnel. As we have noted, this pattern is typical of participation in voluntary organizations generally, especially of community service-type organizations. However, in 1953, participation in civil defense was as common among persons with only high school training. as among those with college training, and it was as common among service workers as among professionals, managers and proprietors. In fact, service

workers along with unskilled laborers are the only occupational groups whose relative participation in civil defense remains constant from 1941 to 1953. (Tables 15 and 16). These changes point to shifts in the composition of civil defense personnel during this time period, making it appear that civil defense became less similar to community service organizations in 1953, becoming more of an urban blue collar and government worker organization, as we will demonstrate later.

In 1953, non-veterans were substantially more likely to volunteer for participation in civil defense than were veterans, and this tendency was most clearly marked among non-veterans whose peers fought in World War II. Almost half of all non-veterans between the ages of thirty and fifty were participating in civil defense according to the survey of July 1953. (Table 17A). Possibly, these individuals formed the core of CD participants in World War II, and either because of prior contact with civil defense or greater personal motivation for civil defense participation, they are substantially more likely to be participating than any other group of men. Alternatively, asking non-veterans from this age group about their civil defense participation may have aroused feelings of guilt about their status as non-veterans, leading many to say they were participating in civil defense when they were not.

Official OCD information on veteran characteristics of volunteers is not available so that we could examine these possibilities further. However, if it is true that non-veterans are more likely to participate, that fact could very well have gone unnoticed. There are many more veterans than non-veterans in this age group, and it is this age group which is most likely

Table 15: Participation in Civil Defense for American adults of different levels of Education, December, 1941 and July, 1953.

Per cent of adults in each subgroup who reported they were participating or signed up for participation in civil defense

	AIPO 255 1941	AIPO 517 1953
Completed Elementary School or less*	9%**	5%
High School: Completed 9th-12th grades	19%	10%
Some college, including college graduates	30%	10%
Trade or business school training	29%	Not given
Total Number in Sample	(3096)	(1545)

* Data were coded into slightly different categories in these 2 surveys: in 1941, elementary education included persons completing the 7th grade; in 1953, elementary education included persons completing 8th grade.

** This cell should be read as follows: 9% of all respondents who completed 7th grade or less reported that they were participating or signed up to participate in civil defense.

Table 16: Participation in Civil Defense for American Adults in
different Occupations, December 1941, and July 1953.

Per cent of adults in each subgroup who re-
ported they were participating or signed up
for participation in civil defense.

	AIPO 255 1941	AIPO 517 1953		1941	1953
Own Occupation:					
Professionals	28%	12%	(All		
Proprietors and Managers	26%	10%	white collar)	25%	10%
Clerical & Sales	24%	9%			
Skilled and Semi-Skilled	16%	6%	(All blue		
Unskilled	4%	4%	collar)	13%	6%
Farmers	12%	6%			
Service workers	13%	14%			
Housewives	19%	6%			
Not employed	18%	6%			
Total Number in Sample	(3096)	(1545)			

Table 17A: Participation in Civil Defense for Veterans and
Non-Veterans, July 1953. (AIPO 517)

	Per cent of total in each Subgroup particpating or signed up for participation in Civil Defense:	Total Number in Subgroup
Veterans - W. W. I	10%	(79)
Veterans - W. W. II	11%	(255)
Non-veterans - Age 50 +	34%	(167)
Non-veterans - Age 30 - 49	48%	(168)
Non-veterans - Age 20 - 29	21%	(57)
Total	100%	(723)

to be participating actively in voluntary organizations. Thus, the greater tendency for non-veterans to participate could have been obscured in the flood of veterans. (Table 17B).

Thus, when we look at the popularity of an organization among the various subgroups of the American population, we do not necessarily gain an accurate picture of the organization itself. This is true because the various subgroups are not equally di ,- tributed in the American population. Another example is presented when we look at the composition of the civil defense organization in 1953. Here we see that although civil defense participation is slightly more popular among white collar workers than among blue collar workers (Table 16), the fact that there are more blue collar than white collar workers in the American population leads to a predominantly blue collar civil defense organization. (Table 19). This pattern represents a shift from 1941 to 1953. In 1941 CD participants held predominantly white collar jobs, but in 1953 there is a predominance of blue collar employees among participants.

Similarly, when we look at the educational attainment of the civil defense participants in these survey samples, we see that at both time periods the largest proportion are high school trained, following the characteristics of the American population generally. However, the composition of civil defense has changed in this respect, the proportion of CD participants with college training declining from 1941 to 1953. (Table 19).

In Table 18, which summarizes the composition of the civil defense volunteer group, we see that at both time periods the organization had a majority of men participating, but the proportion of women in the organization has increased by 1953. In addition,

Table 17B: Composition of Civil Defense - Veterans Status of CD
Participants only, July 1953. (AIPO 517)

	Per cent of all Civil Defense Participants who were:
World War I Veterans	12%
World War II Veterans	39%
Non-veterans - Age 50+	17%
Non-veterans - Age 30 - 49	23%
Non-veterans - Age 20 - 29	9%
Total Number of CD participants	(69)
	(100%)

Table 18:   The Composition of Civil Defense - Sex, Race,
            Age,   and City size characteristics of CD participants
            in December 1941 and July 1953.

Per cent of Civil Defense Participants Who Are:	AIPO 255 12/10/41	AIPO 517 July '53
Men	61%	54%
Women	39%	46%
White	98%	96%
Non-white	2%	4%
Age: under 30	22%	15%
30 - 39	25%	29%
40 - 49	26%	27%
50 - 59	16%	17%
60 +	11%	12%
Farm residents	10%	11%
Towns under 2500	21%	17%
Towns 2500 - 10,000	15%	11%
Cities: 10,000 - 100,000	23%	23%
Cities: 100,000 - 500,000	15%	5%
Cities: 500,000 +	16%	33%
Total N	(568)	(90)
Survey sample size	(3096)	(1545)

Table 19:   The Composition of Civil Defense - Educational and
            Occupational characteristics of CD participants in
            December 1941 and July 1953.

Per cent of all Civil Defense participants in each subgroup:	AIPO 255 12/10/41	AIPO 517 July '53
Completed 8th - 9th grade *	18%	23%
Completed 8th - 9th grade through High School graduate	45%	56%
Some College Training including College graduates	37%	21%
	(100%)	(100%)

Own occupation:

	AIPO 255		AIPO 517	
Professionals	9%	46% white collar	10%	34% white collar
Proprietors and Managers	16%		9%	
Clerical and Sales	21%		15%	
Skilled and Semi-Skilled	17%	30% blue collar	21%	42% blue collar
Unskilled	1%		3%	
Farmers	9%		8%	
Service workers	3%		10%	
Housewives	17%		22%	
Not employed	7%		2%	
	(100%)		(100%)	
Total Number of CD participants	(568)**		(90)**	

* Data were coded into slightly different categories in these 2 surveys: in 1941, elementary education included persons completing the 7th grade; in 1953, elementary education included persons completing 8th grade.

** AIPO 255 Total sample size = 3096

AIPO 517 Total sample size = 1545

the proportion of non-white participants has increased from 1941
to 1953. Again, participants are about equally divided between
the various age groups, with a somewhat smaller percentage of
persons over fifty.

That civil defense had become an urban blue collar movement
in 1953 is further shown when we examine the data on participation
by city size. Civil defense participants are most likely to come
from the largest cities in 1953, but in 1941 participants were
about equally likely to come from small towns as middle and large
sized cities. (Table 18). It is interesting to notice also that
while the proportion of large city participants increased sub-
stantially, the proportion of participants in the smaller towns
and cities was still sizeable. Thus, while the composition of
civil defense in 1953 was predominantly metropolitan, a smaller
city segment remained. The blue collar urban concentration in 1953
probably reflects the Ground Observer Corps membership at that time,
with major centers generally located in and around the larger cities.

Greater participation in civil defense in metropolitan areas
at this time is also shown in another national survey of March 1954.
That survey shows that persons who are best prepared, persons most
knowledgeable about civil defense, and persons most likely to be
participating in civil defense are residents of metropolitan
suburbs. Residents of the central city, smaller city and rural
people are least likely to be participating or to have knowledge
about civil defense. However, both rural and small town persons
were the most likely to feel that war was likely, and showed
greater willingness to participate in civil defense than other
persons.[45] It may be that the opportunity to participate in civil

defense was less available to small town and rural people at that time, due to the lack of local CD organizations or Ground Observer stations in those areas.

In 1963, it is difficult to assess the rural-urban composition of civil defense, but from the information available, it would seem to have retained its predominantly urban character. (Table 20). Whether civil defense volunteers have continued to be predominantly blue collar workers is impossible to determine since information on the personal characteristics of volunteers has not been obtained.

The possibility that civil defense has continued to be predominantly urban is puzzling in light of the evidence regarding favorable attitudes towards a shelter policy. Survey results show a shift in attitudes towards shelters in metropolitan areas over the 1956-1957 time period. In late 1956 (pre-Sputnik) one survey shows that metropolitan residents are more likely to favor shelters than small town and rural residents. At that time, persons in different occupational groups, at different education and income levels are about equally likely to favor shelters (percentages run about 75% favorable). After Sputnik, however, in a survey in November 1957, we see that residents of rural areas and smaller cities are substantially more likely to favor shelters than are residents of large metropolitan areas. Furthermore, persons at the lower educational levels are very much more likely to favor shelters than those with college training. The shift was a consequence of reduced favorableness towards shelters in metropolitan areas and among the college educated rather than an increase in the favorableness in rural areas and among those with less education. (Table 21).[46] Also, survey evidence from 1962 shows that lower

Table 20: Urbanism and Participation in Civil Defense: Evidence from a survey of State and Local Governments, 1962.

	1950 Population*	1962 Number of Nongovernmental persons holding Civil Defense Emergency Assignments	Rate of "volunteers" per 1,000 population
Larger local governments:			
Counties of 100,000 population or more	138,434,000	1,097,438	7.8
Townships and Municipalities of 25,000 population or more			
Smaller local governments:	122,914,000	777,273	6.3
Counties with less than 100,000 population			
Townships and municipalities of under 25,000 population			
Total	261,348,000	1,856,711	7.1

* From Statistical Abstract of the U. S., 1962, p. 412. Population by Township, Municipality and County Government units was not available for 1960. Since these rates are based on 1950 populations and a rural to urban shift continued during the 1950–1960 decade (see p. 21, Abstract), the urban rates shown here may overestimate the true urban rates if 1960 populations had been used.

Table 21: Favorable Attitudes Towards Shelter Building Before and After Sputnik: Evidence from two National Surveys, June 1956 and November 1957.[+]

Per cent Favoring a Shelter Policy in:

	1956	1957
Residents of		
Metropolitan areas	81%	57%
Large suburbs	73%	65%
Small suburbs	73%	55%
Cities 50,000 or more	72%	66%
Cities 2,500 - 50,000	75%	72%
Rural	73%	70%

	1956 Per Cent	1957 Ratios [**]
Elementary Education	77% [*]	15:1
High School	78% [*]	11:1
Some college	71%	7:1
College degree	69%	5:1

[+] Source: Survey Research Center, "Some Factors Influencing Public Reactions to Civil Defense in the United States," mimeographed, December 1956, pp. 11-14 in miscellaneous tables portion;

Survey Research Center, "Sputnik: Some Consequences, Expectations and Attitudes," mimeographed, January 1958, p. 14.

[*] Categories combined for comparability and per cents reconstructed by this author (RRW).

[**] Ratios of those favoring to those not favoring were reported for 1957.

socioeconomic level persons, rural persons and Southerners, Negroes
and women are the most likely to expect war and are the most favor-
able towards an expanded shelter program.[47] Further, these groups
tend to have the least information about world affairs and about the
nature of fallout, and they are likely to expect the effects of
attack to be greatest outside their own areas.[48] Thus, those most
favorable towards existing civil defense policy are unlikely to
regard civil defense participation as necessary, and probably more
importantly, they are the groups in the population who are least
likely to belong to voluntary organizations or to participate
actively in the community. On the other hand, those who are least
favorable towards a shelter policy; are those least likely to expect
war, but/to be directly affected if it occurs; and those who are
most informed are exactly those persons who are the greatest joiners
and the most socially active persons in the community--the most
highly educated, those with highest incomes, and men. It is hardly
surprising then that civil defense organizations encounter consid-
erable difficulty obtaining volunteers in the current climate of
opinion. The only groups who typically belong to voluntary organiza-
tions and are relatively favorable towards a shelter policy are
women and farmers, and we suggest that it is these groups who are
most likely to participate in CD in 1963.

We might suggest further that those persons who do volunteer
from these groups are likely to be either strongly threatened by
the cold war environment or to be motivated by a desire to advance
or change their community status. Since many of these persons have
low access to other community voluntary organizations which could
serve the same purposes, civil defense organizations in many com-

munities may present a new opportunity for status advancement to
those individuals who are otherwise blocked in attempting to raise
their community status.[49]

In contrast to patterns of voluntary organization participation
generally, participation in civil defense varies considerably by
region. It has always been highest on the Atlantic and Pacific
coasts and always lowest in the non-coastal Southern states.
Participation in the Mountain states was relatively high in 1941,
only moderately high in 1953 and relatively low compared with other
areas in 1961. Participation in the Midwest was low in 1941 com-
pared with other regions and has been intermediate in 1953 and 1961.
(Table 22).

These trends in CD participation by region are similar to the
trends in perception of threat by region.[50] In 1941, perception
of threat (that is, expectation that one's own community would be
bombed) was greatest on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and lowest
in the non-coastal Southern and Mid-western States. In 1953, per-
ception of threat was still greatest on the coasts and lowest in
the South. However, perception of threat in the Midwest was
relatively higher at this time. The only exceptions to these
parallel trends then, are the Mid-west and the South, where CD
participation does down, but perception of threat rises. Again,
the organization of the Ground Observer Corps and the concentration
of such units on the coasts may have resulted in decreased
opportunities for meaningful CD participation in the interior areas.

This general pattern in CD participation by region appears to
hold for 1963. Again, civil defense participation is highest on
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and lowest in the non-coastal South.
Participation is also low in the Mountain States in 1963. (Table 23)

Table 22: Regionalism, Participation in Civil Defense and Per-
ception of Threat: Evidence from two National samples,
December 1941 and July 1953.

Per cent of Adults from each subgroup who:

	Reported they were participating or signed up for participation in civil defense		Reported that their own community was likely to be bombed	
	AIPO 255 Dec. '41	AIPO 517 July '53	AIPO 255 Dec. '41	AIPO 517 July '53
Pacific Coast States	32%	7%	49%	42%
New England and Middle Atlantic Coast States	23%	12%	51%	41%
South Atlantic Coast States	28%	6%	39%	12%
Caribbean Coast States	15%	1%	28%	18%
Non-coastal Southern States	12%	1%	13%	20%
Mid-west and East Non-coast States	10%	7%	19%	32%
Mountain States	26%	8%	24%	17%
Total number in sample	(3096)	(1545)	(3096)	(1545)

Table 23A: Regionalsim and Participation in Civil Defense: Evidence from a survey of state and local governments, 1962.

	1960 * Population (in thousands)	1962 Number of persons holding Volunteer Civil Defense Emergency Assign- ments **	"Voluntarism" rate per 1,000 population
Regions:			
Pacific Coast	21,098	161,784	7.7
New England - Mid-Atlantic Coast	48,859	456,679	9.3
South Atlantic Coast	16,302	52,999	3.2
Caribbean Coast	97,745	22,613	4.3
Non-coastal South	10,848	23,301	2.1
Midwest and Eastern Non-coastal States	55,269	257,853	4.7
Mountain States	7,073	16,835	2.4
Total	182,062	1,067,196	5.9
(Hawaii)	633,000	12,234	19.33
(Alaska)	226,000	8	---

* Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962, U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 19.

** Source: DOD-OCD, Annual Statistical Report, FY 1962, p. 160.

Table 23B: Civil Defense Regions and Participation in CD: Evidence from a survey of state and local governments, 1962.

	1960 * Population (in thousands)	1962 Number of persons holding Volunteer Civil Defense Emergency Assign- ments **	"Voluntarism" rate per 1,000 population
Civil Defense Region 1	33,358	286,958	8.6
2	34,201	284,713	8.3
3	24,846	70,302	2.8
4	29,932	121,263	4.1
5	17,902	86,329	4.8
6	14,065	49,211	3.5
7	18,828	153,493	8.15
8	6,190	27,169	4.4
Total	179,322	1,079,438	6.0

* Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962, U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 19.

** Source: DOD-OCD, Annual Statistical Report FY 1962, p. 160.

Unfortunately, comparable information on perception of threat by region is not available for 1963.[51]

In view of the comparability of these regional trends in CD participation and perception of threat, it seemed reasonable to expect that individuals participating in civil defense would be considerably more likely to believe their communities will be attacked. This tendency to believe their own community will be attacked is in fact greater among CD participants than among non-participants, and the relationship is more marked in 1941 than it is in 1953. (Table 24). The difference between 1941 and 1953 is probably not surprising, and we suspect that it is a result of refocusing of civil defense goals in the postwar period. Thus, in 1941 CD participation in local communities was probably very closely related to a goal of protection against enemy attack, and more volunteers would be likely to expect attack. However, in the post-war period, a return to local emergency protection goals in local civil defense organizations is likely, and fewer volunteers would be expected to fear enemy attack.

Nevertheless, the lack of a more striking relationship at both time periods is somewhat puzzling. One possible explanation can be drawn from our earlier discussion regarding individual motives in volunteering. As we indicated then, no direct correspondence between organizational goals and any individual's motives for join-ing can be assumed.[52] Thus, while overall CD voluntarism may be highest in areas where the perception of threat is high, and some individuals who volunteer may be motivated by feelings of threat (that is, by commitment to an organizational goal of protection from threat), other individuals may be motivated to volunteer by

Table 24: Percentage of CD participants and Non-participants who believe their own community will be attacked -- Evidence from two National Surveys in December 10, 1941 and July 1953.

	AIPO 255 1941	AIPO 517 1953
CD participants	43%	39%
Non-participants	30%	31%
Total number in sample	(3096)	(1545)

prior contact with the organization, by expectations that they will volunteer because of their job (in local government, for example), or by motives of status advancement, as we have suggested earlier.

Parenthetically, we might take note of an intriguing finding from the 1953 national survey. Civil defense participants at that time were somewhat more isolationist in their attitudes towards the establishing of an international police force than were non-participants. (Table 25). This finding for 1953 is consonant with Withey's 1962 finding that shelter-builders differ significantly from non-builders along certain value dimensions.[53] The nature of these differences in values between CD participants and other populations has not been studied up to this time, however. We will attempt to clarify these differences later in this report when data on the values of civil defense directors in three Midwestern states will be presented.

Table 25: Attitudes towards an International Police Force for
Civil Defense Participants and Non-participants,
July 1953.

Should U. S. join an international police force to help maintain world peace?	Per cent of all	
	CD participants	Non-participants
Yes	46%	56%
No	35%	29%
No opinion	19%	15%
Total N (1545)	(90)	(1455)

III.   On The Use of Volunteers And Voluntary Organizations

A.   INTRODUCTION

In the preceding sections, we have discussed the social conditions which create voluntary organizations and which promote individual voluntarism   examining data currently available on the extensiveness of that voluntarism.   In this section we will examine the voluntary organization as an organization in isolation, that is, apart from its social context.   Initially, we will look at the goals of voluntary organizations, then at their typical structure. We will conclude with an examination of certain voluntary organizations of particular interest to civil defense.

Earlier, when we touched upon the subject of voluntary organization goals, we distinguished between several types of voluntary organizations -- those whose goals were directed towards serving the interests of the members themselves, including special interest organizations and organizations with sociability and expressive goals, and those organizations whose goals are directed towards serving interests outside the self interest of the members, such as social welfare and social reform goals.   Typically, in American society today, voluntary organizations state specific and limited goals.   For example, community service, elimination of a disease, racial integration.   These goals are, for most voluntary organizations, continuing goals requiring sustained activity.   However, some voluntary organizations require only sporadic or ephemeral activity; for example, fund-raising activity.

In "keeping their eye on the ball," that is, in keeping organizational activity focussed upon organization goals, voluntary organizations may differ from other organizations.   David Sills

suggests, for example, that voluntary organizations are character-
ized by a higher level of commitment to the ultimate goals of the
organization than are other organizations, such as business organ-
izations. Thus, although volunteer members may differ in their
rankings of priorities among goals, it is rare that commitment to
goals is lacking. Organizations which are non-voluntary, that is
organizations where workers are paid, are on the other hand
characterized by much lower levels of commitment to final goals,
especially at the lower ranks. In fact, a number of theorists
suggest that most non-voluntary organizations demonstrate a
tendency for procedures and means to become ends in themselves.
In this case, the job and its tasks take center stage and their
raison d'etre is forgotten. This process, well-known in comic
literature, has been termed the "organizational paradox" by
Philip Selznick.[1]

It is because of this lack of commitment to final goals in
non-voluntary organizations that written rules and procedures
tend to develop, in order that some reliable level of task ful-
fillment eventuates. The voluntary organization, on the other
hand, is in many cases victimized by the high level of commit-
ment among its workers. The "pet project" volunteer, the volunteer
with excessive enthusiasm, and the volunteer with no skills but
much interest constitute perrennial problems to voluntary organiza-
tions. In other words, volunteers as workers tend to have limited
interest in their tasks, but relatively unlimited enthusiasm for
organizational goals. Frequently, therefore, all tasks must be
specifically justified in terms of their relationship to ultimate
goals. More important, when interest in the goals wanes or when

the goals are seen to be achieved, the volunteers disappear and the organization begins to dissolve.

For example, Sills points out that after a polio vaccine was developed, the tendency would be for volunteers to disappear from the National Foundation (for Infantile Paralysis).[2] Logically, they regarded the job as done and their participation no longer required. Refocussing a voluntary organization towards other related goals is a difficult task, and frequently is not attempted at all.[3]

The problem of the volunteer civil defense organization after World War II probably represents just that situation. Volunteers regarded the job as done when the war was over, and expected the organization to dissolve. Apparently, no explicit attempt to refocus the organization was made, and it was, on a Federal level, dissolved by Presidential order. At the onset of the Korean War, the voluntary Ground Observer Corps reached its height, but with the development of radar techniques, it too was dissolved. Again, no explicit attempt to refocus organizational goals was apparently made, and volunteer activity seemed unnecessary to the attainment of those goals which were stated - namely, the protection against enemy attack. The military, in the public mind, had that under control.[4]

As we have seen from the experience of voluntary organizations generally, it was unlikely that volunteers could be retained in the absence of a statement of compelling new goals. Currently, the statement of civilian protection against nuclear attack probably represents a goal for many volunteer directors. But the attractiveness of that goal, and the necessity of volunteer

activity to achieve it, has been seriously questioned in the mass
media and elsewhere. Many directors in fact show greater commit-
ment to a goal of protection against natural disaster, although
that goal has not been specified as a Federal civil defense goal
until recently.[5] In part, the failure of civil defense as a
voluntary organization recently might very well be traced to this
lack of restatement of a compelling goal. As many organizations
have discovered, no compelling goal, no volunteers.

Up to this point, in discussing organizational goals, we
have tabled the question of organizational structure. But we
hardly need to point out that there are many different ways of
using volunteers. To begin with, we should distinguish between
the use of volunteers as decision-makers in an organization and
volunteers as rank and file. In any particular organization, of
course, volunteers may be used in one or both capacities or in
neither capacity. Depending upon the manner in which they are
used, the character of the organization will be radically changed.[6]

In an organization where volunteers are decision-makers,
ultimate authority usually resides with the rank and file member.
Organization officials are usually elected, elections are fairly
frequent and at regular intervals, and any official position is
rotated among as many members as possible. This type of organiza-
tion structure is usually termed a federation structure, and most
voluntary organizations have this structure. Since authority
resides in the rank and file, it is also termed the "democratic
organization," and participation in formulation and realization
of policy is theoretically open to the total membership. The
fundamental instrument of decision-making is by vote, including

voting to delegate decision-making responsibility to particular officials. In national organizations with a federation-type structure, local autonomy is the principle, and the flow of power stems from the local groups to the central coordinating body.[7]

In studying the National Foundation, Sills found that the corporate (authoritarian) structure was essential for the efficient conduct of the Foundation program, but volunteers expected the organization to have a federation-type structure and the majority perceived it to have that structure even when it did not. Sills felt that continuing volunteer interest and participation was based, at least in part, upon that misperception.[8]

One of the explanations given for continuing interest in the Red Cross in the Post World War II period, despite the aura of controversy which surrounded it, was the restructuring of the national organization to give greater autonomy and decision-making authority to local units. Thus, although the Red Cross had previously been directed by a fairly closed group of volunteers on the national level, it was restructured in the direction of a federated structure when greater commitment to the organization by its volunteers and by the public was required to assure organizational survival.[9]

The typical expectation of the voluntary organization then is that it have volunteers as decision-makers; and that it therefore have a federated structure in which authority resides in the rank and file and is delegated upwards to its officials, who are usually elected.

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The typical expectation of the voluntary organization then is that it have volunteers as decision-makers; and that it therefore have a federated structure in which authority resides in the rank and file and is delegated upwards to its officials, who are usually elected.

On the other hand, in the corporate or bureaucratic structure, authority resides in the decision-makers, and participating in decision-making among the rank and file is not expected. This isolation from decision-making responsibility creates and fosters the lack of commitment to organization goals, as we have noted. It is unusual in corporate or bureaucratic structures that volunteers are used. However, the case in which they are used is of particular interest to us here. Volunteers in government, as administrative rank and file, has periodically occurred, especially in times of threat and where especially onerous programs were involved. That is, even within usually corporate or bureaucratic structures, volunteers tend to be used when high levels of commitment to program goals is required. Some of these uses of volunteers we will examine later in this report -- volunteers in the Office of Price Administration on Selective Service Draft Boards, in the administration of the Tennessee Valley Authority, and in the administration of Agricultural Extension programs.

At this point we should note that there are some very real limits to voluntary participation in any type of organization. As Bernard Barber points out in his discussion of "mass apathy" in voluntary organizations, there is a socially structured pull away from participation even in voluntary organizations relevant to an individual's interests. The pull results from the social definition of voluntary activities as of less importance than family and job obligations. Voluntary participation is therefore limited to the time left over from these central preoccupations in our society.[10]

Even in organizations with a federation structure, where
volunteers are decision-makers and high levels of commitment to
organization goals are typical, organizational activity usually
takes second place when a conflict with family and job interests
occurs. Even in these organizations, the archtypical voluntary
organization, the number of participating and committed volunteers
is far less than the number of members. In part, as Lipset points
out, the democratic voluntary organization rests on a myth of
high membership interest and activity,[11] Selznick describes the
typical voluntary organization in the following fashion:

> "Most voluntary associations are skeletal in
> the sense that they are manned by a small core
> of individuals -- the administration, the local
> sub-leaders, a few faithful meeting-goers --
> around whom there fluctuates a loosely bound
> mass of dues-payers. This type of membership
> has, on the whole, only a very limited relation-
> ship to the organization; its agreement with it
> may be of the vaguest sort; it may give little
> or no time to the organization nor be guided
> by its pronouncement save, as in unions and pro-
> fessional groups, on very narrow issues; in
> short, the power implications of membership are
> minimal."[12]

Instead, most voluntary organizations demonstrate the "iron
law of oligarchy" stated by the German sociologist Robert Michels
in 1911.[13] In Lipset's discussion of how unions run themselves,
he indicates that much has been written about oligarchy and
voluntary organizations since that time, and almost invariably
these writings have documented the operation of the "iron law"
in another set of circumstances. He says, "they have shown how
control of the organizational machinery, combined with membership
passivity, operates to perpetuate oligarchic control. From these
studies it is clear that unions and other voluntary organizations

more closely resemble one-party states in their internal organization than they do democratic societies with organized legitimate opposition and turnover in office.[14] Barber makes the same point in discussing a number of other organizations.

> "In the 'service clubs,' for example, there
> is a very active nucleus and a large group
> who are "just members." ...The American
> Legion was founded in 1919 by a small group
> and it is run by a self-perpetuating oligarchy
> ...Goldhamer summarized the situation for
> fraternal organizations as follows: "Though
> fraternal organizations are subject to
> democratic control, it appears that the
> actual formulation of policy...is largely
> the function of a few interested individuals
> with a great bulk of the membership acquiesc-
> ing so long as these policies do not inter-
> fere with their private lives." The Consumer
> Cooperative movement, which stresses equal
> and active participation by all·members more
> than most other associations do, is no ex-
> ception to the active minority pattern...
> Even in avowedly activist organizations,
> there is minimal participation...In the most
> powerful and deeply rooted People's Organiza-
> tions known in this country the degree of
> popular participation reached a point varying
> between five and seven per cent."[15]

With this as our preface, let us turn to the experience of certain organizations which have used volunteers. We will begin with social welfare organizations which have been most notable in this respect, using volunteers both as decision-makers and as rank and file. For this description and evaluation, we will rely heavily upon a discussion by Daniel Thursz which is directly to the point.

We will then review the experience of certain governmental agencies in using volunteers, relying upon the somewhat sketchy descriptions available. In the case of greatest interest, that of Civil Defense in World War II, no descriptions are available in the literature. Fortunately, some documentation of the OPA use of volunteers exists, and we will rely upon that.

B. VOLUNTARISM AND SOCIAL WELFARE 16

During the early nineteenth century in America, social welfare
agencies were established by volunteers, primarily along religious
sectarian lines, using a minimum of paid staff. In less than a
hundred years, by the end of World War I, the volunteer was virtually
eliminated from the more significant tasks in social work, and many
agencies wanted professionally trained workers only. What happened
in the interim?

The Civil War greatly enlarged the ranks of volunteers, and
it also gave impetus to the development of paid workers as an
essential ingredient in the effective administration of social
welfare activities. During the Civil War, the U. S. Sanitary
Commission was organized on a national quasi-governmental basis
to serve the needs of servicemen. The Commission used a large
paid staff supported by voluntary contributions. This was the
first organization to adopt and publicly defend the position that
"for the sake of efficient operation and hard work."[17] However,
there were those who felt that the Commission had proved the con-
trary, and it was as a result of the Civil War experience and the
work of this Commission that the first Red Cross society was
organized in this country in August of 1864. From that time to the
present, the Red Cross has held as a basic principle that "the use
of volunteers is essential for the carrying out of the nationwide
Red Cross program of service to the people."[18]

But the Red Cross was an exception to the general trend,
By the time of the industrial depression following the Civil War,
most social welfare organizations had ceased to use voluntary

service to any large degree. The main complaints about volunteer
workers revolved around their unreliability in fulfilling assigned
responsibilities and their lack of adequate training for their
jobs. These complaints led to the realization of the need for
training volunteers, and had resulted by the turn of the century
in the organization of formal methods of volunteer training. But
compared with earlier times, fewer volunteers were used, not only
because the volunteers were limited, but also because professionals
lacked faith in voluntary service and were therefore unwilling to
train and supervise volunteers.

Probably a more important reason for the diminishing use of
volunteers was the accelerating industrial revolution in the
United States. This was accompanied by rapid social changes and
severe fluctuations in the business cycle, so that it became
necessary to devise new methods for dealing with the new problems.
There was need for better control of charitable activities, for
new methods of social welfare in the increasingly industrial
society, for greater efficiency and reliability in administration:
in short, a need for the "professional" approach. Helping the
poor had become a serious business, not merely the "plaything"
of the philanthropist in search of status, prestige and power.
At this time, a new role for volunteers was shaped, in which the
volunteer no longer held primary task responsibility, but instead
subjected himself to professional discipline, authority, and
control.

During World War I, volunteers were again accepted into
social agencies in large numbers in order to meet the unusual
demands of war. Social welfare became "everybody's business,"
and almost the entire community became involved in providing the

necessary manpower to do the job. For the first time, social work was more than a paid professional or an upper class volunteer activity, and volunteers were increasingly drawn from the middle classes. However, at the end of the war, the army of volunteers disbanded, and professionals took up their struggle for higher standards and a greater acceptance of the concept of social work as a professional responsibility. Those who were interested in retaining the volunteer social worker recommended partnership between the professional and the volunteer, and advocated more elaborate volunteer training for the job. But social workers felt the volunteer was a threat to the profession and to their own professional status.[19]

The movement to retain volunteers in social work was spearheaded by the Junior League, and resulted in the organization of community Volunteer Bureaus which recruit volunteers, prepare training programs for them, and plan for their use in social agencies. However, it was not until the depression of the 1930's that social work agencies again began to use large numbers of volunteers. At this time, as in wartime professional social work personnel were too few in number to handle the emergency welfare tasks; but even then, emphasis was on careful selection and training of those volunteers who were accepted. In addition, the use of volunteers as interpreters of the program to the general public came to be recognized.

In 1932, a major step was taken in the establishment of the National Committee on Volunteers in Social Work. One of the committees main goals was the development of central bureaus for recruiting and placing volunteers. By 1938, twenty six such

bureaus were in existence throughout the United States. A number of national organizations established volunteer work as one of the major criteria for membership. Again, foremost among these was the Association of Junior Leagues of America, which prepared its members for volunteer work by making a prerequisite for activity in the group a systematic course of lectures, discussions and field trips.

These days of uneasy partnership between the professional and the volunteer were followed by a reconciliation. The Second World War again swelled the ranks of volunteers tremendously, and they were accepted into social agencies (as well as into government) with considerable enthusiasm. As David Haynes wrote in 1943," ...as social needs are expanding, the social agency no longer thinks of the volunteer as merely supplementing the efforts of the professional worker, but recognizes that trained and suitably placed volunteers are meeting a real community need. This has been illustrated by the increased willingness of agencies to give training and the volunteers' desire to prepare themselves for community service."[20]

The Civil Defense Administration established thousands of Civilian Defense Volunteer Offices which in some cases replaced the previously established Volunteer Bureaus. Prior to the war there had been 86 Volunteer Bureaus in the U.S., but in December 1943, there were 4300 civilian defense volunteer offices with about eleven million volunteers on the rolls.[21]

An attempt was made to avoid the pattern of World War I, when the volunteers were disbanded immediately after the war. The Community Chests and Councils and the Associations of Junior

Leagues jointly sponsored a study of post-war plans and possibilities for the continuance of local centralized services for recruiting, placing and training volunteers. The Advisory Committee on Volunteer Service within the Community Chest played an important part in the effort to retain the gains made during the war years. The committee even attempted to enlarge the concept of volunteer service at this time to include the total needs of the community rather than those of social and health agencies only. But the controversy over volunteer versus professional continued to rage.[22]

In any event, the committee was not able to find sufficient support and financial backing in local communities to maintain the thousands of offices that had been organized under the Civilian Defense Administration during the war.[23] And again a rapid drop in volunteer participation occurred in the post-war period, as evidenced by a concern with "mass apathy" among social scientists and in the press.[24] For perhaps the first time, social welfare organizations wanted more volunteers than they could find. In part, the expansion of social welfare tasks and the persistent shortage of trained workers led to more organizations experimenting with volunteers and seeking volunteers to fill these jobs. Volunteers even came to be used as supervisors and trainers of other volunteers.[25]

Again during the Korean War period, a Volunteer Manpower Office was established in the new Federal Civil Defense Administration, but the concept of "civil defense" was considerably narrower than in World War II, and excluded community services seen in World War II as morale building--for example, health, recreation and public works activities which brought civil defense directly

into social welfare voluntarism. The Volunteer Manpower Office had a brief life of about eighteen months, and was abolished in a re-organization of FCDA at the close of the Korean War in May 1953. FCDA also encountered difficulty in recruiting enough volunteers. The need was estimated at 17.5 million volunteers (12 out of every 100 persons), and the total number recruited was only approximately 4 million.[26]

Today, the National Association of Volunteer Bureaus, with about 86 volunteer bureaus, serves to promote citizen participation in service organizations in these communities; acts as a clearing house for requests for volunteers, and recruits, interviews and refers volunteers to agencies; consults with agencies and organizations regarding their use of volunteers; and serves to exchange information between the various volunteer bureaus in the country. The professional staff service for the National Association of Volunteer Bureaus is provided by the United Community Funds and Councils. Currently, more emphasis is being given to recruitment techniques, more effective training methods and on-the-job supervision in an effort to attract more volunteers and to hold them longer. More agencies are writing job descriptions for volunteers, setting job requirements in terms of time, training and experience, and informing volunteers frankly and clearly what they may expect in terms of supervision, training, evaluation and promotion or other recognition of their work.[27]

In addition, a new kind of volunteer participation has emerged. This participation is directed towards international rather than national and community service goals, and includes participation in the International Health and Welfare Agencies (many organized

through the United Nations), participation in the American
Association for the United Nations, and more recently, Peace
Corps volunteer participation.

Regarding the future of voluntarism in community and national
social welfare agencies, Eugene Shenefield notes a growing short-
age of volunteer workers, and predicts that agencies and volunteer
bureaus will continue to expand recruitment efforts, especially
into the college age group and the post-retirement age group.
Philip Hauser predicted a future shortage of volunteers in 1958,
stating that the increase in case loads and health and welfare
problems will continue, so that the total level of services must
expand between 33% and 75% in order to accommodate the increase
in population within the next 25 years. In addition, Professor
Hauser noted that between 1955 and 1975 volunteers will have
decreased approximately 20% (if present trends continue) because
there will be a percentage decrease in the number of persons
between the ages of 25 and 65.[28]

Nathan Cohen expects that the ranks of volunteer will be
further thinned by the changing distribution of leisure time in
this country, such that middle-class persons who are most likely
to volunteer will have less leisure time, and lower-class persons
who are unlikely to volunteer will have more leisure time. Further,
increasing professionalism among middle class persons leads many
to feel that their contribution to the community is being made in
their full-time professional employment. The large corps of
women volunteers is likely to be reduced by the growing tendency
for married middle-class women to seek full-time employment after
their children are in school. He sees hope for voluntarism in

the possibility that higher educational levels and more leisure
time among young people and working class people will channel them
increasingly into volunteer participation.[29] We might add that
it is among young people that voluntarism for international, rather
than community, service has attained its widest popularity.

We have seen from social work experience with volunteers
that enthusiasm for their use has varied with the status of the
profession, reaching its nadir after the First World War, as the
profession sought to establish its standards for admission and
its legitimacy in reserving social welfare tasks to its members.[30]
Times of crisis intervened to increase the work load radically and
to increase the corps of volunteers as well, resulting in a massive
integration of volunteers into these organizations. At the present
time, with the profession established and recognized, the shortage
of professional workers has resulted in increased efforts to
recruit and hold volunteers, but difficulties in filling the gap
with volunteers are multiplying.

It is important to note that there are intrinsic difficulties
in using volunteers in social welfare organizations and elsewhere.
Social welfare organizations are, after all, formal organizations,
composed of carefully defined positions arranged in a clear
pattern of hierarchical authority, and each office has assigned
to it certain tasks, including those of supervision of subordinates.
When an incumbent of a position is absent from the job, inadequate-
ly trained to do his job, or unwilling to perform his job in the
manner expected by his supervisors, the organization is seriously
disrupted. Volunteers have all of these shortcomings, from the
viewpoint of social work organizations and the professional social

work executives who run them, and steps have been taken to try to correct these shortcomings while retaining volunteer workers. As Bernard Barber explains:[31]

"Executives of organizations require trained, reliable, disciplined and responsible subordinates. On the whole, volunteers are less suitable in these respects than paid employees. At least so far as large groups of workers are concerned, money income is the most effective incentive for securing the regular efforts of workers in American society. This is not because Americans are mercenary, but simply because...a paid job is terribly important as the primary determinant of the social status and livelihood of each individual and his family. When a worker is paid, his job takes precedence over other obligations. But when a middle-class woman takes a volunteer position, that job at best is always competing with her other obligations. It cannot, in the nature of the case, be as important to her as a job is to a paid worker. Hence, it is inevitable that the other obligations of the volunteer will often win out and cause disrupting absences and irregularities in organizations using volunteers. Chester I. Barnard, formerly President of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company and now President of the Rockefeller Foundation has commented on this inferiority of volunteers in formal organizations:

'After much experience, I am convinced that the most ineffective services in a continuing effort are in one sense those of volunteers, or semi-volunteers; for example, half-pay workers. What appears to be inexpensive is in fact very expensive, because non-material incentives—such as prestige, toleration of too great personal interest in the work with its accompanying fads and "pet" projects, the yielding to exaggerated conceptions of individual importance—are causes of internal friction and many other undesirable consequences.'[32]

...The volunteers' job in a formal organization is, in important respects like any paid job, requiring definitely scheduled contributions of work and the ready performance of tasks assigned by superiors regardless of the personal preferences of the individual volunteer. Yet it is apparently difficult to be guaranteed such performance by volunteers, witness the following injunctions to them contained in a pamphlet issued by the Volunteer Bureau of Greater Hartford:

'Be dependable, come when you say you will and be on time. Be loyal, take constructive criticism to an agency superior rather than the outside world.

Respect the policies, standards, rules and personnel practices of the agency. Be willing to accept supervision.'"

Barber also notes that volunteer specialists and a rationalized
technology for using volunteers in social welfare have developed.
The major principles, as he summarized them, are:[33]

1. Not everyone who volunteers can be accepted. Many
    may not have the necessary skills for the volunteer
    jobs available, or they may not readily be trained
    to acquire these skills.

2. Careful placement is essential. The first contact
    should determine which job in the organization the
    volunteer can fill, and the volunteer should be
    given knowledge about the agency, its staff and
    their duties, its rules and regulations, policies,
    standards, facilities and any training courses
    conducted by the agency.

3. Both pre-service and in-service training are
    desirable, with considerable training on the job
    under careful supervision preferred. Extensive
    pre-service training programs discourage volunteers,
    and many drop out of the program. Also, since the
    volunteer is free to leave at any time, even if he
    is a trained and presumably satisfied member of the
    organization, professionals are advised to have
    periodic contact with the volunteer to see that he
    is getting the job satisfaction he desires. Volun-
    teers must feel that their work is worth doing.
    (Notice that these procedures for personnel recruit-
    ment, training and supervision are quite different
    and more time-consuming than those customarily used
    in American industry.)

4. <u>In acknowledgment of the special motivation of the</u>
   <u>volunteer, it is necessary to reward him with some</u>
   <u>standardized symbol of his type and length of ser-</u>
   <u>vice</u>. It is recommended that these rewards be dis-
   tributed at community recognition ceremonies, with
   the participation of public officials, leading
   citizens and impressive speakers.[34]

Even in an "ideal" volunteer program, however, professional
workers and volunteers may come into conflict. "For the pro-
fessional, his place in the organization is essentially a 'job,'
with established routines, patterned hierarchical relationships,
problems of security and a career, and definite, limited goals.
He is likely to have vested interests of emotion and values in
the organization itself and in its effective functioning. The
volunteer, however, because she is motivated by enthusiasm for
the final goals of the organization, may be impatient with the
needs of the organization itself and of its full-time, regular
professional employees."[35]

In closing, we might summarize the advantages and dis-
advantages of using volunteers <u>as organizational rank and file</u>,
which we have suggested in our discussion of their use in social
welfare organizations.

The advantages are:

1. Using volunteers supports political democracy by
   broadening the base of participation and involving
   the rank and file citizen in programs designed for
   his benefit.[36]

2. Where shortages of funds or trained personnel exist, volunteers can fill the gap so that programs do not have to be cut back.

3. Carefully selected, trained and well-supervised volunteers frequently do as good a job as paid workers.

4. When an organization's program expands radically, volunteers can step in temporarily to do the work. (Social welfare tasks in the depression and civil defense tasks in wartime are examples.)

5. Volunteers can serve as a channel of interpretation and support for the program to the general public.[37] This role is especially important where onerous or controversial programs are involved.

The disadvantages are:

1. Volunteers generally have high enthusiasm for the final goals of the organization and little patience with the day to day activities which are necessary in reaching the goals.

2. Volunteers cannot be held to standards of job performance as paid workers can. They cannot be fired.

3. Volunteers cannot be controlled by organizational superiors easily. They frequently prefer their own "pet projects" to the tasks which the superiors feel need doing.

4. Volunteer activity generally takes a back seat to job and family obligations. Thus, the volunteer is subject to high turnover rates.[38]

5. Greater time must be taken in selection of volunteers, fitting volunteers to jobs, training volunteers and supervising them than is typically necessary for the paid worker. For example, volunteers are frequently unskilled and require training to do their jobs.

6. Volunteers require some kind of reward and acknowledgement of service. Since they are not paid, these may be symbols of service or verbal praise, but they may also be less strict controls over job performance, yielding to special interests and concerns. The price of the latter may be very high in terms of loss of agency program effectiveness.

7. Volunteers may threaten the "professional" status aspirations of paid workers, resulting in conflict between the two classes of personnel.[39]

Volunteers are frequently found in social welfare and private organizations as members of governing bodies and boards of directors.[40] Organizations using volunteers in this capacity are usually staffed at least partially with paid professional workers. However, the use of volunteers in this capacity has not been controversial, and volunteers continued to serve on governing bodies throughout the controversy over professional versus volunteer rank and file workers. When volunteers are used as decision-makers, their advantages are:[41]

1. Volunteers are usually highly committed to the final goals of the organization and usually bring a fresh outlook to the decision-making table. They are generally free from the vested interests which

paid workers tend to have in the status quo, in current
organizational means and procedures. Thus, programs
and policies tend to respond more rapidly to currently
felt needs. (Since the raison d'existence of voluntary
organizations has frequently been the fulfillment of
needs unmet by existing social institutions, the
selection of a volunteer decision-making structure
seems appropriate.)

2. Using volunteers supports political democracy by
broadening the base of decision-making authority to
include representatives of the public for whom the
programs are intended.

3. Volunteers serve as channels of interpretation
of the program to the public. Volunteers who are
in leadership positions can serve as models of support
for the program. This role is especially important
where onerous or controversial programs are involved.

4. Volunteer board members frequently are major
contributors to the resources of the organization,
and involvement tends to increase their contribution.

The disadvantages are:

1. Volunteers who serve on boards must be very carefully
selected, since the future of the organization depends
upon their commitment to programs and final goals of the
organization. A particular board may radically change
and refocus the organization's purposes, and safeguards
against this possibility are frequently instituted. In

some cases, organizations have restricted the number of issues submitted to volunteer boards, delegating greater responsibility for decision-making to paid personnel. In addition, a continuing paid executive secretary is frequently hired, and he typically has considerable influence over the selection of board members and the decisions they make.

C. VOLUNTARISM AND GOVERNMENT

Introduction

The use of volunteers in private organizations is more common than the use of volunteers in government. Indeed, there is an assumption by many public agencies that the use of volunteers is inappropriate in providing public services. Nevertheless, some public agencies have used volunteers, especially in programs requiring widespread public support--military conscription programs, rationing and price control programs and civil defense in World War II, for example. These public agencies used volunteers partly because there was a sudden need for a large number of personnel to administer new programs--programs that could not wait for the customary hiring and training practices. Also, a labor shortage was created by the extensive military and production demands of wartime, making the hiring of such a large number of persons difficult, and the cost of hiring them in so competitive a labor market exorbitant. The policy of using volunteers was, in addition, a deliberate attempt to insure greater public support for programs requiring great citizen sacrifice and a considerable increase in government intervention into private activities.

The use of volunteers in government has been somewhat different from their use in private organizations. Private organizations use volunteers as rank and file personnel in carrying out the tasks of the organizations; and especially in social welfare this use of volunteers has been controversial, the number of volunteers rising and falling as the intensity of the professional-volunteer controversy waxes and wanes. Private organizations also use volunteers as decision-makers, on governing bodies and boards of directors. This use of volunteers has been far less controversial and has been relatively constant in these same organizations. In government, on the other hand, decision-making is the prerogative of elected officials, or of paid professional personnel who are responsible to elected officials, and volunteer participation has been rank and file participation. Where volunteers have entered the decision-making sphere at all, they have tended to do so in an advisory or administrative capacity. In those cases where volunteer participation has originally been conceived as decision-making in nature, there is a tendency for the sphere of that decision-making to narrow and for these volunteers to become administrative arms of a higher decision-making body.

OPA and OCD

The World War II Office of Price Administration program and the Office of Civilian Defense program were examples of government use of volunteers both as rank and file workers and as local administrators of a Federal program. The OPA case has been well-documented, and is also the only case where the agency has gone on record as using volunteers in order to gain greater public

acceptance.[42] In OPA, a large number of volunteers were used on
local administrative boards. Initially, the boards were composed
of local professional and business personnel, but in order to
broaden the base of public acceptance, they were eventually
"democratized" to include representatives from labor leadership,
Negro leadership and leaders from other social and ethnic
minorities.[43] Here, leading citizens from all segments of the
population were used as models of support for the program. Al-
though receiving no pay, these board members were sworn employees
of the Federal Government with fairly broad adjudicative and en-
forcement functions on the local level.

In addition, volunteers were used in OPA as rank and file
workers--as community service volunteers, as information and
education specialists for publicity purposes, as regular full-
time or part-time clerical workers (assisting paid clerical
workers who acted as supervisors), and as peak-load volunteers
during the distribution of ration books to the country. These
latter volunteers were largely school teachers and PTA members,
recruited through the schools.

Perhaps no other program of voluntarism in government,
besides the civil defense program, has used so large a corps of
voluntary workers. Volunteers in OPA were over 75% of the total
staff, and as of August 1945, 275,000 volunteers worked for OPA.[44]

During the early years of the war, volunteers were recruited
and placed in OPA by the Office of Civilian Defense which had the
"right of approval" over volunteer programs. However, OCD had
only an advisory relationship with its 900 councils of defense,
and state and local OCD offices sometimes failed to provide

volunteers to OPA when requested, especially for price control work. OCD objected to the lack of supervision of OPA volunteers and the early OPA failure to keep volunteer records. According to an agreement between the agencies, all volunteers, from whatever source, were to be registered with OCD, and after fifty hours of service they were to be accepted into the U. S. Service Corps. Also, in the early years, volunteer supervisors were provided by OCD. Later, OPA recruited its own volunteers, used its own volunteer specialists and developed its own volunteer awards.[45]

Putnam summarizes the OPA experience with volunteers:

"...Not until the installation of volunteer specialists did OPA formulate nationally the most elementary precepts for personnel work with people who are giving their services to a cause: (1) volunteer records must be kept as scrupulously as those of paid personnel; the time given must seem important both to the agency and the volunteer; (2) the volunteer's possible limitations on available hours must be respected and discounted in plans for performance; (3) since the volunteer comes to the program through interest, a definite effort must be made to sustain that interest; generally speaking, training is his minimum wage, and (4) the volunteer must be given public recognition for work well done.

" A few of the lessons to be learned from OPA experience apply specifically to volunteers but the majority of them apply to paid as well as volunteer personnel in any decentralized operation. With this in mind certain generalizations and warnings may be stated. First, in the administration of a central policy through a widespread local system, communication becomes a matter of paramount importance. Instructions must arrive on time. They must be simple and definite. They should be easily available to all personnel. Contacts must be frequent. Training must be continuous to provide for changes in program and changes of personnel. Training material must be adapted to the experience of the people receiving it. Above all the reasons behind the instructions must be carefully given. They must be clear and convincing to the people far removed from the source of authority. Second, performance must be constantly reviewed to prevent the establishment of incorrect patterns and

reporting systems must be adequate to allow for realistic
evaluation of performance. Third, in operations as tech-
nical and as varied as those of rationing and price con-
trol both administrative and technical supervision are
necessary. OPA experience would seem to prove that while
administrative supervision may be given successfully on
an over-all board basis, excellence of program performance
depends upon technical supervision and motivation routed
in a direct line from the central office. Multiple super-
vision of board activities was one of the administrative
problems never fully solved by OPA. And lastly, central
office authority should recognize that local conditions
vary. Whenever possible regulations should be drawn to
allow for discretion, well defined and limited, but still
discretion, on the part of the local administrator, paid
or volunteer.

"The final conclusion to be drawn from OPA's experience
in volunteer local board administration cannot be expressed
in terms of administrative lessons, nor even in an ap-
praisal of program achievements and failures. It lies
rather in the recognition that the democratic urge toward
participation in the processes of government is still
strong in the American people. In any national emergency
they can be counted on to contribute "their common effort
for our common good;" more than that, they must be reckon-
ed with. Under OPA they volunteered for a national emer-
gency and they stayed on the job as long as they were
persuaded of national need. They shaped what they found.
They stayed through the hard hours and the dull hours for
four long gruelling years. Their dollar contribution
based on the lowest clerk salary scale, runs in to millions.
Their contribution to the processes of democratic admin-
istration of Federal policy can scarcely be over-esti-
mated."[46]

During the time the OPA program was operating, there was a

tendency for the grass roots offices to become increasingly

"federalized." Local boards were originally established in 1941,

at least one to every county, under a State Rationing Administrator,

who reported to Washington. Regional and field offices were

separately established to administer the price control program.

When price control was extended to include almost all consumer

commodities and services, the decision was made to use these

existing boards for both tasks. The local boards were redesignated

War Price and Rationing Boards and OPA assumed responsibility for

their support and supervision. At this time, State offices were also "federalized" with State Directors usually reappointed by OPA to serve as heads of OPA State offices and any district offices within the State. Initially, local offices retained considerable autonomy and were difficult to control. As a result, the Federal office established program guides and reporting systems to evaluate local board performance, and these performance standings were generally distributed among the boards to encourage greater conformity to Federal expectations. Thus, the tendency was for local units to become increasingly subject to Federal authority and for district and regional offices to limit their own authority and autonomy, relying upon Federal decision-making and direction.[47]

The Selective Service System

A similar tendency apparently characterized local Draft Boards in World War II, who were also administering a program requiring a high level of citizen sacrifice. The program of military conscription under the Selective Service System, was administered in local communities by Draft Boards composed entirely of volunteer members. Regarding this program, Stewart says:

> "At the beginning of the period of operation of the System the Local Boards represented their communities in the structure of the System; at the end of the period of war-time operation the Local Boards represented the Selective Service System in their communities. The Local Boards...were as essential part of an integrated hierarchical structure. They were, at this time, the agents of the federal authority...

> "This change was accomplished, in large part, by the multiplication and particularization of regulation and by increased and more rigid supervision of the Local Boards by the (Federal) administrators. The general technique was the gradual elimination, so far as possible, of the opportunities for classification on a 'sentimental' or 'non-rational' basis...[48]

" ...As the number of inductions increased and,
particularly, as the purpose of induction changed
from conscription for peacetime military training
to conscription for military combat, the volume
and intensity of pressures increased. The central-
ization of control of the System provided an escape
from such pressures for the Local Boards. Local
Board action came to be based not on an ambiguously
defined local autonomy, but on a well-defined set
of regulations implemented by careful supervision.
...Centralization of control was more efficient in
that it was a more favorable condition for the
eliciting of the cooperation of the Local Board
members."[49]

Thus, on the local level, in Draft Boards as well as in OPA

Boards, the tendency was for the system to become increasingly

"federalized," with Federal offices requiring uniform administration

and instituting procedures to that end. Volunteer board members

came to limit their decision-making autonomy and to see themselves

as local administrators of a Federal program. The tendency was

to bow to Federal direction and to de-emphasize local autonomy,

where such autonomy existed.

In both the Selective Service System and OPA, the Federal

policy was to maintain the fiction of local autonomy, and the

methods of control over local boards were always informal and

indirect.[50, 51] It is probable that Federal timidity in exerting

authority rested upon the history of resistance to Federal direction

in peacetime, and upon the conflict of strong Federal power with

the principle of grass roots democracy, which decentralized

administration was supposed to represent.

Of course, increasing local reliance upon Federal authority

relieved local boards of criticism, and references to a Federal

policy indicated impartiality and equality of treatment for all

citizens. Impersonal Federal authority, as compared with local

and more personal authority, is thus probably more accept-
able as a source for programs which seriously limit personal
interests.

The increasing reliance upon Federal authority in these
wartime programs may be a manifestation of the general trend
towards collectivism in a crisis period, and it may not occur
in peacetime. Unfortunately, an analysis of current "peacetime"
draft boards has not been made, and we are unable to determine
whether local initiative is in fact more likely to be exerted
in peacetime. Since the OPA program was curtailed soon after
the war, an answer from that program cannot be obtained either.
However, the very fact that controls were abolished supports the
thesis that private interests resume dominance in peacetime.
Whether localism and local autonomy also became stronger, or
even returned to their prewar levels, cannot be determined from
these data. Our guess would be that localism reasserted itself,
but probably less strongly than in the prewar period.

The Agricultural Extension Service

It is in the peacetime U. S. Department of Agriculture
programs that the theory and practice of citizen participation
in administration has reached its fullest development, involving
a vast apparatus to administer an action program reaching almost
every farmer in the nation. The administration of these govern-
ment programs based on the ideal of cooperation and voluntary
participation, has culminated in a set of procedures which can
be thought of as the general principles of agricultural democracy:

1. Decentralized administration in varying degrees
through community, county and state farmer committees,
elected by cooperating farmers or appointed by the
Secretary of Agriculture.

2. The use of referendums in determining certain
administrative policies, especially those having to
do with quotas, penalties, and marketing agreements.

3. The use of group discussion and other adult
education techniques as a means of promoting under-
standing of the problems and procedures involved in
the administration of the various programs and
referendums.

4. Cooperative planning in program formulation and
localization of programs.[52]

These USDA programs are supported by Federal matching funds to
the States. The Agricultural Extension Service program, which
we will take as our model, is administered by the States through
the state agricultural colleges.[53] Considerable State variation
in administration is allowed, although all program plans require
Federal approval for matching funds and regular progress reports
must be submitted. Federal specialists function to disseminate
scientific information to the States, and all of these devices
produce substantial national uniformity in outlook, policy and
program. The State agricultural colleges exercise supervision
over local county agents and the integration of the Agricultural
Extension Service into these colleges has been accomplished.
The Extension Service system has been responsible in large part
for the technological revolution in farming in the U. S. in the
recent past.

The County agent, a representative of an acknowledged
educational institution as well as of State and Federal agencies,
provides practical guidance in local farming methods. He is a
jack-of-all-trades--educator, demonstrator, and administrator--

and he works within local communities and local-regional cultures.
Considerable variation in county administration is permitted,
and the county agent will sometimes work through local organiza-
tions and institutions (wherever these exist) and sometimes set
up separate organizations (where they do not exist). However,
the long run tendency in local areas has been for separate
organizations to evolve. The technique of working through
existing recognized leaders in the farming community has been
a major principle, and demonstrations by these leaders has been
a particularly successful device for instituting new techniques.

These Department of Agriculture principles have been widely
adopted by agencies administering international programs of
technological change, and they have generally proved successful
abroad. Let us therefore quote here Brunner and Yang's state-
ment of these principles as they guide the local agent:

> 1. "Within the necessary board legal framework
> applicable everywhere within a nation, the greatest
> degree of latitude should be provided for with
> respect to program and methods, in order that
> both may, as closely as possible, fit local con-
> ditions, that is, the local resources in soil,
> finances, and human beings and the local traditions,
> culture and total needs.
>
> 2. "It is necessary to work in harmony with the
> culture and to understand the culture within which
> changes are to be produced. It is necessary that
> the new possibilities be revealed with care,
> patience and sympathy. The new way must, if at
> all possible, be rationalized, not necessarily
> in terms of the procedures of the old, but certainly
> in terms of its values.
>
> 3. "The community must be regarded as the basic
> unit of work.
>
> 4. "The home must be regarded as the basic unit
> of concern.

5. "Local leaders should be used as responsible
representatives of the program. This puts in
every community persons known and respected who
will vouch for the possibly strange teachings of
the Extension agent, who tries the techniques
and demonstrates their validity under local con-
ditions.

6. "The Extension worker should be prepared to
learn from the local people he serves. (New
techniques and substances may be discovered from
those methods and substances which have stood
the test of time and been effective in the past.)

7. "The simpler or the more primitive the society,
the greater the utility of the principle of
demonstration. The advantages of personal demon-
stration of techniques and methods by the Extension
worker is very high."54

In addition to county agents, the State Extension Services

use Extension specialists in administering the program. The

State specialists are the professional liaison between the county

agents, the agricultural colleges, the experiment stations, and

the U. S. Department of Agriculture. The specialists are "subject-

matter specialists" who assist the county agents in organizing

and forwarding programs and interpret scientific knowledge and

factual information to the agent for distribution to the people

through his volunteer leaders and farming organizations. Fre-

quently, the State specialist also trains local volunteer

leaders. The ratio of State specialists to county agents has

been maintained at roughly one to five. Today, the county agent

typically has a four-year college degree in agriculture, and

some have advanced degrees. The specialists typically have

advanced degrees in an agricultural specialty.

Federal staff specialists serve as an inter-state information

clearing-house, and assist the various state specialists with

their programs, but they have no administrative or supervisory

functions over the States. Supervision of the States is carried on exclusively through the approval of state plans for matching funds, but assistance in preparing State plans is given by the Federal extension specialists.

The Agricultural Extension Service example leads us to examine more closely the two ways of using volunteers which that program exemplifies:

1. The use of other organizations, especially local voluntary organizations, in administering a program.

2. The use of volunteers who are incorporated into the organization itself as rank and file, or as volunteer members of advisory and administrative committees.

The Agricultural Extension Service currently uses both techniques, having established a number of voluntary organizations, including the Farm Bureaus and 4-H clubs. Considerable difficulty resulted when strong identification with the Farm Bureau evolved, so that only members of the Bureau were regarded as eligible for Extension Service assistance. Eventually, the Extension Service became independent of its voluntary organization, and the service became available to all farmers and farming organizations within the various States.[55] Four-H clubs and other voluntary organizations established by the Extension Service remain under the formal direction of the county agent.

Of course, many U.S.D.A. programs operate with volunteer boards or committees. The agricultural stabilization, (marketing,) and conservation program is administered by ASC boards on the

local level, although the local committeemen receive small fees
for their services in the program. The recent U.S.D.A. crop
control programs have also set up local cooperative boards on
much the same principle. In these latter programs, the presenta-
tion of Federal expectations and policy is considerably more
direct than in the Extension Service program. Although the ASC
program has been moderately successful, the crop control program
has not, for reasons too complex for us to explore thoroughly
here. (We might point out, however, that crop control, as com-
pared with conservation and marketing advice, operates less
obviously to the individual's farmer's advantage and requires
that the individual farmer sacrifice his traditional maximum-
production goal. The program thus operates to restrict private
interests severely, as was true of the wartime programs we have
discussed; but in this case, there is no general concensus on
the goal to be achieved.)

Some Concluding Generalizations

Selznick points out that these same two ways of using
volunteers are characteristic also of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.[56] TVA organized its own grass roots volunteer
units in creating the electric power cooperatives, and worked
through the extension service organizations in its agricultural
program. We draw primarily upon his ideas in the general
discussion to follow:

A corps of volunteers, created by an agency to implement
its program, usually creates new channels of information to the
public and bolsters public support. Where existing leadership
is not well-structured and where other voluntary organizations

do not exist, the creation of these units may be necessary to
reach the public efficiently. However, if these organizations
are created, by-passing well-established local leadership, they
tend to be ineffective and to have limited access to the public
and to community resources. They are likely to be supported
primarily by those who are relatively powerless locally, and the
special interests of these powerless individuals or groups can
deflect the organization's activities on the local level. In any
event, creating a new corps of volunteers to support a program
involves an appeal to the individual citizen rather than to
existing groups, and generally results in recruitment of those
with high enthusiasm and devotion to the program, so that the
volunteer corps takes on a "social movement" character.

On the other hand, siphoning the implementation of a program
through existing organizations and leadership recognizes and
supports these institutions, and is socially conservative in
nature. This technique can be said to be essential where power-
ful organizations exist in an area, especially where these
organizations have objectives and programs related to those of
the administering agency. For example, where strong farmer's
organizations existed, the administration of a program using
these organizations as a channel of information and support was
not only expedient but probably critical to successful local
administration.[57]

In all cases, local participation in program administration
results in the adaptation of broad policy to local conditions,
in line with democratic values; and the sharing of responsibility,
even within a fairly narrow sphere, allows citizens through

voluntary organizations or volunteer corps to become identified
with and committed to the program--and ideally, to the apparatus
of the operating agency. Grass roots administration represents
a concept of democracy in administration, taking into account
public reactions and resting upon public support. Its primary
advantage is that it tends to create continuing public support,
both for the administering agency and its program.

In any particular case, the question of whether to use
existing organizations or create new ones is difficult to answer,
and Selznick notes that the answer usually depends upon "specific
programmatic and administrative imperatives." [58] In fact, the
question has usually been left open, and both techniques have
been allowed, the decision being left to the top (paid)
administrator on the local level. His position, closer to the
local scene, allows him to determine whether there are organiza-
tions in the area whose sponsorship and approval is critical to
the successful administration of the program, and whether these
organizations and their leadership can be enlisted to provide
support. Where local organizations existed at all, they have
usually been used, and no new organization set up by the admin-
istering agency. This is the safest alternative if leaders can
be coöpted into publicly supporting the program. The danger
is that these leaders may change the program or try to sabotage
it, making the recruitment of leaders who are reasonably favorable
to the program essential.

Selznick observes that the concept of democracy in administra-
tion, as exemplified in the U.S.D.A.'s programs, has tended to
result in involvement of volunteers in the program rather than

real participation. We have already noted a tendency in wartime
OPA and Selective Service boards to yield to Federal authority
and limit local autonomy in decision-making and administration.
We suggested that the tendency was more pronounced in wartime
than in peacetime, but no evidence has been found to substantiate
the point. However, we do see here that a similar tendency has
been observed in peacetime programs as well.

Selznick speculates that the tendency is a result of the
needs of the administering (Federal) agency which requires uni-
formity of structure because it is charged with program respon-
sibilities which cannot be readily changed since they are
usually incorporated into law or legally-supported executive
directives. As an administrative organization, it demands
efficiency and effectiveness which require unity of command
and continuity of policy. The organization is constrained to
maintain these over time and throughout the hierarchy. In
practice, them, the local voluntary organization or board
probably cannot become a real part of the policy-determining
structure.[59]

The volunteer, as we have noted, has limited interest in
the organization, and its demands take a back seat to job and
family obligations, making him more likely than the paid worker
to leave the organization. The volunteer is not as easily
controlled by organizational superiors and he cannot be held
responsible for job performance in the way that paid workers
can, because he cannot be fired. The voluntary organization
has its own programs and its own goals, and therefore must limit
its commitment of personnel and resources to the goals of other
organizations.

These limitations of the volunteer and the voluntary
organization, in combination with the demands of the administering
agency. serve to restrict their real participation in policy-
making and in administration. Their role becomes a supporting
one only, and volunteers become rank and file, subject to the
authority of a paid worker. Voluntary organizations become
information channels and models of support for the program and
do not act as administrative agencies. And volunteer boards
become administrative rather than decision-making, even where
some decision-making autonomy exists.

But while the role of volunteers is secondary, it is not
superfluous. Volunteers and voluntary organizations represent
a kind of filter for agency policy. What is unacceptable policy
to volunteers is likely to be unacceptable to the rest of the
public, and this is especially true where broad voluntary in-
volvement and support exists. Volunteers thus serve not only
to adapt policy to local conditions within the boundaries
permitted by the administering agency, but they can also serve
as bellweathers for agency policy. If volunteers resist
directives entirely, they may be reflecting a more general
resistance to the policy in question, and the agency can be
prepared for meeting resistance if it decides to pursue the
policy. More important, the involvement of volunteers and
voluntary organizations represents organized support for the
program and is a source of strength. And the broader the
voluntary involvement and support, the stronger the agency
program.

I. Prologue on Voluntary Organizations - Footnotes

[1] This definition is a synopsis of common elements included in
definitions used by the following authors:
  (a) Herbert Maccoby. 1958. "The Differential Political
        Activity of Participants in Voluntary Associations,"
        American Sociological Review, 23, p. 523-32.

  (b) Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy. 1937.
        A Report of the Urbanism Committee to the National
        Resources Committee. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Govern-
        ment Printing Office, p. 24.

  (c) Arnold Rose. 1954. Theory and Method in the Social
        Sciences. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
        Press, p. 73.

[2] Arnold Rose lists the following scholars who discuss the paucity
of voluntary organizations or associations in preliterate
societies: (Cf. Arnold Rose, ibid., p. 53):

  Robert Redfield. 1947. "The Folk Society," American Journal
      of Sociology, 52, pp. 293-308.

  R. M. MacIver. 1935. "Interests," Encyclopedia of the Social
      Sciences, New York: MacMillan, Vol. 8, pp. 144-148.

  Robert H. Lowie. 1925. Primitive Society. New York: Boni
      and Liveright, Chap. 10-11.

  Hutton Webster. 1932. Primitive Secret Societies. New York:
      MacMillan.

  Alexander Goldenweiser. 1937. Anthropology. New York: Crofts,
      Chap. 19-20.

  E. D. Chapple and C. S. Coon. 1942. Principles of Anthropology.
      New York: Holt, Chap. 17.

[3] See R. T. Anderson and G. Anderson. 1959. "Voluntary Associations
      and Urbanization: A Diachronic Analysis," American Journal of
      Sociology, 65, pp. 265-73.

[4] See Louis D. Hartson. 1911. "A Study of Voluntary Associations,
      Educational and Social, in Europe During the Period from 1100
      to 1700," Pedagogical Seminary, 18, pp. 10-30.

[5] See Kenneth Little. 1957. "The Role of Voluntary Associations
      in West African Urbanization," American Anthropologist, 59,
      pp. 579-596; and

  Michael Banton. 1957. West African City: A Study of Tribal
      Life in Freetown. London: Oxford University Press, Chap. 9-
      10.

I. Prologue on Voluntary Organizations - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[6] Regarding the tendency for more specific organizations to emerge on the Danish island of Dragor during a period of rapid industrialization, see R. T. Anderson and G. Anderson, op cit. Also, regarding this trend for more specific organizations to emerge in China, see J. F. Burgess, 1929, "Ancient Gilds and Social Change," The China Weekly Review, 47 (Feb. 23 and Mar. 2, 1929), pp. 520 and 18-20.

Georg Simmel also felt that increasing specialization in urban societies results in greater voluntary organizational membership, although he does not make the point that the voluntary organizations themselves become more specific.

Cf. Georg Simmel. 1908. "The Metropolis and Mental Life," in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translated by Kurt Wolff, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950, p. 188; and

Georg Simmel. 1908. "The Web of Group Affiliations," in Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, translated by Reinhard Bendix. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955, especially pp. 162-163.

[7] See R. T. Anderson and G. Anderson, op cit., regarding this point. Also, for a case where an indigenous model was not present, see Floyd Dotson, 1953, "Voluntary Associations in a Mexican City," American Sociological Review, 18, pp. 380-383.

[8] Cf. Georg Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life," op cit., and "The Web of Group Affiliations," op cit.

[9] Among the many authors documenting this point, we will cite only a few:

Bernard Barber. 1950. "Participation and Mass Apathy in Associations," in Studies in Leadership, edited by Alvin W. Gouldner. New York: Harpers. (A summary of about 10 data sources);

Arnold Rose, op cit., p. 57ff. (Another summary source);

Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman. 1958. "Voluntary Association Memberships," American Sociological Review, 23, pp. 284-294 (Another summary source which also reanalyzes a series of relevant surveys in the mid-Fifties in the U.S.);

Mary Jean Cornish. 1960. "Participation in Voluntary Associations," Part III of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Voluntary Health Associations and Disease: Some Public Views, (FOR LIMITED DISTRIBUTION ONLY);

Murray Hausknecht. 1962. The Joiners. New York: Bedminster Press. (An analysis of two U.S. national surveys which included questions on organizational memberships.)

I. Prologue on Voluntary Organizations - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[10] This statement represents Lipset's ideas regarding the principal function of voluntary organizations in a democracy. Cf. Seymour M. Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman. 1956. _Union Democracy_. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, especially p. 89.

[11] The basis for the idea that voluntary organization membership is most typical of the Establishment and the Aspiring is found in S. N. Eisenstadt, 1956, "The Social Conditions of the Development of Voluntary Associations -- A Case Study of Israel," in Roberto Bachi, editor, _Scripta Hierosolymitana_, Vol. III, Studies in Economic and Social Sciences. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, pp. 124-125 and in Arnold Rose, "Voluntary Associations in France," in _Theory and Method in the Social Sciences_, (_op cit_.), Chap. 4.

[12] Cf. S. M. Lipset, _et al._, _op cit._, especially pp. 82-91.

[13] Richard F. Curtis. 1959. "Occupational Mobility and Membership in Formal Voluntary Associations," _American Sociological Review_, 24, pp. 846-848.

[14] See references cited under footnote 9 above. Also, see

R. T. Anderson and G. Anderson, _op cit_. (Denmark);

Kenneth Little, _op cit_. (West Africa);

S. N. Eisenstadt, _op cit_. (Israel);

T. Cauter and Jay S. Downham. 1954. _The Communication of Ideas: A Study of Contemporary Influences on Urban Life_. London: Chatto and Windus, pp. 64-66 regarding a similar pattern in Derby, England;

Floyd Dotson. 1951. "Patterns of Voluntary Association Among Urban Working Class Families," _American Sociological Review_, 16, pp. 687-693 (United States);

Mirra Komarovsky. 1946. "Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," _American Sociological Review_, 11, pp. 686-698 (New York City).

[15] Arnold Rose made the suggestion initially, and others have elaborated upon it. Cf. Arnold Rose, _op cit._, esp. p. 50;

S. N. Eisenstadt, _op cit_.;

S. M. Lipset, _et al._, pp. 82-91.

I. Prologue on Voluntary Organizations - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[16]Among the writers noting this unusually large number in the early
Nineteenth Century was Alexis de Tocqueville, (See his _Democracy
in America_, Vol. I. New York: Vintage Books, 1954, especially
p. 199). Later observers continued to comment on the same
phenomenon. For example, see Lord Bryce, 1911, _The American
Commonwealth_, Vol. II, p. 281 (cited by Herbert Goldhamer and
Noel P. Gist, 1943. "Social Clubs and Fraternities," in _Develop-
ment of Collective Enterprise_, edited by Seba Eldridge. Lawrence:
University of Kansas Press) and also Mary and Charles Beard. 1930.
The Rise of American Civilization: The Industrial Era. New York:
MacMillan, pp. 730-31.

[17]Arnold Rose, _op cit._, pp. 58-59.

[18]Survey results, discussed in detail in the following section,
show that (a) fraternal organizations are primarily small town
organizations with membership concentrated in the older age
groups (over 50), and (b) larger cities have a larger number
of business association, civic and educational organization
memberships, especially among younger people (under 50). This
statement is also based upon Robert Merton's distinction between
the voluntary organization memberships of "locals" and "cosmo-
politans" in Rovere. "The local influentials evidently crowd
into those organizations which are largely for 'making contacts,'
for establishing personal ties. Thus, they are found largely in
the secret societies (Masons), fraternal organizations (Elks),
and local service clubs....Their participation appears to be less
a matter of furthering the nominal objectives of these organiza-
tions than of using them as _contact centers_....The cosmopolitans,
on the other hand, tend to belong to those organizations in which
they can exercise their special skills and knowledge. They are
found in professional societies and in hobby groups. At the time
of the inquiry, in 1943, they were more often involved in Civilian
Defense organizations where again they were presumably more con-
cerned with furthering the objectives of the organization than
with establishing personal ties." (Robert K. Merton. 1949.
"Patterns of Influence: A Study of Interpersonal Influence and
of Communications Behavior in a Local Community," in Paul F.
Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton, editors, _Communications Research:
1948-49_. New York: Harpers, pp. 189-190, and cited in David L.
Sills, 1957, _The Volunteers_. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, p. 223).

[19]Bradford Smith. 1954. _A Dangerous Freedom_. Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott, Chap. 6 ("Voluntary Associations on the Hoof").

[20]See Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 1936. _Soviet Communism: A New
Civilization?_ New York: Scribners, pp. 424 and 1130, cited in
Bernard Barber, 1945, "'Mass Apathy' and Voluntary Social Partici-
pation in the United States." Unpublished PhD. dissertation,
Harvard University, pp. 262ff.

I. Prologue on Voluntary Organizations - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[21] That times of crisis act as a trigger in the assumption of new functions by government can undoubtedly be documented in other democratic societies as well. For example, the introduction of comprehensive social services and nationalization of critical industries took place in England during the 1940's, leading some to fear for the future of voluntarism. See especially the following:

> Lord William H. Beveridge. 1948. Voluntary Action: A Report on Methods of Social Advance. New York: MacMillan, especially Chapter 10 ("The Future of Voluntary Action"); and

> Madeline Rooff. 1957. Voluntary Societies and Social Policy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, especially Chapters 13-14; 23-24.

For a discussion of the case of Northern Europe where government involvement in the economy and in social planning became increasingly comprehensive in the depression of the 30's and especially in the World War II period, see George R. Nelson, editor. 1953. Freedom and Welfare: Social Patterns in the Northern Countries of Europe. Copenhagen: The Ministries of Social Affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, especially pages 38-46.

Coincidentially, we might guess that on a community level it is those communities with a history of major disasters which are most likely to integrate local civil defense emergency functions into government. The case of St. Louis, Missouri is notable in this regard.

We do not suggest, however, that only crisis is likely to result in the assumption of new functions by government. Clearly, other conditions might also have that effect, and new functions might be acquired more slowly in non-crisis periods. We wish merely to argue that once a crisis has occurred, it tends to result in the integration into government of functions previously left to voluntary organizations and individual action.

II. Voluntary Organizations in American Society - Footnotes

[1]Alexis de Tocqueville, op cit., p. 199.

[2]Lord Bryce, op cit., p. 281.

[3]Mary Beard and Charles Beard, op cit., p. 731.

[4]Cf. de Tocqueville, op cit., p. 198; and Bradford Smith, op cit.

[5]Cf. Mary and Charles Beard, op cit., p. 730.

[6]Robin M. Williams, Jr. 1951. American Society. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2nd edition, 1960, p. 427.

[7]Bernard Barber, "'Mass Apathy' and Voluntary Social Participation
in the United States", op cit., p. 255 ff.

[8]Max Weber. 1905. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
New York: Scribners, 1956, translated by Talcott Parsons. See
especially Chapter 2.

[9]Maccoby notes two Western democratic traditions regarding the
relationship between the democratic state and the associations
of its citizenry.

(Cf. Herbert Maccoby. 1958. "The Differential Political Activity
of Participants in a Voluntary Association," American Sociological
Review, 23, p. 524.

One tradition, stemming from Rousseau and the French Revolution,
envisions secondary associations (voluntary organizations) as
divisive forces, endangering equality and detracting from
allegiance to the democratic state by promoting conflicting
loyalties. The second tradition, stemming from the Puritan
Revolution and John Locke, see secondary associations as cohesive
forces, promoting liberty and the democratic society by serving
as intermediate sources of influence between the individual and
the state. American sociologists have generally taken this
latter point of view towards voluntary organizations in American
society. Amoung contemporary American sociologists, this view
was first taken by Arnold Rose, op cit., p. 69, and he has been
supported by S. M. Lipset, Union Democracy, p. 82-86 and Hausk-
necht, op cit., p. 111. Lipset quotes the early observations of
de Tocqueville to this effect (Cf. de Tocqueville, op cit.,
p. 376-386) and also the early statement of Emile Durkheim:
"A (democratic) nation can be maintained only if, between the
states and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series
of secondary groups near enough to individuals to attract them
strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way,
into the general torrent of social life." (Cf. Lipset, et al.,
pp. 85-86 from Emile Durkheim. 1893. The Division of Labor
in Society, 2nd U. S. edition, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1947,
p. 28).

II. Voluntary Organizations in American Society - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[10]Cf. especially S.M. Lipset, _et al._, _op cit._, p. 89.

[11]Cf. Arnold Rose, _op cit._, p. 51 and Hausknecht, _op cit._, p. 166 ff.

[12]This function was emphasized by de Tocqueville, _op cit._, p. 117 - 120, but Hausknecht feels the function has now been largely assumed by the mass media. (Cf. Hausknecht, _ibid._, p. 116-118.)

[13]Cf. Arnold Rose, _op cit._, p. 103; Hausknecht, _ibid._, p. 118-120.

[14]Cf. Hausknecht, _ibid._, p. 119; and S. M. Lipset, 1960, _Political Man_. Garden City: Doubleday, pp. 97ff.

[15]Cf. Hausknecht, _ibid._, p. 120-122 who also notes that this function has been studied by Eric Josephson. 1959. "Political Youth Organizations in Europe, 1900-1950: A Comparative Study of Six Radical Parties and Their Youth Auxiliaries." Unpublished PhD. dissertation: Columbia University, 1959.

[16]Cf. Hausknecht, _ibid._, pp. 115-6 and the references cited in Section I, footnote 21 of this report.
See also Alvin L. Schorr, 1960; "Governmental and Voluntary Agencies," and Ralph M. Kramer, 1960, "A Study of Lay and Professional Attitudes," in _Community Organization_ (Papers presented at the 88th Annual Forum of the National Conference on Social Welfare). New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 153-174.

[17]See references cited in Section I, footnote 9 of this report, especially Cornish, and Hausknecht (p. 46).

[18]See references cited in Section I, footnote 9 of this report, especially Wright and Hyman (p. 289 and Hausknecht (p. 29).

[19]See references in footnote 18 above.
Also see Elaine Cumming and William E. Henry. 1961. _Growing Old._ New York: Basic Books.

[20]Cf. Basil Zimmer. 1955. "Participation of Migrants in Urban Structures," _American Sociological Review_, 20, pp. 218-224.

[21]See our data presented later in this section. Also see Wright and Hyman, _op cit_,. p. 293.

[22]See references cited in Section I, footnote 9 of this report.

II. Voluntary Organizations in American Society - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[23] Among the many sources which discuss individual motives for joining, we will cite only the following summary sources:

David Sills. 1957. The Volunteers. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, pp. 81-104.

Daniel Thursz. 1960. Volunteer Group Advisers in a Social Group Work Agency. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, Chap. 5.

Eva Schindler-Rainman. 1959. "Why do People Volunteer?" in Community Organization (Papers presented at the 86th Annual Forum of the National Conference on Social Welfare). New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, pp. 127-133.

Lawrence K. Frank. 1958. "What Influence People to Join Organizations?" Adult Leadership, (February 1958), p. 196.

[24] Cf. David Sills, op cit., pp. 81-104.

[25] See Section I, footnote 11 of this report.

[26] Robin Williams, Jr., op cit., p. 471.

[27] Cf. Thursz, op cit., Chap. 5.

[28] See Section I, footnote 6 of this report.

[29] Bradford Smith, op cit., p. 103.

[30] Specifically, the data reported in this section are drawn from the following sources:

1. NORC Survey No. 367 (1955). A U. S. national survey: $N = 2379$. The results on voluntary organization membership from this study have been reported in Wright and Hyman, op cit., and in Hausknecht, op cit.

2. AIPO Survey No. 352 (1954). A U. S. National Survey: $N = 2000$. The results on voluntary organization membership from this national survey have been reported in Hausknecht, op cit.

3. AIPO Survey No. 625 (February 1960). A U. S. national survey: $N = 2985$. These data were made available to the author through the courtesy of the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass. and were analyzed for this report in order to clarify and expand the findings available from other sources.

It is important to note that these surveys were not primarily focussed upon the gathering of data on voluntary organization membership. These data are, therefore, subject to a number of limitations. For one thing, the questioning for completeness in covering all voluntary organization memberships of the respondents was probably defective. Also, the wording of questions

II.   Voluntary Organizations in American Society - Footnotes (Cont'd)

about membership varies from study to study, complicating the analysis.   Differences in the coding and grouping of organizations mentioned by respondents also varies slightly from study to study although an attempt was made in the analysis of the 1960 data to approximate the groupings of organizations used in NORC Survey No. 367 as reported by Hausknecht.   The effect of differences in wording of the questions is shown by the higher proportion of respondents mentioning church membership in the 1960 survey where the question included a listing of kinds of organizations, including church organizations.

The questions used in these studies were:

NORC 367:   "Do you happen to belong to any groups or organizations in the community here?" (If yes:) "Which ones?"   "Any other?"

AIPO 352:   "What organizations or clubs; like church organizations, service clubs, fraternal clubs do you belong to?"

AIPO 625:   "What community organizations or groups, if any, do you belong to now -- that is, fraternal, social, business, civic or religious groups?"

Unfortunately, although the two AIPO (Gallup) surveys have the most similar questions, data on membership by type of organization are not available for the earlier survey.   Therefore, the reporting of data on membership in different types of organizations in this report is based upon an analysis of the NORC survey and the later AIPO survey.

[31]Unfortunately, union membership was excluded in the analysis of voluntary organization membership in Hausknecht's volume.   Thus, our discussion here is limited by the exclusion of one of the major categories of voluntary organization membership in contemporary American society.   The estimate of the percentage of labor union members in the United States given by Wright and Hyman is 23%.   One of the surveys analyzed here for participation in civil defense asks for labor union membership, and that survey shows 21% of the total sample reporting union membership. Our findings (from AIPO 517, July 1953) are thus closely congruent with those of Wright and Hyman (from NORC 335, 1953).

[32]The types of voluntary organizations in our re-analysis of the 1960 survey (AIPO 625) have been recombined in order to be directly comparable to the types of voluntary organizations reported in Murray Hausknecht's The Joiners.   His categories exclude labor union membership and are as follows:

Veterans, military and patriotic organizations and their auxiliaries;

Civic and service organizations, including PTA, Boy Scouts and youth service organizations, health organizations, including the Red Cross;

II. Voluntary Organizations in American Society - Footnotes (Cont'd)

Political organizations or pressure groups;

Lodges, fraternal organizations and secret societies;

Church and religious organizations, including church membership itself;

Economic, occupational and professional organizations other than labor unions;

Cultural, educational, college alumni organizations;

Social, sports, hobby and recreational organizations.

[33]Cf. Hausknecht, op cit., pp. 123-125.

[34]Cf. Wright and Hyman, op cit., p. 289, and Hausknecht, ibid., p. 24-25.

[35]These data and conclusions are reported in Wright and Hyman, op cit., p. 290. Table 6B is reproduced here from p. 290 in the Wright and Hyman article.

[36]Data are not available here for the various churches. Occupational differences between Protestants, Catholics and Jews have been reported, as have occupational differences between the various Protestant denominations. Cf. Liston Pope, 1948, "Religion and the Class Structure," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 256: 84-91.

[37]The data on participation in civil defense reported here was made available through the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass. and constituted two separate surveys done by the American Institute of Public Opinion on December 10, 1941 and in mid-July 1953.

Questions regarding civil defense participation were:

AIPO 255 (1941): "Outside of your regular employment, are you doing work in the civilian defense program, such as air-raid warnings, first aid, and the like?"

Categories were: "Yes," "No, but signed up," and "No."

AIPO 517 (1953): "Are you, yourself, doing any work in the civilian defense program such as air-raid warning, first aid, and the like?"

Categories were: "Yes," "No," and "No, but signed up."

[38]This summary of the context within which these surveys were taken has been drawn from the New York Times Index for 1941 and 1953.

II.   Voluntary Organizations in American Society - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[39]Cf. Violet M. Sieder. 1945. "Volunteers in Social Work," in
the Social Work Yearbook. 1945. New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
p. 484.

[40]Cf. Katharine R. Van Slyck. 1947. "Volunteers in Social Work,"
in the Social Work Yearbook. 1947. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, p. 550.

[41]Cf. American Red Cross Publication # 541. "Red Cross Service
Record: Accomplishments of Seven Years, 1939 - 1946," cited in
Bernard Barber,"Mass Apathy and Voluntary Social Participation
in the United States," op cit., p. 234.

[42]Population figures represent the total American civilian popu-
lation over 14 years of age. Cf. U. S. Bureau of the Census.
1960. Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial
Times to 1957. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, pp. 7-8. The figure for 1960 is taken from U. S.
Bureau of the Census. 1962: Statistical Abstract of the
United States: Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing
Office, p. 5.

[43]Cf. The New York Times Index, 1952 and 1959.

[44]The figure for 1943 was obtained from Violet Sieder, op cit.,
p. 484. Estimates for 1951, 1952, and 1953 are given in the
Federal Civil Defense Administration's Annual Reports for
Fiscal Years 1951, 1952, and 1953. The estimates for 1959
- 1961 are drawn from the Office of Civil Defense Mobiliza-
tion's Annual Statistical Reports for Fiscal Years 1960 and
1961 and from the Office of Civil Defense (Department of
Defense)'s Annual Statistical Report for Fiscal Year 1962.

[45]Cf. Stephen B. Withey. 1954. "Fourth Survey of Public Know-
ledge and Attitudes Concerning Civil Defense: A Report of a
National Study in March 1954." Survey Research Center:
University of Michigan, (September 1954), especially pp. 100,
135-138.

[46]Survey Research Center. 1956. "Some Factors Influencing
Public Reactions to Civil Defense in the United States,
"mimeographed, (December 1956), pp. 11-14 in the miscellaneous
tables portion; and

Survey Research Center. 1957. "Sputnik: Some Consequences,
Expectations and Attitudes," mimeographed, (January 1958), p. 14.

[47]Cf. David K. Berlo. 1962. "The Public's Opinions on Existing
or Potential Federal Fallout Shelter Programs," Office of Civil
Defense Research Report, Michigan State University, (September
1962).

II. Voluntary Organizations in American Scoiety - Footnotes (Cont'd)

[48] Stephen B. Withey. 1962. "The U. S. and the U. S. S. R.: A Report of the Public's Perspectives on United States - Russian Relations in Late 1961." Survey Research Center: University of Michigan, (March 1962), p. 19 especially.

[49] See our discussion on the functions of membership in voluntary organizations earlier in this section (pp. 14-18).

[50] Questions regarding the perception of threat were as follows:

AIPO 255 (1941): "Do you think that there is any chance that this city (town, neighborhood) will be bombed?"

Categories were: "Yes," and "No."

AIPO 517 (1953): "In case of another World War, how much chance do you think there is for this community (city) being attacked with atom bombs -- a good chance, a fair chance, or not much chance?"

Category "a good chance" was regarded here as comparable to the "Yes" category in 1941. Categories "a fair chance," and "not much chance" were regarded as comparable to a "No" in 1941.

[51] Stephen Withey did ask questions about whether the effects of attack would be greater in the respondent's own area or elsewhere. Cf. Stephen Withey, op cit., 1962. Data are not reported by region on this item, however.

[52] See our discussion of individual motives for joining on p.18 of this section.

[53] Cf. Stephen Withey, op cit., 1962, pp. 24-30.

III. On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
      Footnotes

[1]Philip Selznick. 1943. "An Approach to the Theory of
Bureaucracy," American Sociological Review, 8: p. 49,
disucssed in David L. Sills. 1957. The Volunteers.
Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957, pp. 62-70.

[2]Sills, ibid., pp. 253-4, 265-268.

[3]Cf. Arnold Rose. 1954. Theory and Method in the Social Sciences.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 58.

[4]The number of civil defense participants declined sharply after
the Ground Observer Corps was disbanded. (See our note in the
preceding section.) Virtually no major tasks focussed on
national civil degense goals remained after that time. Vol-
unteer fire, police and rescue organizations remained to fill
local requirements, and were usually called civil defense
personnel, but the major tasks of these units were primarily
related to local emergency preparedness goals. Currently, a
few warning, communications and radiological monitoring
personnel in addition to some local directors remain as vol-
unteers, and their jobs are related to national goals. Of
course, in 1963-4 period, the job of shelter manager will be
added to this list.

[5]See for example, the case of the civil defense organization in
West Frankfort, Illinois in a later section of this report.

[6]William M. Evan. 1957. "Dimensions of Participation in Vol-
untary Associations," Social Forces, 36, pp. 148-153.

[7]Sills, op cit., p. 2-8.

[8]ibid., p. 218-219.

[9]Conditions of external distrust and internal controversy sur-
rounded the Red Cross charter revision which became law in
May 1947. The revision abolished the national self-perpetua-
ting boards and substituted an electoral process giving direct
representation to local chapters and guaranteeing that the
chapters themselves would be governed by the will of the
membership. Cf. Foster Rhea Dulles. 1950. The American Red
Cross: A History. New York: Harper and Bros., pp. 531-538;
and Richard Carter. 1961. The Gentle Legions. Garden City,
N. Y.: Doubleday, pp. 60-61.

[10]Barber, 1950, op cit., p. 486ff.

[11]Lipset, op cit., especially pp. 3-13.

III. On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
      Footnotes (Cont'd)

[12]Philip Selznick. 1952. The Organizational Weapon. New York:
    McGraw-Hill, p. 96, quoted in Sills, op cit., p. 19.

[13]Robert Michels. 1911. Political Parties. Glencoe, Ill.:
    Free Press, 1949, p. 401.

[14]Lipset, op cit., p. 3.

[15]Barber, 1950, op cit., p. 484-5.

[16]This section is drawn primarily from Daniel Thursz, 1960,
    Volunteer Group Advisors in a National Social Group Work
    Agency. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University Press,
    Chapter II: "The Volunteer in Social Welfare."

[17]Mabel T. Boardman. 1915. Under the Red Cross Flag. New
    York: J. B. Lippincott Co.

[18]Marie Youngblood. 1952. "Volunteers in Red Cross Home
    Service," Social Case Work, 33 (July 1952), p. 291.

[19]A number of observers have suggested that the social worker's
    struggle to be recognized as a professional during this period
    was the direct cause for their rejection of volunteers. Cf.
    Thursz, op cit., p. 50, 55-56; and Violet M. Sieder, 1945,
    "Volunteers in Social Work," Social Work Yearbook, Vol. 8.
    New York: Russell Sage Foundation, p. 485.

[20]David W. Haynes. 1943. "Volunteers in Social Work," Social
    Work Yearbook, Vol. 7 New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
    p. 551.

[21]This estimate apparently includes all volunteers registered,
    including those registered for community service, health and
    welfare activities, as well as those registered for civil
    defense and government agency services. The latter segment
    was estimated at 6 million as of December 1943. (See our note
    on this point in the preceding section.) The estimate given
    here is from Norma J. Sims, 1949, "Volunteers in Social Work,"
    Social Work Yearbook, Vol. 10. New York: Russell Sage Founda-
    tion, p. 537.

[22]Thursz, op cit., p. 64.

[23]One of the major achievements of the Committee was the develop-
    ment of a "Statement of Principles of Volunteer Service" which
    has served as criteria for volunteer activity to the present
    day. The summary of the statement reads:

III. On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
     Footnotes (Cont'd)

"Volunteer service is that voluntary effort, given without pay,
by an individual in a community who wishes to share theirin
the responsibilities of those democratic institutions concerned
with the advancement of human welfare. The opportunities of
citizen participation are the privilege and obligation of all.

"The volunteer recognizes his responsibility to be a source of
accurate information to his family, his friends, and the public,
regarding the program in which he participates.

"Recognition of a reciprocal relationship built on mutual respect
and responsibility between the volunteer and professional, each
with individual areas of competence defined and understood, is
necessary to the best development of the social attitude and the
intellectual technique with which to approach common objectives.

"Volunteers should never be used in jobs or services for which
money has been provided for paid personnel, or for which money
could be secured through proper channels and action. Exceptions
might be in (a) essential jobs impossible to be filled with paid
personnel because of manpower conditions, provided the particular
effect of these conditions does not result directly from poor
personnel practices in comparison with similar operations; and
(b) in situations where money might be available for initiation
or extension of services upon demonstration by volunteers of
the need for the value of such services.

"Giving effective volunteer service requires sincere interest
in the work to be done, willingness to accept the necessary
training and supervision, and a business-like approach to the
job. The good volunteer should be as dependable as a paid
worker.

"Receiving volunteer service requires recognition of the use-
fulness of such workers to the agency's program, respect for
their desire to contribute time and effort without pay, and
constructive interest in their education and supervision."

(Cf. Katherine Rogers Van Slyck. 1947.. "Volunteers in Social
Work," Social Work Yearbook, Vol. 9. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, p. 553.)

[24] See Bernard Barber, op cit. who cites the following as providing
evidence for this concern:

Robert Lynd. 1939. Knowledge for What? Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

John M. Dumas. 1947. "Apathy -- Our Fifth Column," National
Municipal Review, 36: pp. 494-6, 502.

Saul D. Alinsky. 1946. Reville for Radicals. Chicago:
University Press, p. 66.

III.   On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
       Footnotes (Cont'd)

[25]Thursz, op cit., p. 69.

[26]Cf. Violet M. Sieder. 1954. "Volunteers in Social Work,"
Social Work Yearbook, Vol. 12. New York: American Association
of Social Workers, p. 539.

[27]Robert F. Finley. 1957. "Volunteers in Social Welfare,"
Social Work Yearbook, Vol. 13. New York: American Association
of Social Workers, p. 539.

[28]Professor Hauser is a demographer from the University of Chicago
and is quoted here by Eugene Shenefield, 1960, in "Citizen and
Volunteer Participation," Social Work Yearbook, Vol. 14. New
York: National Association of Social Workers, pp. 159-163.

[29]Nathan Cohen. 1960. "The Volunteer and Social Change," in
The Citizen Volunteer, edited by Nathan Cohen. New York:
National Association of Social Workers, Harper & Bros., pp.219-245.

[30]The suggestion that restriction of entry into "professional"
jobs is an important factor in the process of change from an
"occupation" to a "profession" has been made by a number of
sociologists. Cf., for example, Theodore C. Caplow, 1954,
The Sociology of Work. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, p. 64; or Mary Jean Huntington, 1956, "The Sociology of
Professions: 1945-1955," in Sociology in the United States of
America, edited by Hans Zetterberg. Paris: UNESCO, especially
p. 88.

[31]Bernard Barber. 1958. "Bureaucratic Organization and the
Volunteer," in Social Perspectives on Behavior, edited by
Herman D. Stein and Richard A. Cloward. Glencoe, Ill.:
Free Press, pp. 606-609.

[32]C. I. Barnard. 1938. The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, p. 221, quoted in Barber, ibid. p. 607.

[33]Barber, ibid., p. 608-609.

[34]For example, during World War II in civil defense, the U. S.
Citizen Service Corps was established. This organization kept
records of volunteer service, awarded appropriate insignia,
and distributed special awards for especially long and meritor-
ious service. (Cf. Barber, 1948, op cit., p. 243.)

[35]Barber, 1958, op cit., p. 609.

III. On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
      Footnotes (Cont'd)

[36] For example, see <u>Democratic Man: Selected Writings of Edward C.
Lindeman</u>, edited by Robert Gessner. Boston: Beacon Press,
1956, p. 217 and reprinted in <u>Leadership and Voluntary Enter-
prise</u>, edited by Charles W. Merrifield. New York: Oceania
Publications, 1961, p. 77.

[37] Cf. Barber's conclusion:

"...Rational technical solutions for social problems offered
by professionals are not enough. Their effectiveness depends
upon changes in the attitudes of the members of the society.
Attitudes are changed most readily when the citizens themselves
participate in the planning and carrying out of solutions to
social problems. Professionals speak only for the means to
ends; citizen volunteers can speak to their fellow citizens
for the ends themselves." (Barber, 1948, <u>op cit</u>., p. 196.

[38] Thursz notes that the turnover rate is generally very high
for volunteers in social work agencies. The turnover in
voluntary troop leaders in the Girl Scouts is estimated at
49%; turnover among Boy Scout leaders at 50%; and turnover
in the B'nai B'rith Youth Organizations is roughly 40%
yearly. (Thursz, <u>op cit</u>., p. 10)

OPA turnover was generally estimated at 50% a year by Mansfield.

"...For the whole of OPA, this (turnover) ratio ran about 50%
per year. For the 7-month period ending January 1944, a time
of special trial, the rate of the entire agency was 64%, for
local board clerical staff 40%, for regional district and area
rental offices 111%, and for the national office 74%." Harvey C.
Mansfield 1947, <u>A Short History of the OPA</u>, Wash.: U.S. Govt.
Printing Office, p. 229.
Unfortunately, no breakdown for volunteers, as compared with
paid workers, is given here. A comparison of the turnover of
volunteer and paid civil defense directors in three Midwestern
States in 1962-63 is given in a later section of this report.

[39] Cf. Thursz, <u>op cit</u>., p. 71-73; and Barber, 1958, <u>op cit</u>. p. 609.

[40] In still another case, many voluntary organizations operate by
electing decision-makers from their membership and paying these
elected officials for making policy and carrying out the major
activities of the organization. For example, labor unions
operate in this fashion.

III. On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
Footnotes (Cont'd)

[41] The advantages and disadvantages presented here are implicit
in many practical materials on volunteer boards. Cf. for
example, Cyril O. Houle. 1960. The Effective Board. New
York: Association Press; or United Community Funds and Councils
of America, Inc. 1954. First on the Agenda: A Guide for
Boards of Voluntary Agencies. New York: Advisory Committee
on Citizen Participation of Community Chests and Councils of
America and National Social Welfare Assembly; or Clarence King.
1938. Social Agency Boards and How to Make them Effective.
New York: Harper and Bros.

[42] Cf. Chester Bowles. 1954. "OPA Volunteers -- Big Democracy
in Action," Public Administration Review, 5: pp. 350-359;

Persia Campbell. 1944. "Volunteers in Public Administration:
A Case Study," Public Administration Review," 4: p. 23;

Bernard Barber. 1948. op cit., p. 244.

[43] Imogene Putnam. 1947.. Volunteers in OPA. Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office (General Publication No. 14
in the OPA Series of Historical Reports on War Administration),
p. 23.

[44] ibid., p. 1 and 143. Also see Harvey C. Mansfield, 1947, A
Short History of OPA. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government
Printing Office (General Publication No. 15 in the OPA Series
of Historical Reports on War Administration), pp. 241-252.

[45] Putnam, op cit., Chapters 10 and 11.

[46] ibid., pp. 148-149.

[47] Mansfield describes the tendency for increasing Federal control
in the following:

> "Board management was a problem in the national
> office...Board members were volunteers, they were
> at the opposite end of the communication and re-
> porting line, they were often strongly entrenched
> locally, and they could or would read only a
> limited amount of the voluminous materials sent
> them. The national office had not even a mailing
> list of their names and addresses; they were too
> numerous and shifting a group for direct individual
> attention. All this added up to a high degree of
> local autonomy. Program instructions filtered
> through program channels, but the controls over
> board performance were relatively weak unless the
> boards could be given an automatic and objective
> standard they could apply to their own operations..."

III. On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
Footnotes (Cont'd)

"Finally...a system of monthly programs to guide
the emphasis of board activities was developed,
and a statistical reporting system was installed;
the results of which were fed back to the boards,
and which disclosed at a glance the relative
standing of each board in the accomplishment of
set goals. Figures on the number of retail stores
in a board's jurisdiction, the number of stores
checked per month, the number of board conferences
with retailers over violations, and the disposal
of violation cases, formed the framework of this
measurement of performance. Had it been in opera-
tion three years earlier the story of local retail
price control might have been very different...

"Regional offices never ceased to believe that
they were required to transmit to Washington
problems that they were better equipped to act
upon expeditiously and with fuller knowledge and
appreciation of the factual circumstances.
District offices felt the same way about their
regional offices...

"The question of decentralization became a burning
issue in the spring of 1943. An extensive survey
was made then to determine the extent of existing
delegations and to encourage further delegation.
It developed that the field offices already had
nearly all the responsibility that some of them
felt they could handle..." (Mansfield, op cit.,
pp. 219-220; see also pp. 162-163.)

Regarding the tendency for Federal control to be accepted and
preferred by local volunteer boards, Putnam says:

"...When educating the community seemed of vital
importance...the number (of volunteers) doubled
and trebled; when this emphasis shifted,....their
number dropped to an all-time low. Again,...
when they received definite and regular programs
from the national office their number again grew
and then remained stable in spite of the general
decline in volunteers...." (ibid., p. 147.)

[48] Donald D. Stewart. 1951. "The Place of Volunteer Participation
in a Bureaucratic Organization," Social Forces, 29 (March 1951):
pp. 312. This article represents a summary of Donald D. Stewart,
1950, "Local Board: A Study of the Place of Volunteer Partici-
pation in a Bureaucratic Organization," Columbia University,
unpublished PhD. dissertation.

[49] ibid., p. 316.

III. On the Use of Volunteers and Voluntary Organizations --
      Footnotes (Cont'd)

[50] ibid.

[51] The technique of distributing performance standings of the local
boards is noted above. Cf. Mansfield, op cit., p. 219.

[52] These principles were stated by M. L. Wilson, Director of
Extension Work of the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture in 1940.
Cf. M. L. Wilson, 1940, "A Theory of Agricultural Democracy,"
an address before the American Political Science Association,
Chicago, December 28, 1940 (quoted in Philip Selznick, 1949,
TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study of the Sociology of Formal
Organization. Berkeley: University of California Press,
p. 222.

[53] The description given here of the Agricultural Extension Service
is taken from Edmund de S. Brunner and E. Hsin Pao Yang, 1949,
Rural America and the Extension Service: A History and Critique
of the Cooperative Agricultural and Home Economics Extension
Service. New York: Columbia University Teacher's College
Bureau of Publications, especially Chapters 2-4.

[54] ibid., Chapter 11.

[55] ibid., pp. 65-71.

[56] Cf. Selznick, op cit., especially pp. 219-226.

[57] The use of other organizations in implementing (carrying out)
an organization's program has been termed "cooptation" by Philip
Selznick, who discussed this procedure in relation to the
administration of the TVA. Selznick identified two basic forms
of cooptation: formal and informal. In formal cooptation
Organization A (usually a government organization) incorporates
Organization B (usually a voluntary organization) into its
decision-making structure via formal cooperative agreements and
the like. Formal cooptation occurs when there is a need to
establish legitimacy of authority or administrative accessibility
of the relevant public. Informal cooptation involves an actual
restructuring of decision-making power within Organization A to
include new elements (for example, Organization B or C), but
without public or legal recognition of the incorporation of new
elements. Selznick feels that "the voluntary association device
...(is)...a case of formal cooptation, primarily for promoting
organized access to the public but also a means of supporting
the legitimacy of the TVA program." (ibid., pp. 259-264.)

[58] ibid., p. 219.

[59] ibid., p. 220-221.

SECTION II

Community Leaders and Local Programs

Introduction

Our decision to study community power structure and opinion
leadership as part of the problem of voluntarism in civil defense
was based on the assumption implicit in Section I that volunteers
are more readily recruited into local programs which have obtained
at least the tacit support of leaders whose influence is generally
recognized as embracing the community as a whole. We hypothesized
that in the absence of a clearly comprehended disaster situation,
civil defense does in fact tend to lack this upper-echelon support.
We therefore designed a comparative community study which we hoped
would provide a preliminary test of this proposition.

As noted in Section I, a federal-local program relying chiefly
on volunteers for staffing its operations may elect to emphasize
one of two general procedures: (1) it may use existing organiza-
tions, particularly local voluntary groups, in administering its
program; or (2) it may use individual volunteers who are directly
incorporated into the organization itself, as rank and file workers,
or as members of advisory and administrative committees. If the
second method is emphasized, the danger exists, as Selznick
observes, that recruits will tend to be persons who, although
enthusically devoted to the program, are relatively powerless
locally, and whose specialized personal interests, whether
technical or ideological, may deflect the organization's goals
and activities on the local level away from those set or recom-
mended by the federal agency. This danger is, of course, magnified
if the community's established leaders are bypassed in the process
of program development, _and_ if the current need for the program is
not transparently obvious. In such a case, the corps of volunteers

- 2.1 -

may take on the character of a "social movement" having little
apparent relevance to the community's central preoccupations.

Selznick further observes that while the question of which
alternative to emphasize must depend primarily on the imperatives
of the program's objectives at the federal level, it is wisest to
elect the first procedure, the use of existing voluntary organiza-
tions, insofar as local organizations exist which have similar or
related aims. Here again, and particularly if the program's
objectives span the total community, the established local leader-
ship must be brought into the program, at least at the level of
understanding and general support of its purposes. Such acquiescence
is more than ever essential if established leaders are actively
involved in those local organizations whose goals are most closely
to those of the program in question.

In the case of civil defense, both characteristics obtain: i.e.
i.e., its principal aim is nothing less than protection of the
entire community in natural or man-made disasters; and there are
existing local organizations whose aims are similar, if not so all-
encompassing. Furthermore, these organizations (most notably the
Red Cross, the Community Chest, the Salvation Army, and volunteer
groups associated with hospitals and schools) do tend to be popular
with "the establishment", members of which are typically to be
found sitting on their boards and committees, if only in a decora-
tive capacity. It would therefore seem particularly relevant to
the success of local civil defense programs that its administrators
attempt to work through these established leaders; and in short,
our aim in this phase of our two-pronged study was to investigate
the degree to which, in a selected sample of communities, this is
being done.

A further and more immediately practical argument for the importance of certain community leaders' attitudes to the success of local civil defense programs has been injected by the federal agency's efforts in recent years to develop a national fallout shelter program. When official emphasis shifted from private family shelters to public shelters located in existing buildings, it became necessary for civil defense administrators at the local level to deal directly with those community "gate-keepers" whose cooperation is essential to carrying out the marking and stocking programs. Our study coincided with the completion of the shelter survey and the beginning of marking and stocking; and it was precisely at this point, with the departure of the Army Engineers who conducted the survey, that local civil defense personnel became crucial to the effective continuation of the federal shelter program.

To cite a single example: In "Hometown", where the local civil defense organization had developed minimal contact with non-governmental community leaders, the local director found himself confronting attitudes ranging from apathy to hostility on the part of a number of owners, managers, or caretakers of buildings identified for shelter use. He was ultimately forced to appeal to Chamber of Commerce officials, to whom he had been hitherto unknown, for assistance in the necessary task of "opening the shelter doors". Thus, from both a long and short run point of view, established local leaders appear centrally important to the conduct of a maximally effective civil defense program. At the very least, it would seem essential to obtain their acquiescence in the program's major goals, if not their personal participation in its activities.

The Communities

Our first field problem was the establishment of criteria for selecting the study communities. We considered comparing communities having effective civil defense programs (by federal agency standards) with communities having ineffective programs; but we ultimately rejected criteria so specific to civil defense per se. We instead sought criteria that would yield a range of community types from which we could derive hypotheses that might apply more broadly to the total society. We knew that, owing to the pilot nature of our inquiry and the fact that we could hope to visit no more than five or six communities, we could not reach definitive conclusions about "American communities" or "American community leaders". Yet, within the time and funds at our disposal, we wished to maximize representativeness, and we decided, therefore, to select communities on the basis of certain socio-economic characteristics that typify the nation as a whole.

Specifically, these criteria are the following: (1) median income; (2) labor force composition (white collar exclusive of sales, mining and manufacturing, agriculture); (3) degree of industrialization (total number of manufacturing organizations); and (4) rate of industrial growth (per capita value added from manufacturing over a ten year period).[1] On the basis of these measures, then, we chose a group of five communities which differ from each other on a rough "economic growth" continuum, and which may be viewed as representing socio-economic types characteristic (although by no means exhaustive) of American communities in general. In addition, we controlled very roughly on size, so

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[1] Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census. County and City Data Book, 1962. (A Statistical Abstract Supplement) U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., 1962.

that all five communities fall within the 10,000 to 100,000 population range.

We decided further that all communities should be located in the general vicinity of a major target area. This would permit us to control on the vulnerability-to-attack factor, and to hold geographic region constant. (The latter may not have been essential, but we wished to minimize any extraneous considerations that might be introduced by wide variations in overall "regional culture", state laws, or regional civil defense regulations and procedures.) Our choice of the middle-west was based largely on considerations of sheer expediency: (1) the project director, before physically joining the Cornell staff, had begun an examination of the civil defense program in the community we call "Hometown", a middle-sized city in central Indiana, and it seemed reasonable to complete this preliminary investigation. (2) While debating criteria for the selection of study communities, we visited the 1962 meetings in Knoxville, Tennessee of the United States Civil Defense Council. We were there urged to concentrate in Civil Defense Region IV by several midwestern local directors, who volunteered their cooperation in our contemplated questionnaire survey of local civil defense directors.

We emerged, finally, with the following five communities, listed and described in order, from the comparatively simple or "under-developed" to the highly complex and industrialized:

1. <u>River City</u>. A once-proud transportation and lumber town, this community has been afflicted by various forms of mechanization and has suffered for years from chronic unemployment and rapid population loss. On our four criteria for selection, River City

ranks fifth in median income; first in per-cent of labor force
employed in agriculture, and fifth in the other two employment
categories; fourth in total number of manufacturing establishments;
and third in per capita value added from manufacturing, 1950-1960.
Its population is about 12,000, and declining; and it is located
within 200 miles of St. Louis, a major target area.

2. <u>Minersville</u>. Dependent for half a century on coal mining,
this community has been victimized by the severe technological un-
employment characteristic of that industry in America. Located in
"Tornado Alley", it has experienced a long history of natural
disasters and mine disasters, and its civil defense program
reflects this. On our criteria, Minersville ranks fourth in
median income; second in per-cent of labor force employed in
agriculture, third in the manufacturing employment category
(almost exclusively mining), and fourth in the white collar
category; third in total number of manufacturing establishments;
and fourth in per capita value added from manufacturing. Its
population is about 9,000, and declining; and, like River City,
it is located within 200 miles of St. Louis.

3. <u>Hometown</u>. This community might be more appropriately
named "Averageville", since, on our selection criteria, it closely
approximates both the national and regional average. Hometown is
a relatively stable, middle-sized community, originally an agri-
cultural trading center, but slowly becoming industrial. For our
five communities, it ranks third in median income; third in per-
cent of labor force employed in agriculture, fourth in the manu-
facturing employment category, and second in white collar employ-
ment (it is the seat of a major university); second in total

number of manufacturing establishments; and second in per capita value added from manufacturing. Its population is about 50,000, and growing; and it is located within 150 miles of Chicago.

4. <u>Factoryville</u>. The largest city in our sample, this is an old and rapidly growing industrial community, still dominated by heavy industry, but beginning to diversify. For our sample, it ranks second in median income; fourth in per-cent employed in agriculture, first in the manufacturing employment category, and third in white collar employment; first in total number of manufacturing establishments; and first in per capita value added from manufacturing. Its population is about 80,000, and growing; and it is within 50 miles of Chicago.

5. <u>Newtown</u>. In a sense, this community falls outside our "economic growth" continuum, since it is an exclusively residential suburb with no manufacturing establishments and a population which is almost wholly white collar. We can compare it with the other four more traditional communities only on median income, for which it ranks first. We included Newtown in our sample, because its type has been multiplying rapidly in American society, and will become increasingly characteristic if metropolitan decentralization continues. Its population is about 40,000, and beginning to stabilize; and, like Factoryville, it is within 50 miles of Chicago.

The Community Leaders

In selecting the leaders to be interviewed in each community, we considered (a) the decision-making influence of the <u>person</u>, in the community as a whole, and (b) the importance of the leadership

role to the effective conduct of a local civil defense program.
For example, although superintendents of schools are not usually
community-wide influentials, we always interviewed them, because
of the central importance of the schools to civil defense.
Similarly, except in large metropolitan centers, the local mayor
tends to be influential on a community-wide scale only if his
non-governmental occupation makes him so. However, since local
civil defense programs are frequently formal adjuncts of city
government (as in Hometown, Factoryville, and Newtown), or have
close unofficial ties with it (as in Minersville and River City),
we always interviewed the mayor. For the rest, our selection
procedure was as follows:

After choosing our five communities, and before entering the
field, we wrote to the executive director of the Chamber of
Commerce, requesting complete lists of persons occupying the
following positions: (1) owners or managers of the principal
manufacturing firms; (2) owners or managers of the principal
retail establishments; (3) principal officers and board members
of the local banks; (4) officials of the principal labor organiza-
tions; (5) the mayor, and members of the city council and county
board of supervisors; (6) the superintendents of schools; (7)
owners or managers of the local newspapers and radio stations, if
any; (8) officers of the Chamber of Commerce; (9) members of the
community's most prominent law firms; and (10) directors and deputy
directors of city and county civil defense programs.

These initial lists were, of course, very lengthy. But when
we arrived in a given community, we spent about half a day with
the Chamber of Commerce executive, interviewing him with respect

to the relative influence, community-wide, of the persons on our original lists. We asked: "Suppose an issue affecting the total community came up, for which the support of key leaders would be essential - for instance, a school bond issue, or a flouridation program, or something like that. Of all these people, whose backing would you consider most important?" We then went through the lists, person by person, and ended with a far shorter list numbering between twenty and thirty-five. These were the persons we then interviewed; and as we interviewed, we continuously checked our list against respondents' assessments of the local power structure. This procedure occasionally resulted in a_ditions or deletions;[2] but by and large, the Chamber executive's original diagnosis held up very well.[3]

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[2] In Hometown, we eliminated labor officials, by this procedure, since it was the view of all other respondents that these functionaries are quire uninvolved in general community affairs. In Factoryville, we added Roman Catholic Clergy, upon discovering that the population there is well over 50% Catholic. In Newtown, our entire sample is unique, since, as noted, this is an exclusively residential suburb. Here, we interviewed government officials; the village attorney; the village manager; the superintendents of schools; the presidents of the two boards of education; the public relations agent for the shopping center merchants; the pastor of the largest church; and one of the community's original "settlers", cited by all other respondents as the single most "listened to" man in town.

[3] This is not surprising, since this individual must, by the very nature of his job, be uniquely sensitive to total community power structure. It has, in fact, become customary in recent years for the U. S. Chamber of Commerce to conduct special training courses in community structure for its local executives; the executives in River City, Hometown, and Factoryville had all taken such courses.

A precise breakdown of respondents by occupational situs follows, for each community:[4]

1. Minersville

    (a) City and County Government: 4
    (b) Banks: 1
    (c) Industry: 4
    (d) Retail and Service: 8
    (e) Agriculture: 3
    (f) Labor: 1
    (g) Media: 1
    (h) Miscellaneous Professional: 1

2. River City

    (a) City and County Government: 4
    (b) Banks: 4
    (c) Industry: 5
    (d) Retail and Service: 3
    (e) Education: 4
    (f) Agriculture: 2
    (g) Labor: 1
    (h) Media: 1
    (i) Miscellaneous Professional: 3

3. Hometown

    (a) City and County Government: 3
    (b) Banks: 3
    (c) Industry: 5
    (d) Retail and Service: 5
    (e) Education: 3
    (f) Agriculture: 0
    (g) Labor: 0
    (h) Media: 1
    (i) Miscellaneous Professional: 1

4. Factoryville

    (a) City and County Government: 5
    (b) Banks: 3
    (c) Industry: 7

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[4] The reader will note variances by community in the proportion of industrial to retail and service leaders interviewed. This reflects power structure differences owing to variations in economic base. Thus, in Minersville, a one-industry town in which coal company representatives do not participate in local affairs, the key leadership group is heavily weighted with retail merchants; in Factory, industrial owners and managers predominate and in River City and Hometown, the proportions are more nearly equal.

4. **Factoryville** (Cont'd)

> (d) Retail and Service: 4
> (e) Education: 5
> (f) Agriculture: 1
> (g) Labor: 2
> (h) Clergy: 3
> (i) Media: 2
> (j) Miscellaneous Professional: 3

5. **Newtown**

> (a) Village Government: 13
> (b) Retail and Service: 2
> (c) Education: 4
> (d) Clergy: 1
> (e) Miscellaneous: 4

Between December, 1962, and June, 1963, we interviewed a total of 131 leaders in the five field-study communities, and of these, 18 were formally associated with civil defense. However, the data discussed below derive from smaller sub-samples within the leadership groups we interviewed. In order to render the leadership populations identical, or nearly so, and the inter-community comparisons valid, we selected from the total group of respondents fourteen persons whose status-role positions are almost the same for each community. These are: the mayor, the presidents of the two principal banks, the owners or managers of the four firms having the largest employment rolls; the two most important downtown merchants; the newspaper editor; the superintendents of schools; the president of the Chamber of Commerce; and the leading official of the most important labor organization. Since Minersville has only one bank and one school superintendent, the number there is twelve rather than fourteen.[5]

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[5] There are some variations in these sub-samples, tailored to community variations in elite structure. In Hometown, as previously noted, organized labor is not influential in the total community, whereas a major university is: hence, a university official substitutes for a labor leader in this sub-sample. In Factoryville and Newtown, the cleargy are influential; hence, a leading clergyman is included in these two groups, but not in the other three. As noted earlier, the entire Newtown sample differs from the others, owing to the residential nature of the community.

We interviewed the community leaders with a guide uniform for all respondents, consisting of open-ended questions about a rather broad range of social-problem issues.[6] The interview began with a question about world problems in general, moving from there to a set of questions concerning war as a general form of human behavior; causes and cures of the present Cold War; and the likelihood of a third major "hot" war using nuclear weapons. From here, we moved into problem areas more specifically domestic: race relations, labor-management relations, unemployment, and civil defense, asking about each of these as they affect both nation and local community. Our reasons for pursuing this line of inquiry were (1) to attempt to derive perceptual themes, or organizing principles, on the basis of which individuals presumably organize a large number of specific social attitudes; and (2) to locate the issue of civil defense in the context of attitudes toward other local, national, and international problems. In the course of our analysis of these data, we have developed analytic categories which do appear to link these attitudes into evaluative patterns. However, for purposes of the present report, we limit our presentation to those findings having direct relevance to civil defense.

Community Leadership Attitudes

All respondents were asked the following questions with respect to civil defense:

> 1. What about civil defense, here locally?
>   What is the program like, as far as you know?

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[6] Persons formally associated with civil defense were not interviewed in this fashion, but were treated as informants, from whom we obtained details about the program's nature and objectives.

2. In general, what do you think of the local
   civil defense program?

3. If you yourself were to set up a local civil
   defense program, what do you think it should
   be like?

4. In your view, who should have principal
   responsibility for the conduct of civil
   defense?

5. How concerned would you say you are with
   the problem of civil defense?

6. Do you have preparedness facilities of any
   kind here at your place of business? How
   about in your home? Have you made any plans
   for facilities of this kind?

7. In general, how do you feel about the whole
   question of fallout shelters?

The reader will note that all of these questions are open-ended, in the sense that no categories of response are suggested. This was deliberate, since we wished the respondent to structure the problem in his own terms, without benefit of our more special-ized understanding of civil defense at both federal and local levels. In this way, we were able to derive impressions of the respondent's _knowledge_ about civil defense, as well as his attitudes toward it; and we were able to locate discrepancies between perceptions, on the one hand, and reality, on the other.[7]

We present below brief summaries of responses to these questions, not necessarily in the order in which they were asked. Our tabular presentation appears in Appendix B.

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[7] Although most of these questions are straightforward, so that responses are readily classified for statistical purposes, this is not as true of Questions 2 and 7, above. Here, the problem of bias arises, and we do not intend to minimize this. Responses were classified by the project director (blind for respondents' identities), followed by spot checks by a person unfamiliar with the data. The raw data themselves are of course available upon request.

1. General Attitudes Toward Fallout Shelters

We find in general that responses to the broad question about fallout shelters tend to be largely negative, although seldom aggressively so. Slightly more than half (53%) of the respondents in our five sub-samples answered the question in a manner which we have classified as "unqualified rejection"; and except for a few genuinely bitter antagonists, this usually meant a disinclination to be "bothered". (Said one Hometown leader, for example: "I think the whole thing is pretty silly, and to tell you the truth, I couldn't care less.") Another 24% gave answers which we have termed "qualified rejection". This type of response usually ran something like this: "I suppose we need some kind of precautions, just in case. But I don't see the President building a shelter, so why should I?" Nine per cent of all respondents in the sub-samples declined to offer any opinion, claiming ignornace or true neutrality. And the remaining 14% gave responses which we classified as "qualified" or "unqualified" acceptance, the "qualified" acceptors giving responses like: "If they could get the bugs out and assure me that shelter specifications are really sound, I would build one tomorrow." (Table 1, Appendix A)[8]

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[8] It should be noted here that responses were addressed to the question of fallout shelters in general, without specification as to private versus public shelters. When we first began our field work, we did make this distinction, only to find that it tends to be relatively meaningless. Except for a very small number of unusually well informed individuals, most respondents reacted to the concept of shelters, irrespective of sponsorship. Furthermore, it is likely that many respondents formed their views during the debate in 1960 over private home shelters, and this is the image they tend to retain.

By way of clarifying this notion of "qualification", we present below a summary of the reservations about shelters which we encountered, together with illustrative comments and the frequency with which these qualifications were expressed:

1. <u>The need for a massive shelter program has not been demonstrated</u>. This reservation was expressed by forty-one of the respondents in our sub-samples (61%), and a typical illustration is the following:

> "I can be honest and say my neighbor can go ahead if he wants to, but I don't think I would build one. It ties in with my feeling that I strongly feel or hope that shelters will have no use. It makes sense to plan for protection, but in the event of a nuclear bomb or fallout, if it comes in the midst of Factoryville, I wouldn't want to live."

2. <u>In the absence of demonstrated need, the cost of an effective shelter program is prohibitive and unjustified</u>. Thirty-two persons (48%) volunteered this reservation, illustrated by the following:

> "I think we should have precautions of some kind, even though I don't think there's going to be a nuclear war. Just in <u>case</u>, though. But I'm against private family shelters - they're too expensive, they're just not practical. I'd favor shelters in the schools and other public buildings. There again, though, the cost is so great! I think the American public just won't buy a strong shelter program. Most people think shelters show a defeatist attitude, and they'd rather spend the money for something else. I don't blame them."

3. <u>Know-how is inadequate: (a) No one can know where the enemy will attack, if he does. (b) No one knows what the magnitude of the weapons might be. (c) No one knows how to build truly effective shelters, no matter what the magnitude of the weapons</u>. Twenty-seven persons (40%) gave this response, as, for example:

"If I was told that it would make the difference
between life and death for my family, I would
definitely build one, and I would do it with my
own money, although most people can't. But I
have never had an authoritative statement regard-
ing whether or not it would help me to build one."

4. <u>The aftermath of a nuclear attack would be impossible
to live with: (a) In all likelihood, sustenance and friends
would be destroyed or contaminated. (b) Even if destruction were
not total, a post-attack society would not be worth living in.</u>
Twenty-two persons (33%) gave this type of response:

"The shelter program is just about as silly as you
can get. You can't build enough to cover every-
body where everybody would be. And even if you'd
survive, all the vegetation would be dead, people
would be dead, you might just as well not come out."

5. <u>Unless all can be saved, none should be saved. (Who
will hold the shotgun at the door?)</u> This reservation was expressed
by sixteen of our respondents (24%):

"The original concept of CD was a little bit radical,
I thought - where you built your shelter and put a
shotgun inside the door. Then you were supposed to
to go inside a hole for two weeks. If that's the
kind of screwballs that were thinking this thing
out, no wonder it didn't go over. I couldn't shoot
a man for trying to save himself and his family!"

6. <u>Hiding in a hole in the ground is cowardly; it is better
to face the music and go down like a man.</u> Nine respondents (14%)
gave this response, as follows:

"Personally, I think it's a bunch of baloney. I
don't know why the government bothers with it.
They use this fear stuff, and I personally don't
think the American people are scared enough to
buy it. Myself, I'd rather be taken standing
up than to run into a hole."

7. <u>The nation should work for peace, not prepare for war</u>.

Eight persons (12%) volunteered this type of response:

> "All this preparation for shelters, all this
> preparedness! It tends to build up the
> attitude that, 'Well, we're ready for it,
> let it come!', rather than concentrating
> on all-out efforts to prevent it."

8. <u>Families would be separated</u>. Five respondents (7%) made

this reservation, as, for example:

> "Even if we had the knowledge and the funds
> to construct adequate shelters for everyone,
> it wouldn't work, because families won't
> stay separated. Dad would be at work, Mother
> would be at home, Junior would be at school.
> You couldn't expect those people to go down
> into their own shelter without knowing what
> was happening to the rest of the family."

9. <u>In-shelter tensions would make underground captivity</u>

<u>unbearable</u>. Five respondents (7%) offered this type of observation:

> "If I were in charge of civil defense, I would
> emphasize that <u>home</u> should be a man's shelter.
> This is where the family ought to be anyhow.
> A group of strangers thrown together in a
> shelter would present a tremendous psychological
> problem."

It thus appears that the question of <u>need</u> for a strong shelter

program has not been answered to the satisfaction of nearly two-

thirds of our respondents; nor can it be answered in any conclusive

way. Second in importance, for these community leaders, is the

problem of <u>cost</u>, whether privately or publicly defrayed; and

closely related is the third major reservation, adequacy of con-

struction specifications, or <u>know-how</u>. As to post-attack con-

ditions, or aftermath, this is yet another imponderable, like

need, and may be tapping a more general optimism-pessimism

orientation. The remaining reservations are what might be termed

"psycho-philosophical", and it is difficult to see how these can
be met in any public airing of the issues, since they seem
essentially private and subjective in character. But cost and
know-how _can_ be thoroughly discussed, and the frequency with
which they were volunteered as objections to the shelter program
suggests that they should receive even more exhaustive attention
than is currently the case.

In an effort to shed further light on the basic character of
these responses to our shelter question, we grouped them into
three broad categories: (1) "affective" responses (references to
separation of families and interpersonal tensions within shelters);
(2) "cognitive" responses (references to need, cost and know-how);
and (3) "evaluative" responses (references to aftermath, sheltering
all or sheltering none, hiding in a hole, and working for peace).
We then correlated these qualification categories with level of
acceptance or rejection of the fallout shelter concept. We found
that persons giving evaluative responses are by far the more
likely to reject the shelter concept, out of hand; those giving
affective responses are the more likely to accept the shelter
concept, or to qualify an initially negative reaction; and those
giving cognitive responses are in the middle (Table 2, Appendix A).
We tentatively interpret these findings as suggesting that if cost
and know-how criticisms could be adequately met, much of the
negativism we encountered would be vitiated. We think it likely
that most of those who volunteered evaluative responses will tend
to remain relatively rigid in their views, at least in the absence
of a clear and present danger of actual nuclear attack.

We next grouped responses to the shelter question into a sort of reference-group dichotomy, as follows: (1) "personal" orientations (references to essentially private considerations, whether affective, cognitive, or evaluative - e.g., "They cost too much, I can't afford it"; "I won't shoot my neighbor"; "I won't hide in a hole"); and (2) "collectivity" orientations (references to some social group - e.g., "Americans aren't scared enough"; "The nation should work for peace"; "A post-attack world would be uncivilized"). When these categories were correlated with acceptance or rejection of the shelter concept, we found that the collectivity-oriented are somewhat the more likely to reject shelters in toto. (Table 3, Appendix A). The categories are rough, and the relationships are not striking; nevertheless, this preliminary finding suggests that appeals based largely on considerations of sheer personal survival may be missing the mark, for many community leaders, and might even boomerang. Our feeling was that discussions of the need for a shelter program would have greater impact upon such group-minded elites, if civil defense were presented more clearly and precisely in the broader context of overall Cold War strategy and objectives.

We also examined responses to the shelter question as these appear to be related to prognostications about the inevitability of war in general, and the likelihood of nuclear war in particular. Our predictions, based on the superficial logic of the case, were that believers in the inevitability of war would be the more favorable toward shelters, as would predictors of an eventual nuclear holocaust. We found something rather different:

First, the relationship between shelter attitudes and assessment of war's inevitability is U-shaped: that is, those among our respondents who state that war is definitely not inevitable and those who state that it definitely is are equally the more likely to dismiss the notion of fallout shelters. (Table 4, Appendix A). Those whose responses are hedged (i.e., war is probably inevitable, or war may not be inevitable) are far more accepting of the shelter concept. Having observed the result, the explanation seemed obvious: If war is not inevitable, there is no need for shelters; if war is inevitable, there is little hope for salvation. In either case, a shelter program appears unavailing and wasteful. Second, we find that respondents who predict nuclear war are somewhat more, rather than less, likely to reject shelters, although the relationship is not pronounced. (Table 5, Appendix A).

Since the latter correlation appears especially to defy logic, we hypothesized that we were again tapping a generalized optimism-pessimism dimension, a dimension also implicit in the question concerning the inevitability of war. Accordingly, we combined responses to both items, obtaining what we have termed an optimism-pessimism score. Those respondents who state categorically that war is not inevitable and nuclear war unlikely are classified as "optimists"; those stating categorically that war is inevitable and nuclear war a distinct possibility are classified as "pessimists"; and those who qualify their responses to one or both questions are classified as "doubtfuls". When we correlated this score with shelter attitudes, we found a clear relationship in a direction opposite to the one initially predicted. That is, optimists are most favorable toward shelters, pessimists least

favorable, and doubtfuls in the middle. (Table 6, Appendix A).
From these findings, preliminary though they may be, one gathers
that the so-called "scare" approach to the need for shelters may
be mustering negative, rather than positive, attitudes toward the
program.

And finally (since we had found that the generalized reference-
group and optimism-pessimism variables correlate separately with
shelter acceptance or rejection), we combined these categories and
found that the relationships are considerably enhanced. For both
the personally oriented and the collectivity oriented, optimism-
pessimism score is related to shelter attitudes. But the relation-
ship is cumulative: that is, only one-third of the optimists who
are personally oriented reject the shelter concept, whereas nearly
three-fourths of the pessimists who are collectivity oriented do
so. (Table 7, Appendix A). We suggest that the explanation may
be of this order: The personally oriented optimist appears to be
saying, "I don't really think there will be a nuclear war, but
just in case, I want to maximize my chances for survival, so that
I can get back into action when it's over." The collectivity
oriented pessimist, on the other hand, may be saying, as one of
our respondents did indeed say - "I really don't want to worry
about starting the world all over again. Maybe it would be just
as well not to be protected and not to have to worry about that."

2. Salience of Civil Defense

As previously noted, reactions to the fallout shelter issue,
although negative, were not aggressively so. We believe, there-
fore, that it would constitute an erroneous interpretation of our

data to assume that a well administered, clearly presented, and adequately financed federal program of public shelters would be actively resisted by these community elites. What struck us most forcibly in our field studies was not so much the _direction_ of shelter attitudes as their generally low salience, relative to other local and national issues.

When asked, "How concerned would you say you are with the problem of civil defense?", nearly half (47%) of the respondents in our five community sub-samples gave responses which can scarcely be interpreted as denoting anything but indifference. Another 35% indicated some slight interest; and fewer than one-fifth (18%) expressed "considerable" or "very great" interest. (Table 8, Appendix A). Another indicator of concern, perhaps more telling than stated attitude, is the degree to which concrete defensive precautions have in fact been taken. We found that half our sample have _no_ preparedness facilities or plans in their places of business; another 12% we classified as "passive acceptors" in that their buildings were designated for shelter use in the federal survey; 20% have a warning system or provision for alternate storage of vital records; 13% have a formal disaster plan; and only 5% either have a shelter or plan to construct one. (Table 9, Appendix A). As to home preparedness, the record is weaker still: only 4% have a complete home shelter built to federal specifications, or an area set aside for shelter use; 7% have considered building a shelter, but ultimately abandoned the idea; and 89% have never seriously considered building a shelter. (Table 10, Appendix A).

Although, as we have reported, a good many negative comments were made about civil defense in general and the shelter program in particular, most of these lacked the force of fierce or rigid conviction. Our impression was that apathy, rather than outright hostility, is the prevailing attitude among the community leaders we interviewed. Thus, while it is doubtful that, in the absence of a concrete emergency, many of these leaders could be persuaded to become actively involved in civil defense activities, it seems equally doubtful that any organized resistance would greet a solidly administered program. Program administration, and its partner, program interpretation, appear to be the keys to the cities, as we shall discuss further in the pages to follow.

3. The Federal-Local Dichotomy

It is true that civil defense at all administrative levels has always maintained a dual program of responsibility for both natural and man-made disasters, including armed enemy attack. But this fact seems all but unknown to the community leaders in our five sub-samples. A strong federal emphasis in recent years on the fallout shelter program appears to have come across as an exclusive emphasis. One consequence has been, or so our data suggest, that many community leaders make a distinction between the federal program, on the one hand, and the local program on the other; and this is reflected in varying attitudes toward civil defense at these two administrative levels.

We found, for example, that only 15% of our respondents expressed generally unfavorable sentiments toward their local civil defense programs (in contrast to the 53% unfavorable to shelters); 39% expressed favorable attitudes toward the local

program; and the remaining 46% we have classified as neutral or
indifferent. (Table 11, Appendix A). We found further that only
one-third of our community leaders are largely ignorant of local
program activities and aims; whereas, as we have noted, it was
our impression that a majority were but dimly aware of the two-
pronged character of the federal program. (Table 12, Appendix A).
It is true, of course, that there is a positive relationship
between attitude toward the federal program (shelters) and attitude
toward civil defense at the local level. But the correlation is
by no means perfect, since more than one-fourth (27%) of our
least pro-shelter respondents are favorable toward the local
program, and nearly one-third (31%) know a good bit about its
operations. (Table 13, Appendix A).

Since we know the communities and their civil defense pro-
grams, we explain this apparent paradox on the basis primarily
of program goals and program emphasis, at the local level. The
Minersville and Newtown leaders tend to be least accepting of
fallout shelters, yet most supportive of their local civil defense
programs. In Minersville, in fact, a prominent retail merchant
and "old-family" member is civil defense director; and in Newtown,
civil defense is considered an essential adjunct of village govern-
ment. The explanation appears to be that in these two communities,
civil defense means protection against natural disasters and such
man-made misfortunes as mine explosions or burning buildings.

In Hometown and River City, on the other hand, the civil
defense directors are comparatively invisible, and community
leaders appear to become aware of the program only when they are
called upon for permission to mark their office, factory, or

school buildings for shelter purposes. In consequence, they tend
to identify the local program with what they perceive to be the
federal program, and natural disasters are thought to be the
province of the Red Cross or County Medical Society. Factoryville
appears to be a case of guilt by association. The civil defense
program is incorporated at least formally into local government,
but local government itself was at the time of our visit held in
low esteem by most community leaders not directly associated with
it. Thus, no one was pleased with civil defense, whether he
favored shelters or some other program emphasis.

In general support of this point, we found that to the extent
that our respondents were able to express any program preference
whatever (that 48% could not, we interpret as further evidence
of low salience), they opted in the main for general disaster
protection, with a de-emphasis on shelters; and this is especially
true in Minersville and Newtown. (Table 14, Appendix A).. Table 15
indicated that negative attitudes toward shelters and favorableness
toward the local program are accompanied by preference for a
general disaster emphasis. Table 16 suggests that regardless of
one's attitude toward shelters, a positive attitude toward the
local program is associated with a preference for general-disaster
protection. And in Table 17, we see that those of our community
leaders who maximally support the local program (i.e., those who
express a favorable attitude toward it and display a high level of
knowledge concerning it) evince an overwhelming preference for the
general disaster emphasis.

In summary, then, it would appear that where, in these five communities, the local program is identified exclusively with the federal shelter program, it tends to be regarded with indifference or impatience. But where the local program has, as in Minersville, long rendered services which are of clearly practical and immediate use to the community, it enjoys general support among community leaders. It should be noted here that this federal-local program distinction was not made by the researchers but by the respondents, who appeared, on the whole, more confused than condemning. This confusion is reflected in our finding that even though the civil defense program at the federal level tends to be misperceived, civil defense is nevertheless felt by a plurality of our respondents to be a federal responsibility. When we asked how civil defense should be organized and administered, more than a third (36%) were unable to specify; but 39% favored some form of strong federal direction, and only a fourth would vest principal responsibility in the local community. (Table 18, Appendix A).

From all of this, it would appear that the federal fallout shelter program may have been both undersold and oversold. It has been undersold in the sense that its relationship to overall Cold War strategy has been made insufficiently clear, and problems of cost and construction appear unresolved. It has been oversold in that it has come to be seen as the exclusive focus of the federal agency, so that general disaster functions are perceived as an entirely local phenomenon.

The Local Programs Described

As we have shown, leadership attitudes toward their local civil defense programs vary considerably from one community to another; and these disparities cannot be explained solely, or even primarily, on the basis of differential attitudes toward the federal fallout shelter program. It seems reasonable, therefore, to seek the explanation in the character of each local program. We present below brief summary descriptions of civil defense in the five communities we visited, basing these descriptions on interviews with local directors and deputy directors, as well as with officials of other organizations having similar objectives (in most cases, the Red Cross and the County Medical Society). The descriptions are based also on responses to our civil defense directors' questionnaire, which in every instance was completed by the local director or his deputy.

1. Minersville

In this community, where leadership attitudes toward local civil defense are generally favorable, the program emphasizes protection against natural disasters. Although the director personally favors a shelter program, especially in probable non-target areas like his own, he has presented civil defense to the community at large primarily as a natural disaster program. Private shelters have been encouraged in the community for many years, but not for fallout protection so much as for protection against storms and tornadoes. This area, located in "Tornado Alley", also has a history of mine disasters; hence, the need for a standby corps of emergency personnel has long been recognized.

The existing program, as close to a model civil defense program as we encountered in our field studies, was initiated by the current director in 1955. He was appointed by the local mayor and the county board of commissioners, and his program serves both city and county. He is, in addition, a member of the community elite. His family owns one of the largest furniture stores in the area, and, as a volunteer public servant, he served civil defense in an unpaid capacity until three years ago, when he became director, officially, of the county program. The county pays him $100 a month for his civil defense activities, and there is also a part-time salaried deputy director who takes primary responsibility for routine administration and paper work (it was he who filled out our lengthy questionnaire).

About 500 persons in the county are active in civil defense, according to the local director. They are engaged chiefly in radiological monitoring, home nursing, communications work, and auxiliary police and fire service. Training courses in these services are given at least annually in the civil defense building, a converted school building owned by the county and used solely for civil defense purposes. The local director and his deputy have taken civil defense management training at Battle Creek, and the county has sent one person to shelter-management school there. Managers for the three shelters identified in this county are now being trained by this person.

The civil defense program in this community has its own budget in both city and county. Additional funds are voted for unusual expenses. For example, special funds were voted for the acquisition of the school for use as a training and emergency

control center; and recently an additional $10,000 was voted for the modification of the building as a fallout shelter. The county cannot afford the expense involved in modifying this structure for blast protection, and hence must bear the total cost for fallout shelter modification. The local director was critical of federal policy for failure to allow matching funds for the modification of emergency operating centers as fallout shelters, in counties which are unlikely to be targets and must operate on very limited funds.

The emergency operating center currently has emergency power and communications facilities. Although a number of individuals in the community have been trained in radiological monitoring, the stations in the community are not now operating regularly, although warning stations in the fire house are manned twenty-four hours a day. The warning system, consisting of sirens, rescue and fire fighting equipment, and extensive radio equipment, have all been obtained with matching funds. The civil defense emergency personnel, especially the auxiliary police, fire, and rescue squads, meet regularly for training purposes. They were recently deployed in a large fire in one of the mines, and they regularly participate in fire fighting activity for smaller fires in the community.

Shelter spaces are available in the community for about 350 people in three shelters. A few shelters were also identified in nearby Baxter, the county seat, but only about 6% of the population in the county would be sheltered by these facilities. However, there are approximately fifty private family shelters in town, most of them built to federal fallout shelter specifica-

tions. The local director in Minersville is the only director in
our five communities who has his own fallout shelter, perhaps
because he alone, as a man of independent means, can afford one.
His shelter was copied from a shelter he saw in the Las Vegas
tests in 1955, and he incorporated it into a new home he built
shortly thereafter. He had been a volunteer fireman for twenty
years, when he witnessed the Las Vegas tests, and that experience
led to his initiating the civil defense program in Minersville, as
it is now constituted. The program had existed mostly on paper,
prior to that time, and has been accredited only since he assumed
direction.

City and county government officials are favorable toward and
interested in the civil defense program in this community.
Because of the natural disaster emphasis and the frequency of
such disasters in this area, no major difficulties have been
encountered in obtaining funds and cooperation from local govern-
ment. That community interest is comparatively high is evidenced
by the large number of volunteers participating in the program;
and no other significant disaster or emergency programs exist
which are not integrated into the city-county civil defense frame-
work. The Red Cross is involved in emergency medical and welfare
services in cooperation with the local civil defense program,
but there is no paid Red Cross executive in this community. Thus
civil defense is in command of all disaster and emergency services
(in contrast, for example, to Hometown and Factoryville, as we
shall discuss).

Minersville's major industry, the coal mines, have emergency
preparedness plans in which the civil defense organization

participates. Since the local program provides emergency personnel for mine disasters, the mine managers have been supportive to the program, although they do not participate directly themselves. No other local industries or commercial firms have emergency prepared-ness programs, but their owners and managers are generally favor-able toward local civil defense activities, and a few are actively involved as volunteers.

2. River City

To the extent that a civil defense program exists at all in this community, it is focussed on protection against natural disasters. The present organization, if it can be so designated, came into being in 1960, reportedly to render the community eligible for federal funds with which to repair a flood-damaged sewer. The local director, who had resigned just before our River City field trip, is a former fire chief and city commissioner, recruited as civil defense director by two leading citizens when funds were needed for sewer repair. While he served, he was paid his expenses only, and received no training in civil defense. As owner-manager of a one-man repair shop, he never felt he could take time off from his business for the training courses offered by nearby Southern Illinois University.

Unlike the coordinated Minersville program, River City has both a city and a county civil defense program, and neither appears to function effectively. The county director has been head of the volunteer firemen for ten years, and retains his civil defense title so that the county will continue to be eligible for certain kinds of surplus property. He receives no extra compensation for

his civil defense work, nor has he had formal training in civil defense. The auxiliary fire and police groups, a rescue squad, and a RACES organization constitute the civil defense rank and file in River City, and these organizations existed prior to the formal establishment of a civil defense program in 1960. Both recruitment and training appear slipshod, being left entirely to other volunteers. The civil defense directors, both city and county, complained bitterly about the amount of time they devote to civil defense, without pay or community recognition. Neither felt he would be willing to take civil defense training, unless someone came to the community for that purpose.

There is no appropriation for civil defense in either the city or the county, but funds are occasionally voted for special purposes. Neither organization has received federal matching funds for personnel or equipment, but each has obtained some surplus property. No formal civil defense training courses have been given in either city or county, but medical self-help courses have been taught in River City through Southern Illinois University and the public schools. The city director sent one man to Battle Creek for instruction in radiological monitoring; but this man, a local high school teacher, left the community before any courses could be instituted.

The city does have a formal civil defense plan, written by a local physician - the only community leader who expressed genuine interest in a civil defense program for this county-city area (another leader, a retired military officer, is active in civil defense at the state level only). The doctor is also in charge of emergency medical services at the local hospital. No emergency

operating center or radiological monitoring station exists in the
immediate area, although warning stations at the police and fire
departments are manned twenty-four hours a day. Before he resigned,
the city civil defense director (who based his resignation on lack
of support from newly elected local government officials) had
planned to approach the city council for funds to modify a portion
of city hall as an emergency control center; but such modification
has been indefinitely postponed.

Members of the RACES organization (two young ham radio
operators who provided the community's only communication services)
resigned from civil defense along with the local director, on
grounds that the city fathers were unwilling to provide them with
additional equipment they felt to be necessary. River City's only
remaining volunteers - the volunteer police and firemen, who also
serve as rescue squad - number about fifty men.

There is one large community shelter in River City, located
in the Federal Building. Its capacity is 6200 persons, about 80%
of the local population. There are three shelters in smaller
communities in the county, which can accomodate perhaps 40% of
the people living in these outlying areas. There is one private
family shelter in the county, belonging to the physician mentioned
above. Local government in both city and county has been generally
indifferent to civil defense, although the former mayor, under
whose administration the city director took office, did seem
amenable to the development of a civil defense organization that
could bring physical equipment to the area.

Thus, the community has no real civil defense organization
and has not evinced much interest in acquiring one, despite the

fact that periodic floods beset the area. The annual "high water"
emergencies are handled by Red Cross personnel sent in from St.
Louis, and this organization supports one part-time professional
in River City. There is a Red Cross Advisory Board in River City,
on which several community leaders serve, but in recent years
locally raised funds have been insufficient even to cover expenses.
No industries or commercial firms in the area have emergency
preparedness plans or programs.

3. Hometown

The word for civil defense in this community is "uncoordinated!
There are, in fact, three survival plans which, if united under a
single umbrella and activated by full-time paid personnel, could
constitute a model for the nation. But jurisdictional jealousies
appear severe; key community leaders appear largely indifferent
to the program and suffer from almost total ignorance concerning
it; and the local civil defense director (officially designated
deputy director, but in practice responsible for the program) has
neither the time nor temperament necessary for conciliating and
coordinating the competing emergency preparedness groups.

In theory, the county has one survival plan and one emergency
preparedness program. There is a county committee representing
all agencies having clear civil defense responsibilities, and
civil defense is part of city and county government; the county
appropriates an annual pittance, and the director and deputy
director are members of the city police force. There is an
elaborate written survival plan, modeled conscientiously on state
specifications and recommendations. The mayor feels dutiful, if
not enthusiastic, about civil defense; and the deputy director, a

police captain in charge of communications, works night and day
at the two full time jobs for which he receives a single salary.

Indeed, if any local director deserves a Purple Heart, it
appeared to us that this one does. Despite a tiny budget; despite
community leadership apathy; despite the fact that there are but
twenty-four hours in a day; despite the fact that he is compensated
only for his duties as police captain; despite the fact that as a
person he has no taste and little aptitude for public relations
and community organization; depite all this, he has managed to
hammer out a program that would probably serve the community well
in a serious emergency.

The city has a fallout-protected emergency operating center;
warning and radiological monitoring stations manned twenty-four
hours a day; a civil defense warning siren; radio stations pre-
pared to give emergency instructions to the general public; an
emergency rescue squad; a volunteer corps of auxiliary police
and firemen; a fleet of privately owned trucks and vehicles
available for civil defense use; a U. S. Public Health Service
emergency hospital, stored in the fallout-protected basement of
city hall; alternate locations for the protection of local
government records; and specifications for local government
succession in the event of emergency. Further, the local director
participated actively in the federal shelter survey, in which
spaces for about 35% of the population in the county were
identified. He has good relations with the local newspaper,
whose publisher is a strong supporter of the federal shelter
program. And he doggedly addresses PTA's and other groups on
the importance of emergency protection, in full knowledge that
he is called upon only when the organization is desperate for a
speaker (his own diagnosis).

Yet civil defense cannot be labeled a success in Hometown, and the captain knows this. A modest man, he does not make claims for what does not exist; and he has resolutely refused to join the state civil defense directors' professional association, because he regards it as a vehicle for self-glorification. He readily concedes his inability to interest business leaders and school authorities in a serious civil defense program; and he has encountered rebuffs in his efforts to carry out his shelter-making responsibilities. Most community leaders feel little need for a disaster program of any kind, and many are unaware that one in fact exists. The huge university across the river acquiesced routinely in the shelter survey, and some civil defense training is offered there, under federal auspices. But the university has no emergency preparedness plan of its own, and this is true also of all but one of the city's several industrial plants.

Moreover, as we have mentioned, the program in Hometown County has three heads: besides the official civil defense organization, there is the Red Cross and the County Medical Society, and neither group seems willing to surrender jurisdiction, despite formal memoranda of understanding. The Red Cross is an old and respected organization in Hometown, and most key leaders in the community have served and continue to serve on its board and its committees. Such natural disasters as the city has sustained (and these have amounted to little more than an occasional blizzard and the annual flooding of river bottom lands) is considered Red Cross property; and as a Red Feather agency funded by voluntary contributions, Red Cross personnel are understandably loathe to share responsibility or credit.

As for the County Medical Society, its emergency preparedness committee is headed by a hard working, highly motivated, headstrong young doctor, who, while paying lip services to inter-agency cooperation, does not observe it in practice. By his own efforts, he has developed a master medical emergency plan, as well as separate plans for the community's two hospitals. The master plan has had one moderately successful dry run, and the doctor has received a number of requests for the plan from other communities. Hometown's mayor is very high on the doctor, but the Red Cross resents him, perhaps for this reason. The doctor is himself impatient with the Red Cross, and while admiring the police captain's energy and dedication, thinks he is over-preoccupied with his own specialty, communications and warning systems.

Thus, the preparedness organizations go their separate ways, and the community as a whole remains indifferent and ill-informed. In addition, the captain feels strongly an inadequacy of guidance from the top. Quite unsolicited by us, he wrote the following statement for incorporation in this report:

"I believe that the present system of CD is inadequate in many phases; there seems to be no consistent policy at top levels. The disagreement between top level officials provides more confusion to the issues. Every Washington and state official automatically becomes an expert when he or she makes a public statement on Civil Defense. Many of these critics are without any real knowledge of the problems of Civil Defense. This only helps to further confuse the issues and eventually the public seems to think that there is no firm policy in planning and organization of the Civil Defense Department...

"I believe CD should be a function of the Department of Defense and should be actively represented in all the phases of military activity that deal directly with problems of defense of the country. This could be in effect now, however we are unaware of it at local levels.

"I believe the military, both reserve, national guard and regular, should take a more active part in CD, and should be charged with certain responsibilities. At present, we are told to contact local military commanders, who in turn tell us that no assignments can be made for their facilities without direct orders. I feel like the cat who finally caught his tail - what now? This is true of many other federal agencies. Assignments apparently should be made at the top level and not at the local level, since most seem to be under the impression that their services have been committed (elsewhere).

"I believe that Civil Defense is only a paper plan on a national level. Local organizations have been geared to operate in limited natural disaster operations only because there has been shown a definite need and the general public is aware of the need. This is not true on the national level. More emphasis on (natural) disaster planning might prove to be the incentive necessary to obtain more active public support.

"In general, I have the same feeling most of the people connected with civil defense must feel - we are swimming upstream with little progress. Civil Defense should not be abandoned, but a more practical approach and more realistic planning is needed to keep it in motion. A more consistent policy from top level officials, more official participation, incentives to individual families for planning, and generally more real objectives in long-range planning (i.e., what happened to individual warning system NEAR? We have been told for the last five years that it was just around the corner.)"

4. Factoryville

The civil defense program in this city has as its major

purpose supplementing government services for protection against

man-made emergencies, especially explosions and industrial fires.

There is no emphasis on shelters and no interest in such a

program, although the city civil defense director did cooperate

in the federal shelter survey. As in Hometown, civil defense in

Factoryville is fragmented and uncoordinated. The city director,

the county director, and the local Red Cross maintain overlapping

programs, and individual volunteers hold positions simultaneously

in all three. Thus, a single communications group wears three

hats and is subject to triple supervision.

A retired U. S. Treasury officer, the Factoryville civil defense director doubles as collector of parking meter fees; and the county director is an overworked local merchant, hard pressed for time. The city director is paid for his part time civil defense work, but the county director receives compensation for expenses only. The Red Cross, on the other hand, supports a full time executive secretary, and it appears that emergency preparedness rests principally upon the shoulders of this organization. The Red Cross program is extensive and commands widespread community support at all levels of the power structure. Indeed, the county civil defense director owes his appointment to a long history of voluntary affiliation with Red Cross. There is, predictably, fierce competition for volunteers and a marked absence of communication among the three agencies. And while the negative consequences of this tripartite arrangement are supportable for the usual run of minor disasters, in a major emergency extreme disorganization could result.

The county civil defense program has attracted few volunteers; a dozen would be a generous estimate. The city program claims at least a paper total of 160 persons enrolled in its various services, and these have been largely recruited through the American Legion and other para-military organizations. But the recruits are untrained and there are no regular meetings for any of the groups. The Red Cross, alone among the three emergency preparedness organizations, offers systematic training and makes concrete program assignments. All emergency food, clothing, and rescue services are the property of this agency, and came into being on its initiative. CD's single contribution is the city's corps

of volunteer police and firemen; but even here, credit accrues
primarily to the regular city police and fire departments, who
recruit and train with minimal dependence on official civil
defense appointees.

The two civil defense directors have taken training courses
at the staff college in Battle Creek, but the community does not
appear to have benefit   thereby. Some training in radiological
monitoring is given in one of Factoryville's largest industries
and in one shop course at the township high school. But these
programs were not initiated by the civil defense organizations,
and in fact the major complaint among community leaders who feel
an emergency preparedness responsibility is that they have been
unable to obtain straightforward information or sustained guidance
from the local civil defense authorities.

The shelter survey has identified 31,000 shelter spaces in
the Factoryville area, enough to serve between one-third and one-
half the population of the city. There are no shelters in the
outlying districts. No one among the civil defense authorities
interviewed was able to state conclusively that there are any
private family shelters in this vicinity, and none of our community
leaders either had a shelter or knew anyone who had one. A civil
defense plan based on sheltering and evacuation has been adopted
by the city council, but neither the civil defense director, the
mayor, or the city manager had copies of the plan or any detailed
knowledge of its provisions.

The city of Factoryville, but not the county, is eligible for
matching funds for personnel, administrative expenses, and equip-
ment, but no application has been made during the past year, since

all concerned feel the required paper work to be excessive.
Factoryville levies a civil defense tax, amounting to about
$17,000 a year. The county, on the other hand, votes funds on
a project to project basis, and has thus far evinced enthusiasm
only for a communications and warning system. Local government
officials in both city and county appear largely indifferent to
civil defense; and, as noted above, even those leaders who favor
an emergency program (most notably, school officials) feel
thwarted and rebuffed by the official civil defense organization.
Following the Cuba crisis, the local Chamber of Commerce sponsored
a public meeting on preparedness, at which civil defense personnel
presented program plans and aspirations. But so inept was the
performance, according to the observers we interviewed, that no
volunteers volunteered and there has been no carry-over of interest.

5. Newtown

In Newtown, the civil defense organization's principal task
is to provide auxiliary personnel in general disaster situations.
The emphasis is on explosions, floods, and fires; and the program's
director is the village fire chief, assigned to this post by the
village governing body, the board of trustees. All village
employees are trained and assigned to some civil defense task,
and a fire department lieutenant is deputy. Shelter program
responsibilities have been assigned to the village planner, who
cooperates with the federal government in identifying, marking,
and stocking shelters, insofar as they exist in this basementless
new suburb. During the Berlin crisis of 1961, the village board
considered undertaking a more extensive shelter program, and the

matter was referred to a special committee. This committee investigated the possibility of building a large community shelter and modifying a proposed addition to the fire and police building for shelter use. However, committee members were unable to obtain information from the county organization as to their village's eligibility for matching funds; nor were they satisfied with what they were able to learn about how actually to build an adequate community fallout shelter. Thus, with the passing of the Berlin crisis, the village board dropped the project.

The fire chief and his civil defense deputy, unpaid for their civil defense duties, have nevertheless taken training at Battle Creek. The deputy is charged with recruitment and training of local civil defense volunteers, and these include: (1) a communications corps of between 25 and 30 men, approximately half of whom have two-way radios in their homes; (2) a warden corps of about 100 women, who meet weekly; (3) an auxiliary police and firemen corps, each about 35 strong and trained by the village regulars; and (4) a radiological monitoring group headed by a highly respected local physicist who works at a famous research laboratory nearby.

In this community, then, the volunteer program is primarily an educational program, developed and supervised by full-time local government employees. On the whole, there is little for these volunteers to do; nevertheless, the communications corps and the radiological monitoring groups hold test sessions several times a month, and, of course, the auxiliary police and fire units are regularly employed in traffic jams and large fires. All civil defense training takes place at the village hall, and the village trustees view the program as a government responsibility not to be entrusted to the vagaries of pure voluntarism.

Although civil defense training proceeds efficiently in
Newtown, facilities are inadequate. There is a warning system
of sorts, but it is merely the same old siren used to summon
volunteer firemen in this and several surrounding communities.
Any warning from this source is thus unlikely to be understood
in the community as a civil defense warning. To date, the civil
defense organization has identified shelters for about 300 of
Newtown's nearly 40,000 residents. The basement of a store
currently under construction will probably accomodate another
500 to 1,000 persons. Managers for the existing shelters have
been recruited, and at least one of them plans to take training
at Battle Creek. There are four or five family shelters in the
community, and others reported having considered building them,
particularly during crisis periods like Berlin and Cuba. However,
ground water in this location would create almost immediate
flooding, and most families have abandoned what shelter plans
they may have entertained.

The formal civil defense plan in Newtown is out of date,
since it specified evacuation only. The community currently
receives no matching funds, meeting all training and personal costs
from its own budget, by setting aside a portion of the property
tax for civil defense purposes. Local government officials ex-
pressed uniform favorableness toward an integrated and efficient
disaster protection program, and have manifested sporadic interest
in the development of a shelter program for the village. There
was one display of open opposition to such a program, during the
Berlin-inspired village board discussions of a large community
shelter; but by and large, the community seems passive rather
than hostile.

Newtown is the only community we visited which had engaged in detailed public discussion of the fallout shelter issue. Its leaders are proud of the village's reputation for good government, and they carefully consider all areas of present and potential responsibility. No one we interviewed really <u>likes</u> the shelter idea; but if adequate funds and criteria for community shelter construction had been available during the Berlin crisis, Newtown would probably have a public shelter today.

Some Concluding Observations

It is our impression, based on pilot investigations of civil defense in five widely varying communities, that in non-crisis periods, crisis-oriented programs experience profound difficulty in enlisting that sustained, day-to-day support from community opinion leaders and decision makers which seems vital to the continuous and efficient operation of <u>volunteer-based</u> community-wide endeavors. Only in Minersville does voluntarism appear effective, and few communities are as variously and severely disaster-prone as this one. A single type of natural disaster, no matter how regularly or predictably it may strike (as with the annual floods in River City), seems insufficient to arouse communities to concerted, on-going preparedness activity. And where a community has no history of serious disaster, as in Factoryville, a program based on volunteers may sag into mediocrity and disrepute. Thus, even though our community leaders were inclined to express preference for a natural disaster civil defense orientation, it seems to us very doubtful that the recent OCD shift to a more balanced emphasis will alone guarantee the development of a solid, continuous, and respected federal-local program.

Although the local directors we interviewed have not been
wholly unsuccessful in recruiting volunteers, these have tended
to come largely from voluntary organizations on the periphery of
the power structure, or from city government personnel who are
not, strictly speaking, volunteers.[9] As a result, civil defense
tends frequently to be regarded as a "fringe" operation, lacking
solid integration into the total life of the community. When
one adds to this an evident tendency toward confusion about the
precise nature of the federal-local civil defense program, it is
not surprising that (a) community leaders display both indifference
and impatience toward it, and (b) volunteers are relatively
scarce. A further difficulty accrues from what seem to be over-
lapping jurisdictions among organizations concerned with community-
wide preparedness and rescue activities. Although memoranda of
agreement have indeed been written at the federal level, these
appear frequently to be honored in the breach at the local level,
with ensuing intramural jealousies and misunderstandings. The
overall picture, in such cases, is one of mal-coordination and
duplication of effort on the part of those persons and organiza-
tions who are involved in preparedness activities.

Where civil defense is formally incorporated into local
government, it seems to fare slightly better than where this is
not the case (provided, of course, that local government is not
itself in disrepute, as in Factoryville at the time of our visit).

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[9] Local directors in all five communities report that they have
recruited most volunteers from (1) veterans' organizations,
(2) local government, and (3) women's organizations. Only in
Minersville were business, service, and fraternal organizations
also represented.

But city and county employees with other duties cannot be expected to carry total responsibility, as illustrated by Hometown's over-worked police captain. In addition, it was our impression that local government officials, while in most cases genuinely concerned about civil defense, are reluctant to place the program high on the priority list, because of what they regard as excessive cost relative to any loudly articulated demand for its services.

We suggest, therefore, that a civil defense program which assumes, as it must, the possibility of armed enemy attack using nuclear weapons, is by definition a national, not a local program. To the degree, therefore, that the shelter program is a central objective, the federal agency cannot rely upon volunteers or quasi-volunteers, who must be recruited in the context of a local leadership climate which tends to remain indifferent to the catastrophe until it actually appears or is seriously threatened.[10]

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[10] See Section V for concrete recommendations as to possible administrative alternatives.

SECTION III

Community Leaders and Civil Defense Directors

A Comparative Analysis

Introduction

This section will be brief, because the general point we wish to illustrate is uncomplicated, and because the data on which our argument is based are less reliable than those presented in the preceding sections. The discussion below derives from two questionnaire surveys administered between January and June, 1963. The first was a mail survey of local civil defense directors in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, to be reported in detail in Section IV. The second is a follow-up survey, also conducted by mail, of the local leaders (exclusive of civil defense personnel) whom we had interviewed personally during our five-community field studies. Our purpose in surveying the community leaders with a structured questionnaire (a much abbreviated form of the civil defense directors' questionnaire) was to permit us to make precisely the sort of comparative analysis which follows, an analysis for which we needed uniform data similarly gathered.

From the point of view of scientific rigor, both surveys leave a good deal to be desired. Both were administered by mail (from necessity rather than choice), and after one follow-up letter, the returns fall considerably short of 100%. Of 634 questionnaires mailed to civil defense directors, 316 were completed and returned: about 50% of the total in each state. Of 121 questionnaires mailed to community leaders, 75 were returned, or 60% of the total personally interviewed. The samples are therefore self-selected and partial, and the findings must be interpreted with utmost caution. Nevertheless, they are suggestive, and we decided to include them in the present report,

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Our decision to survey the community leaders so as to render their responses comparable to those of the civil defense directors was a decision made in the field, and it was made for this reason: The community studies we had conducted up to that point had given us the distinct impression that part of the problem of civil defense at the local level resides in a failure of communication between opinion leaders and civil defense personnel. We reasoned that since, in the first instance, local directors are the principal purveyors and interpreters of the civil defense program, their efforts to persuade their local "publics" of the need for such a program might be materially hampered by difficulties in assorting on a reasonably equal basis with key members of the power elite, through whom messages of community-wide significance are frequently filtered. If, for example, there were wide differences in social background characteristics, or in attitudes on critical issues whether or not related to civil defense, barriers to communication might be raised that have little to do with the intrinsic merits or demerits of the program itself. The chimney sweep, in short, does not usually speak the language of the chairman of the board; and although we by no means suggest that so wide a gap obtains in this case, we wished to undertake a preliminary investigation of just how wide the gap in fact might be.

In the pages to follow, therefore, we examine, within the technical-methodological limits already noted, some similarities and differences between community leaders and civil defense directors with respect to the following: (1) selected social

background and social-psychological characteristics;[1] (2) attitudes on critical issues unrelated to civil defense; (3) attitudes toward the current East-West conflict; (4) attitudes toward war; and (5) attitudes toward civil defense itself. We again caution the reader to proceed with care, and to view these data as suggestive only.[2]

1. Social Background and Social-Psychological Characteristics

We have compared community leaders and local civil defense directors on these background characteristics: (a) chronological age; (b) religious preference and church attendance; (c) political party preference; (d) rural-urban residence; (e) rural-urban origins; (f) formal education; (g) geographic mobility, including service in the armed forces; (h) number and type of local organization memberships. All of these may be viewed as rough measures of broad reference group affiliation, tending to build rapport if they are similar, social distance if markedly dissimilar. The basic proposition is familiar enough, that "birds of a feather flock together"; and the sociological literature is replete with confirming evidence for this piece of folk wisdom.

First, the similarities: We found that community leaders and local directors are alike with respect to chronological age; most are in their forties and fifties. Nearly three-fourths of respondents in both groups are Protestant; and roughly two-thirds in each group report fairly regular church attendance (at least

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[1] In the case of background characteristics, we report for the entire community leadership group, since these items were included in the personal interviews.

[2] Statistical tables appear in Appendix B.

twice a month). Also, the two groups are fairly similar on
political party preference, although community leaders are
slightly more likely to "vote for the man", regardless of party,
and slightly less likely to report no preference. Nor do the two
groups differ with respect to present rural or urban residence;
the overwhelming majority live in small or middle-sized communities
of from 5,000 to 50,000 population. (Tables 1 through 6, Ap-
pendix B).

But here, the resemblances end, and the differences we found
suggest an important disparity between community leaders and local
civil defense directors on a kind of "cosmopolitanism-parochialism"
dimension. A larger proportion of community leaders were brought
up in cities of over 50,000 population. Nearly two-thirds have
had an undergraduate college education or better, as compared to
20% of the local directors. And the community leaders have been
more geographically mobile, at least within the borders of con-
tinental United States. It is true that the local directors are
slightly more likely to have served in the armed forces and to
have seen overseas duty. But one might speculate that this sort
of travel is perhaps less "broadening", with respect to attitude
and value formation, than that provided by education, free movement
about the country, and exposure in youth to the heterogeneity of
the city. (Tables 7, 8, 9, Appendix B).

Rural-urban origin, education, and geographic mobility may
be regarded as indicators of past interactions, providng clues
to the number and variety of persons and experiences to which an
individual has been exposed during the so-called formative years.
But although attitudes may be largely formed in early interactions,

they are reinforced or modified in present interactions. For
this reason, we considered it important to compare the current
interactive patterns of our two groups of respondents. Unfor-
tunately, we have only one measure of this variable: number and
type of organizational affiliations in the local community. How-
ever, these items do distinguish powerfully, and show the two
groups to be residents of quite dissimilar organizational worlds.
(Tables 10 and 11, Appendix B).

Table 11 is significant for two reasons: (1) It shows that
the community leaders are largely involved in local "problem-
solving" organizations, in which they must confront and resolve
a variety of immediate and concrete community issues; hence,
perhaps, their more pragmatic orientation to specific world and
national problem issues, as we shall discuss in later pages. The
civil defense directors, on the other hand, are principally
involved in "resolution-passing" or purely recreational organiza-
tions having no clear responsibility for the resolution of hard,
day-to-day local problems; hence, perhaps, their more ideological
orientation to world and national issues, as we shall show.
(2) The table suggests further that, at least in their organiza-
tional lives, the two groups seldom interact with each other, a
point perhaps more relevant to our central proposition in this
section.

As to social-psychological characteristics, we find some
suggestive differences between the community leaders and civil
defense directors in our samples. Taken together, these differences
tend to support a point made by a number of the studies of
voluntarism reported in Section I of this report: i.e., that for

many individuals, particularly those at lower levels of the power
and status hierarchy, voluntary organizations (among which we
include civil defense as currently constituted) may serve as
channels for upward social mobility, whether or not the ostensible
aim is community service. This is not in itself reprehensible,
of course, unless status-gaining is the individual's principal
motivation, causing him to subordinate the organization's program
to his personal needs.

We have some circumstantial evidence that a sizeable proportion
of local civil defense directors may indeed be suffering from
status anxiety. For one thing, the local directors are considerably
less likely than the community leaders to express a high level of
satisfaction with their present occupations. Further, they are
somewhat more likely than the community leaders to say that it is
"very important" to them personally to "get ahead in life". And
when asked, "If you had your choice, which of the following would
you most like to be - independent, successful, or well liked?",
the community leaders divide about equally among the three choices,
while the local directors opt overwhelmingly for being successful
or well liked.

There is also some evidence that many local directors may be
eager to be "part of the gang", but feel they have not yet arrived
in its midst. The majority in both groups report that they
"circulate among a lot of people in a lot of situations"; but the
local directors are somewhat more likely to say that they prefer
this, as opposed to "spending a good deal of time alone or with
just a few people." And finally, the local directors are far more
likely than the community leaders to say that it is of great

personal importance to be "well liked for my personal qualities".
Although more intensive analysis and a better sample are needed,
one might speculate that many local directors may be using civil
defense to maximize personal contacts in the community - again, not
an intrinsically undersirable motive, unless it is the controlling
one. (Tables 12 through 16, Appendix B).

2. Attitudes on Critical Issues Unrelated to Civil Defense

We have seen that community leaders tend more than civil
defense directors to participate in local organizations we have
characterized as "problem-solving"; and we have speculated that
this may be associated with attitudes on critical national and
world issues which are more pragmatic, less ideological. There
is some evidence for this in the differential responses of our two
groups to questions about current national issues unrelated to
civil defense. Although the community leaders and the local
directors largely agree on broad propositions as to the essential
nature of our nation's economic and political institutions, they
diverge on items relating to specific problem issues.

The two groups agree in about equal proportions that "the best
government governs least"; that "democracy depends on free enter-
prise"; that "the welfare state tends to destroy individual
initiative"; that "government planning results in the loss of
essential liberties"; that "newspapers and magazines should be
allowed to print anything but military secrets"; and that "police
and others should have the power to ban or censor certain books
or movies". They are alike in disagreeing or expressing uncertainty
that "persons who refuse to testify against themselves are probably
guilty". (Tables 17 through 23, Appendix B).

These, however, are basic beliefs, stated in highly general
terms, and learned by nearly every American at his mother's knee.
When we pose concrete current issues, in fairly specific terms,
concensus breaks down. With reference to the controversial question
of prayers in the public schools, the community leaders are the
more likely to agree with the Supreme Court (although nearly half
in fact disagree). And when the two groups are asked to evaluate
the relative importance of specific national problems, the lists
(except for "education") are quite different. Most striking here
is the high ranking accorded to Communism as a national problem by
the civil defense directors, who, as a group place it first,
compared to the community leaders, who place it fifth. Since the
item reads "Communism in the U.S.", we may assume that respondents
interpreted it correctly to mean "internal subversion", not inter-
national Communism. (Tables 24 and 25, Appendix B).

3. Attitudes Toward the East-West Conflict

The finding reported above holds also for attitudes toward the
Cold War: community leaders and civil defense directors agree on
broad propositions regarding the nature of Communism, but diverge
when Cold War issues are posed more concretely. Both groups were
asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements concerning
Communism's character, strategy, and goals. Tables 26, 27 and 28
(Appendix C) show the community leaders and the local directors in
substantial agreement that the Communists can't be trusted; that a
disarmament treaty would be worthless; and that individual liberty
cannot exist in socialist countries.

But these are sweeping propositions, so often repeated since the onset of Cold War that they appear to have become nearly axiomatic for most Americans. On items which deal more specifically with concrete questions of strategy, we do not find concensus between our two groups. By and large, the civil defense directors are more suspicious of Communism at home and abroad, although these differences are not striking. The local directors are somewhat more likely than the community leaders to agree that the Communists will resort to any means to achieve world conquest; that the Communists would not honor a nuclear test ban agreement; that there are many Communists in high government positions in America; and that the American Communist Party should be outlawed. (Tables 29 through 32, Appendix B).

As for United States strategy vis-a-vis the Communist powers, both groups agree that America is _morally_ justified in carrying its conflict with Communism "to the point of risking the destruction of the human race." However, when the question is phrased more pragmatically, we find the community leaders substantially less likely to agree without qualification that "the U.S. must be willing to run any risk of war...to prevent the spread of Communism". In addition, the community leaders are somewhat more likely to agree (or to disagree with qualifications) that "the real enemy today is no longer Communism but war itself." (Tables 33, 34, 35, Appendix B).

From this preliminary evidence, fragmentary as it is, a pattern begins to emerge which suggests that Selznick's point, first stated in Section I of this report, and reiterated in Section II, may indeed hold for some local civil defense personnel: i.e.,

that voluntary organizations which recruit from the community at large and which stand apart from the established leadership run the risk of staffing the program with persons who are relatively powerless locally and whose special interests or ideologies give the program a "fringe" or "social movement" character.

We have seen that our civil defense directors are, compared with the community leaders, less educated, more "parochial", and more involved in paramilitary or lower middle class recreational organizations in their local communities. We have seen further that the civil defense directors, as a group, are the more pre-occupied with Communism as an unmitigated evil abroad and a clear and present danger at home. And we suggest that these differences in social background characteristics, plus certain ideological differences, may lead a "cause" orientation to some local civil defense organizations that interferes with communication and hampers the conduct of the program. As we shall see in Section IV of this report, these differences are minimal in the case of full time paid professional civil defense directors, maximal in the case of volunteers or quasi-volunteers.

4. Attitudes Toward War

On the general question of whether or not war as a form of human behavior is "inevitable", the community leaders and local civil defense directors in our samples are in optimistic agreement, well over half in each group predicting that the human race will ultimately succeed in eliminating war. (Table 36, Appendix B). With regard, however, to the specific likelihood of another major world conflagration, striking differences appear. The civil defense

directors are twice as likely as the community leaders to predict
that there is an "even chance" of another big world war, or that
it is "very likely" or "fairly likely"; and the community leaders
are three times as likely as the local directors to state that
such a war is "fairly unlikely" or "very unlikely". (Table 37,
Appendix B). Similarly, the local directors are far more likely
than the community leaders to predict that a major holocaust will
occur within the next decade. (Table 38, Appendix B). And
finally, the local directors are five times as likely as the com-
munity leaders to place major reliance for preventing a third
world war upon weapons and fallout shelters, the community leaders
more often prescribing weapons and negotiations. (Table 39, Ap-
pendix B).

Again, we can only speculate as to the implications of these
data for the problem with which we are concerned in this section:
communication between civil defense personnel and the established
leadership in local communities. There is some reason to believe,
however, that many local directors may be acting on their con-
victions by employing the "fear psychology" about which several
of our community leaders complained in the personal interviews.
(One was quoted in Section II as saying: "They (civil defense)
use this fear stuff, and I personally don't believe the American
people are scared enough to buy it." There were many variations
on this theme.) To the degree that local directors are in fact
making use of such "scare tactics", they may be erecting yet
another barrier to acceptance of the total program. It is con-
ceivable that in such cases they may come to be regarded by others
in the community as "sword rattlers" or "war mongers", and dis-
missed as frightened fanatics.

5. Attitudes Toward Civil Defense

Since, for the most part, local civil defense directors would
not be local civil defense directors in the absence of a high level
of commitment to civil defense policies and goals, their greater
enthusiasm about the civil defense effort is hardly surprising.
Both groups were asked to agree or disagree with a series of state-
ments that have frequently been made in public discussions of civil
defense; and Tables 40 through 46 (Appendix B) clearly show that
the local directors are more favorable than the community leaders
in their attitudes toward civil defense, and in the degree to which
they adhere to their convictions. (In nearly every instance, the
large differences appear at the extreme ends of the responses
continuum).

On those items which deal specifically with the civil defense
program, we see that local directors are substantially more likely
than community leaders to disagree strongly that "civil defense
activities are nothing but a waste of money and human energy";
that "civil defense is creating a sense of false security"; that
civil defense will increase the probability of war". They are
more likely than the community leaders to agree strongly that "a
civil defense program will reduce the probability of war"; that
"civil defense...creates the impression of preparedness"; that
"civil defense has been too much neglected." And they are con-
siderably more likely to agree that criticism of civil defense
may be Communist-inspired.

On items dealing more generally with nuclear war and fallout
shelters, we find the local directors a good deal more confident
than the community leaders that there can be an adequate defense

against nuclear attack; that life would be worth living in a
post-attack world; and that fallout shelters make nuclear war
less likely. Also, the local directors are more prone to agree
that "the shotgun at the shelter door" is morally justified, al-
though the difference is slight, and nearly one-third in each
group express uncertainty. (Tables 47 through 50, Appendix B).

To our minds, the most pertinent of these findings to the
problem of communication is that nearly half the local directors,
as against one-fifth of the community leaders appear to believe
that criticism of civil defense may be part of a Communist con-
spiracy. This may in fact be the case; no one can be certain.
But since the community leaders seem persuaded that it is _not_ the
case, public expressions of this suspicion by civil defense
personnel may contribute further to a tendency on the part of the
established local leadership to label the program itself "over-
emotional", "fear-inspired" or "hysterical".

In summary, then, our preliminary evidence suggests that
where civil defense places primary responsibility on uncompensated
non-professionals for administering local programs, barriers to
communication with the established leadership may ensue, arising
from the following kinds of disparities:

1. Differences in education of both the formal and informal
variety, with community leaders the more "cosmopolitan", civil
defense directors the more "parochial".

2. Differences in patterns of participation in local
voluntary organizations, together with differences in motives
for such participation.

3. Differences in orientation to critical national and international issues, with community leaders the more pragmatic and cognitive, civil defense directors the more ideological and moralistic.

4. Differences in perception of the Communist threat, both at home and abroad, and of the threat of large-scale war, at least in the foreseeable future.

The following section will report evidence to suggest, as previously noted, that these differences tend to be minimized where local civil defense programs are administered by full time paid professionals whose backgrounds and experiences more closely approximate those of the community leaders with whom they must communicate.

SECTION IV

The Local Directors

Introduction

Thus far, this report has advanced the following propositions, broadly speaking:

1. That a federal-local program of community-wide significance which relies for personnel primarily upon volunteers recruited locally should, for maximum effectiveness, obtain the support and understanding, if not necessarily the active participation, of established community leaders. (Sections I and II).

2. That the leadership groups in the five communities we visited have not, on the whole, accorded the shelter aspects of the civil defense program that support and understanding, although most express approval of its natural disaster functions. In consequence, the program tends to be regarded with apathy or even, in some instances, outright hostility. (Section II).

3. That local misperceptions of the civil defense program may result in part from barriers to communication between established community leaders and local civil defense personnel, owing to differences in social background characteristics and certain social attitude configurations, whether or not the issues involved are directly concerned with civil defense. (Section III).

In this section, we attempt preliminary documentation of this further proposition: that where _primary_ responsibility for the conduct of local civil defense programs is assigned not to uncompensated volunteers but to paid professionals, the program is substantially more effective. We suggest that this may be due in part to the professional's more pragmatic, less ideological, orientation toward his program; to his greater skills in the area of community organization; and to his more "complex" and

- 4.1 -

"cosmopolitan" view of social reality. We suggest conversely that the _volunteer_ local director may be motivated by considerations which are at best peripheral to the program's central goals and tasks, and which at worst lend to the program an aura of over-zealousness. And finally, we suggest that when professionalism in a local director is combined with a socio-economic position above the blue-collar or lower middle class white-collar levels, the probability is substantially increased that civil defense will succeed in implementing and interpreting its program at the local community level.

We base these propositions on data from a structured question-naire administered by mail to all local civil defense directors in Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.[1]

For purposes of the present report, we have organized the data under three classificatory headings: (A) state residence; (B) professional status in civil defense; and (C) a summary index which combines professional status, occupation (a rough measure of socio-economic level), and amount of experience in civil defense work prior to becoming local director. For each of these variables, we report only on those items which clearly discriminate among the various categories and which are most relevant to the propositions stated above.

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[1] A total of 634 questionnaires was mailed out, of which 316 were completed and returned. Indiana: 202 mailed, 107 returned. Illinois: 272 mailed, 132 returned. Wisconsin: 160 mailed, 77 returned. For purposes of the statistical tables, which appear in Appendix C, we code Wisconsin as State A, Illinois as State B, Indiana as State C.

A. Sta‍te Residence

We find first that on a number of criteria of local program effectiveness, State A directors seem clearly superior to State B and State C directors. With respect, for example, to cooperation from local government, the State A directors in our sample more often report that both city council and county supervisors have accepted civil defense responsibilities, and that they have been successful in recruiting volunteers from local government personnel. (Table 1, Section A, Appendix C). Further, the State A directors more often report that their areas have (a) a survival plan based on both sheltering and evacuation; (b) emergency stocks of drugs and medical supplies; (c) an emergency hospital; (d) a warning station manned 24 hours a day; and (e) a fallout-protected emergency operating center. (Table 2, Section A, Appendix C). With regard to the total civil defense program, as specified by the federal agency, State A directors more often report that their area has twenty or more aspects of this program. (Table 3, Section A, Appendix C). And finally, the State A directors report more widespread shelter protection for the population in their area, as well as more adequate personal shelter preparations. (Tables 4 and 5, Section A, Appendix C).

In addition, the State A directors appear generally the more experienced in civil defense work, more often reporting that they have (a) had five years' or more experience in civil defense, and (b) done volunteer work for civil defense before assuming their present positions as local directors. (Tables 6 and 7, Section A, Appendix C). Further, they are the more likely to have made formal application for their present posts, as compared, for example, to

the State C directors, one-third of whom report that they were
recruited to their present posts by "a friend" in civil defense.
(Table 8, Section A, Appendix C). The State A directors appear
better integrated into the apparatus of local government, more often
reporting participation in three or more of its activities. (Table 9,
Section A, Appendix C). And finally, two-thirds of the State A
directors in our sample report that they receive remuneration for
their civil defense duties, as compared with just over one-third
of the State B directors and fewer than one-fifth of the State C
directors. (Table 10, Section A, Appendix C).

There is, in short, an aura of professionalism about the State A
directors, which seems clearly associated with greater program
effectiveness, and which led us to undertake a somewhat more exten-
sive analysis of the "professional" director versus the "volunteer"
director. A summary of this analysis follows.

B. <u>Professional Status in Civil Defense</u>

Our professional status categories are: (1) full time paid
directors; (2) part time paid directors; (3) full time unpaid
directors; and (4) part time unpaid directors. Directors in the
last category constitute the largest group in our sample, and they
appear to have been least successful in carrying out their programs.
Not surprisingly, it is better to be paid than unpaid, better to be
full time than part time; and by and large, the full time paid
director is most effective of all.

When these groups are compared on the item, "Have any of the
following groups accepted any civil defense responsibility in your
area?", we find that the part time unpaid directors report sub-
stantially less success than directors in the other three categories

in obtaining cooperation from top elected officials, commercial establishments, local industries, county supervisors, the city council, and clubs and social organizations. (Table 1, Section B, Appendix C). With respect to a number of objective measures of program effectiveness, we find the full time paid directors superior to all others, and both paid groups more successful than the unpaid directors. (Tables 2, 3, and 4, Section B, Appendix C). In addition, both paid groups adhere more closely than the volunteer directors to federal recommendations for shelter financing and shelter maintenance. (Table 5, Section B, Appendix C).

Who are the incombents of these categories, in terms of their sociological characteristics and social attitudes? We found few items that clearly discriminate among the four groups, but those that do suggest that the full time paid directors are the better integrated into their communities; the more neutral and professional in their life goals or aspirations; and the less "simplistic" and "parochial" in their attitudes toward the socio-political environment.

First of all, the full time paid directors in our sample are clearly the more urban, more than half reporting that they live in and serve communities with populations of 25,000 and over, and nearly one-third reporting residence in communities of 50,000 and over (as compared with less than 10% in the other three groups). This probably means only that the larger communities can better afford to pay their civil defense directors, but it constitutes further evidence for the apparent futility of primary reliance upon voluntarism, particularly in the small towns and rural areas. If effective civil defense programming is to be more than an urban

phenomenon (and post-attack considerations would seem to argue
strongly for the importance of adequate protection in presumably
non-target areas), then it would seem that some attention should
be given to the possibility of a federally planned and coordinated
professionalization program which might hope to correct this small
town-big town imbalance. (Table 6, Section B, Appendix C).

We find further that the full time paid directors in our sample
appear the better integrated socially into their communities, more
often reporting that they "circulate a lot", as compared to "spend-
ing considerable time alone, or with just a few people." (We do
not suggest, of course, that a limited life space is intrinsically
undesirable - merely that "circulating" seems the more rewarding
tendency for persons engaged in work that spans the total community).
(Table 7, Section B, Appendix C). Further, in response to the
question, "If you had your choice, would you prefer to be indepen-
dent, successful, or well liked?", the full time paid directors
more often choose "successful", the unpaid volunteers "well liked".
(Table 8, Section B, Appendix C). Although we may be over-inter-
preting, this suggests the presence in the non-professional groups
of greater anxiety about personal acceptability, which might have
implications for their motives for entering civil defense work and
their consequent uses of the program. In short, these two pieces
of data, taken together, suggest that the CD professionals are at
once more socially successful and less socially anxious than their
volunteer counterparts.

At the risk again of over-interpreting, we present some frag-
mentary evidence which suggests that the paid professionals, both
full time and part time, are less "simplistic" than the volunteers

in their perceptions of social reality. As measures of this
simplicity-complexity dimension, we use two items: "Do you agree
or disagree that in most disagreements, the right and the wrong
side of the argument is readily apparent?"; and "Do you agree or
disagree that Socialism and Communism are basically the same thing?"
In both cases, two-thirds of the full time paid directors <u>disagree</u>,
as compared to less than half of the part time volunteers. (Table 9,
Section B, Appendix C). To stretch the point still further, one
could argue that these more "simplistic" orientations among the
volunteer directors might carry over into their approach to civil
defense, lending to the program that aura of crusading overzealous-
ness discussed in the preceding section of this report.

And finally, we find clear differences between the full time
paid directors and all other groups on a pair of items which we have
labeled "Faith in Governments" and which may be tapping a parochial-
ism-cosmopolitanism dimension. Nearly two-thirds of the full time
professionals <u>disagree</u> that "Government planning almost inevitably
results in the loss of essential liberties and freedoms", or that
"In the long haul the United States cannot really depend on its
allies." On the other hand, only about 40% of directors in the other
three categories express disagreement with these statements.
(Table 10, Section B, Appendix C). This raises the possibility,
however dimly, that the paid professionals may be more prone than
the volunteer directors to view the civil defense effort in the
context of larger social systems and larger social issues (and, as
noted in Section II of this report, our community studies persuade
us that failure to so interpret civil defense is associated with
much of the perplexity about the program which we observed among
community leaders).

C. The Summary Index

Somewhat arbitrarily, perhaps, we have constructed two polar typologies based on those variables we considered most reflective of "true" professionalism in local civil defense personnel. We have argued thus far that the most effective director is the full time paid professional, who functions as a bone fide civil servant; and we have reported some preliminary evidence to this effect. We now present some comparisons between two groups, one of which we call the "high status professional", the other the "low status volunteer". In the first group are full time paid local directors, whose immediately previous occupations place them in the white collar middle class, and who have had volunteer experience in civil defense prior to assuming their present positions as full time directors. In the second group are unpaid directors whose present occupations are blue collar, and who have had no prior civil defense experience. Unfortunately, this procedure for combining variables to isolate polar types has left us with very few cases in the two groups: fourteen in the first, twenty-six in the second. Yet the differences are so striking that we have a good deal of confidence in the validity of these findings, which we predict would hold up for larger populations. We therefore report them here.

We find first that on our several criteria of local program effectiveness, there is virtually no contest between the two groups. More than four-fifths of the high status professionals report that their area has twenty or more aspects of the total program as federally specified or recommended, in contrast to only 3% of the low status volunteers. (Table 1, Section C, Appendix C). Nearly half of the high status professionals state that their area provides

shelter protection for 30% or more of the population, compared to
16% of the low status volunteers. (Table 2, Section C, Appendix C).
With respect to specific program aspects, the high status profes-
sionals are in most cases more than twice as likely as the low status
volunteers to report that these are realities in their area. (Table 3,
Section C, Appendix C).

It might be argued, of course, that the first group's superior
program effectiveness is a function of their residence in more
affluent urban areas. More than half of the high status profes-
sionals serve cities with populations of 25,000 and over, compared
with only 8% of the low status volunteers, fully half of whom
serve communities with populations of less than 5,000. (Table 4,
Section C, Appendix C). In our view, however, this merely rein-
forces a statement made earlier, to the effect that some sort of
reorganization may be necessary, to prevent the total civil defense
effort from becoming, in effect, an exclusively urban phenomenon.

On several measures of similarity to members of the "Establish-
ment" in local communities, we find the high status professionals
again considerably in the lead. With respect to formal education:
nearly two-thirds of this group have had at least some college,
compared to about one-fourth of the low status volunteers. (Table 5,
Section C, Appendix C). In addition, the high status professionals
report a somewhat higher level of geographic mobility, which, as
reported in Section III, is also characteristic of the community
leaders as a group. (Table 6, Section C, Appendix C). The high
status professionals are by far the more likely to state that they
"circulate a lot" in their communities, and they report a larger
number of local organization memberships. (Table 7 and 8, Section C,
Appendix C).

We find also that on two rough measures of life "adjustment" or "satisfaction", the high status professionals appear better off than the low status volunteers. First, they report a much higher level of satisfaction with present occupation. (Table 9, Section C, Appendix C). And second, they appear far less preoccupied with the problem of being "well liked", suggesting a stronger sense of personal worth and a lower level of interpersonal anxiety. (Table 10, Section C, Appendix C). From these admittedly meager pieces of evidence, we infer that the low status volunteers may be using their civil defense activities for purposes peripheral to the program's central objectives, with the risk this entails of deflecting energies from the main tasks.

On our two-item measure of what we have termed "simplicity-complexity", the high status professionals appear the more complex. Well over half of this group disagree that "In most disagreements between people, the right and the wrong side of the argument are readily apparent", as compared to less than one-third of the low status volunteers. Similarly, nearly four-fifths of the high status professionals disagree that "Socialism and Communism" are basically the same thing," and none agree; in contrast, more than one-third of the low status volunteers agree with this statement, and only half disagree. (Table 11, Section C, Appendix C). Related, perhaps, to these differences, are the differential responses of the two groups to two questions about Communism, which may be tapping a "rigidity-flexibility" continuum. The high status professionals are by far the more likely to disagree that "In the struggle with Communism, there is no such thing as an uncommitted country. They are either with us or against us"; and that "whatever anyone says,

there are still plenty of Communists in high places in government."
(Table 12, Section C, Appendix C). Once again, we suggest that
these relatively more "simplistic" and "rigid" volunteer directors
may be lending to civil defense the quality of a super-patriotic
crusade, rather than a hard-headed program for survival.

We conclude, then, that the data reported in this section
provide further support, however tentative, for the proposition
central to our total report: that with respect both to program
development and program interpretation at the local community
level, voluntarism cannot be considered a truly effective mode of
civil defense organization, where primary responsibility for the
program's conduct resides in the hands of the volunteer.

SECTION V

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Note: The recommendations presented here are based upon our original field materials and the review of literature detailed in earlier sections of this report. We will summarize these findings very briefly, and follow the summary with specific suggestions regarding the organization and staffing of civil defense programs at the local community level.

The problem of civil defense organization at the local level is a particularly critical one, because local areas constitute "survival units" in the event of natural disaster, enemy attack, or other emergencies that require the coherent and rational organization of large numbers of people. These units could well become isolated in an emergency, if, for example, communications failed; if vital facilities were in use elsewhere; or if a truly catastrophic event destroyed outside facilities. Thus, prior organization of local areas to cope with emergencies would considerably enhance the possibility of physical and social recovery.

The World War II experience demonstrated that in clearly defined crisis periods, there is a heightening of patriotic sensibilities and strong individual identification with the nation and its goals; hence, volunteers are readily attracted into programs designed to cope with the crisis. On the other hand, during non-critical periods, or in periods like the present one, in which the nature and severity of the crisis are ambiguous and fluctuating, the task of enlisting volunteers for emergency-preparedness programs is onerous indeed. In such circumstances, the key to effective local organization is the local civil defense director,

who, since he cannot rely for program and personnel upon a general-
ized patriotic willingness to sacrifice, must depend instead on
his own imaginativeness, sophistication, and social competence.

Our survey of civil defense directors in three state programs
shows quite clearly that the full-time paid official, who most
closely resembles community leaders in education, occupational and
social history, and social attitudes, is most likely to create and
carry out an effective preparedness program. Where this elementary
rapport is absent between CD directors and local elites, civil
defense tends to be viewed with indifferences or outright distrust -
since, as many community studies have demonstrated, local programs
of any kind are unlikely to be implemented without the support,
tacit or enthusiastic, of these community gate-keepers.[1] It is a
fact that among community leaders, civil defense is frequently
identified with extreme political views, militarism, and sticky
moral issues; and to date, there has been very little community or
individual action with respect to shelter-building or general
preparedness. The world-views of core local decision-makers differs
in a number of important respects from the world-views of most civil
defense directors (with the notable exception of the full-time paid
"Government Pros"). And the world-view which leads to advocacy of
costly preparedness measures in "peacetime" is rare among local
community elites.

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[1] The studies in the social science literature which document this
point are legion, but excellent summaries appear in: Hawley, A.H.,
"Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," American Journal of
Sociology, 1963, 68: 442-431; Miller, D. C., "Decision-Making
Cliques in Community Power Structure: A Comparative Study of an
American and an English City," American Journal of Sociology, 1958,
64: 299-310; Rossi, Peter H., "Power and Politics: A Road to Social
Reform," The Social Service Review, 1961, 35: 359-369.

Before turning to our recommendations regarding the local
organization of civil defense, we should note one important finding
with respect to program goals: A broadened civil defense focus
which includes all emergency situations, from localized natural
disasters to national attack situations, appears essential to any
general public acceptance of civil defense. As we pointed out in
Section II, community leaders see fire, flood, tank car explosions,
mine cave-ins, tornadoes, and the like, as very real hazards; and
they recognize that the ordinary fire and police services are
inadequate to cope with such extraordinary events. But the
possibility of nuclear attack is remote - or so distasteful as to
be unthinkable - and exclusive CD focus upon that contingency has
undoubtedly sabotaged efforts to effect even a minimally adequate
emergency system. In any event, to create an emergency system
designed only to cope with nuclear attack (or fallout from our own
anti-missile missiles) is tantamount to digging a cellar when you
need the whole house. The fact is that local emergency preparedness
of any kind is virtually non-existent in most areas; and radioactive
fallout is only one of many emergencies which cannot be handled by
means of existing community facilities. A program designed to cope
with any emergency, whether caused by natural or human forces, seems
to us the more reasonable approach, in terms both of providing
responsible public service and avoiding public repudiation. (We
know, of course, that efforts have in fact been made to expand
the OCD mandate to include the natural disaster function, and we
include our own findings merely to document the wisdom of these
efforts).

Our specific program recommendations are:

1. CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE CREATION OF FULL-TIME PAID
   DIRECTORSHIPS, filling these posts with college-trained
   individuals who have had prior experience in government
   and in civil defense.

   The part-time paid director is only slightly more
   effective than the outright volunteer. Matching
   funds for full-time county directors should be con-
   tinued and expanded, with their promotion in the
   hands of Federal staff (see 3 below).

2. EMPLOY COUNTIES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS AS LOCAL
   ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS. This units embrace both
   the urban and rural portions of a geographic area,
   and incorporate all contiguous units for the most
   efficient use of funds, without extending beyond
   locally recognized political and socio-economic
   boundaries. County organization prevents the
   proliferation of local volunteer directors in small
   municipalities which cannot afford even part-time
   pay for a civil defense director.

3. CREATE A CORPS OF FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE SPECIALISTS
   TO SERVE AS A FIELD STAFF. These men would train
   local directors on the job; provide continuing super-
   vision and direction for local officials in line with
   Federal policy objectives; and serve as a source of
   valid and reliable information for local directors and
   the community at large regarding civil defense policy

and rationale. The Federal field staff should also
constitute liaison between the Federal office and
the state civil defense units, and work in harmony
with state policies. (The question of whether such
a field staff should be organized as a direct adjunct
to the Washington office or the regional offices is
not one which this investigation has considered.)

An alternative to Federal specialists might be the
organization of state personnel to serve as a field
staff, exactly as in the case of the Agricultural
Extension Service (USDA), with a Federal staff
specialist on hand in an advisory capacity only.
But this alternative seems less desirable than the
one outlined above, for the following reasons:

(a) State systems vary considerable at the
    present time, and state funding is fre-
    quently woefully inadequate. Further-
    more, state civil defense funds cannot
    be controlled in accordance with Federal
    OCD program requirements. Those states
    which need the most are also most likely
    to be those that appropriate least. If
    a uniform national program is to be
    achieved, even matching-fund provisions
    are unlikely to result in enough qualified
    state staff personnel, as the history of
    matching funds for local and state personnel
    has demonstrated thus far.

(b) A Federal field staff of several individuals
    per state, with full federal funding, is
    probably feasible; what is probably not
    feasible is a Federal civil defense person
    in each county; also, matching funds must
    be used for local directors, in order to
    avoid prohibitive Federal expenditures.

(c) State civil defense offices are usually
    seen as incorporating all the worst
    characteristics of the political appoint-
    ment system. A view of state civil defense
    as highly partisan was virtually unanimous
    among community leaders, as well as among a
    good many disgusted local CD directors. State
    civil defense officials are widely believed
    to be hacks, without proper training, infor-
    mation, or motivation for carrying out a serious
    program. The opinion that civil defense is a
    Federal job is common, even among community
    leaders particularly loathe to accept Federal
    involvement in other community programs.

    Some mixture of a state and Federal specialist
    program, also on the USDA model, is another
    possibility. For example, the emergency pro-
    gram functions could be split, so that the
    fallout shelter, warning, and communications
    and radiological monitoring tasks would be

supervised by a Federal staff person, and
auxiliary police, fire, and rescue functions,
and emergency health and welfare could be
state responsibilities, supervised by state
personnel.

More specifically, the alternatives, in
what is probably a descending order of
ultimate effectiveness, are:

I. Direct Federal supervision at the local level for all functions,
    with a local full-time paid person acting as civil defense
    director for the county or metropolitan area.

II. Direct Federal supervision at the local level for certain
    functions especially crucial to national civil defense goals,
    with state supervision over other programs. Here, the local
    director has two direct supervisors, a state of affairs whose
    pitfalls are well known.

III. Federal supervision through state personnel, with state
     specialists providing direct supervision over local
     directors.

Of course, the I and II alternatives are not currently per-
missible under enabling civil defense legislation. The last alter-
native would probably not require legal changes, and would merely
involve the addition of a small corps of Federal specialists
operating at the state level. To be sure, the present regional
offices provide considerable state supervision, but most states

do not have a field staff acting as a source of continuous training, direction, and information for local directors. Instead, the local director is left to his own devices, and his only contact with state and Federal policy or personnel is via his mailbox. No evaluation of his work is ever available from civil defense superiors, nor are awards given him that source. The creation of _some_ CD supervisor for the local director is a minimum requirement: he may be entirely Federal, which would be preferable at least for those aspects of the program that are basically national; he may be a state supervisor who has Federal advice; or he may be both a Federal and a state supervisor. In any case, it is unrealistic to expect very much local adherence to complex Federal program directives, in the absence of direct personal contact between local directors and higher-echelon personnel.

4. ESTABLISH LOCAL (COUNTY) EMERGENCY COORDINATING BOARDS, TO BE COMPOSED OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR TASKS RELEVANT TO EMERGENCY RECOVERY, AND WITH THE ADDITION OF COMMUNITY LEADERS HOLDING POSITIONS CRUCIAL TO SUCH RECOVERY. The role-status positions should be the following, for these local boards.

	--- county supervisor and city mayors
	--- county sheriff and city police chiefs
	--- county and city fire-fighting officials
PUBLIC	--- county and city public health officials
	--- county and city public welfare officials
	--- county and city school officials
	--- county and city public housing officials

	--- area Red Cross executive and local board chairmen
PRIVATE	--- area Salvation Army officials
WELFARE	--- hospital emergency coordinators or advisors
	--- officials of any other private emergency groups

                              --- area Chamber of Commerce representatives
                              --- area bank presidents
                              --- area mass media executives
          PRIVATE   --- area telephone and utility company officials
          BUSINESS   --- officials of major transportation firms
                              --- officials of food-distributing firms
                              --- area labor organization officials

The county civil defense director would of course be an ex-officio member of this board, which would probably need to meet only a few times a year. In general terms, its functions would be:

(1) To coordinate existing emergency plans and exchange information regarding facilities on a regular basis, so that plans to share facilities can be developed, duplication of services can be avoided and gaps in services and facilities can be discovered and filled.

(2) To provide a channel for the dissemination of information and model program guidelines from the Federal office.

At the outset, a Federal field representative should work with the local director in creating and orienting the county committee. The direct information-giving role of a Federal specialist, especially regarding Federal CD functions, would protect the local director against initial harrassment from individuals whose contact with the program has resulted in misinterpretations of its goals and requirements. In addition, the organization of such boards or committees should consume a major portion of the Federal specialist's time, in the early stages; and materials outlining the coordinated program, with necessary local facilities clearly specified, should be developed in advance. The status of these facilities should

constitute the basis for continuing evaluation of local programs, and these evaluations should be generally distributed and known, within the board. Lines of authority and job tasks in emergencies should be instituted and clearly communicated and understood.

While members of the board who are government officials could be expected to participate as an adjunct to their regular duties, it is probably wise to pay all board members a token fee for their services, for example, a flat fee for expenses might be provided. Positions on the board would thus not be wholly volunteer, and members would feel constrained to earn their pay, however meager. Such a procedure would also go a long way toward overcoming initial apathy toward civil defense and its uses.

5. CONTINUE THE USE OF VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTEERS AS ADJUNCTS TO COORDINATING BOARDS AND PAID STAFF, BUT ENCOURAGE THE BROADEST POSSIBLE BASE OF VOLUNTARY SUPPORT.

Current use of volunteers and voluntary organizations should be continuously evaluated, preferably by Federal field persons, so that complete identification of civil defense with a single organization or category of organizations is avoided. For example, in some areas, identification of civil defense with paramilitary organizations like the American Legion has resulted in informal control of local programs by that organization rather than by elected officials.

* * * * *

The recommendations outlined above are directed toward fulfillment of the following objectives:

(1) The establishment of continuing and coordinated programs
of emergency preparedness within local areas, with a view
to maximizing the ability of these areas to cope with
emergencies of varying magnitude.

(2) The creation of ties between local emergency programs
and outside units, which can assist the local groups
in meeting emergencies efficiently by making all local
units a part of the larger system of emergency prepared-
ness planning.

(3) The improvement and extension of local support for
emergency preparedness programs, by providing more
complete facilities and a tighter, more uniform
organization.

(4) The involvement of core community leadership in creating
and expanding the emergency preparedness system. Crucial
to this involvement is personal (not press-release)
disemmination of the most recent and reliable information
to community leaders and mass media outlets - preferably
by means of a cooperative alliance between Federal
specialist and local director.

(5) The creation of a civil defense image which does not
identify the program with special political interests
not relevant to CD objectives. Deflection of agency
purposes in many local areas has frequently followed
from excessive enthusiasm on the part of a small local
minority, at the cost of broad public support (the

Street Corner Evangelist syndrome). Broad support
is best obtained by refocussing on essentials and
broadening the base of local involvement to include
the Establishment as well as the Aspiring.

(6) The preservation of maximum democratic local control
in emergency situations of all kinds.

APPENDIX A

Community Leaders and Local Programs

1. General Attitudes Toward Fallout Shelters

Table 1.

ATTITUDE TOWARD FALLOUT SHELTERS	River City	Miners-ville	Home-town	Factory-ville	New-town	Total Group
Unqualified Rejection	36%	84%	57%	49%	43%	53%
Qualified Rejection	36%	8%	21%	21%	29%	24%
Neutral	----	---	7%	15%	21%	9%
Qualified Acceptance	21%	8%	15%	15%	7%	13%
~~Unqualified~~ Acceptance	7%	---	---	---	---	1%
	100%(14)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(68)

Table 2. IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE WHOLE FALLOUT SHELTER QUESTION? WHY?

ATTITUDE TOWARD SHELTERS:	Affective Responses	Cognitive Responses	Evaluative Responses
Total Rejection	25%	45%	81%
Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance	75%	55%	19%
	100% (8)	100% (38)	100%(21)

Table 3.

ATTITUDE TOWARD SHELTERS:	Personal Orientation	Collectivity Orientation
Total Rejection	44%	61%
Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance	56%	39%
	100% (32)	100% (36)

Table 4.

DO YOU FEEL THAT WAR IS INEVITABLE, AS A GENERAL FORM OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR; OR DO YOU FEEL THAT THE HUMAN RACE MAY SOMEDAY ELIMINATE IT?

ATTITUDE TOWARD FALLOUT SHELTERS:	Definitely Not Inevitable	Probably Not Inevitable	Probably Inevitable	Definitely Inevitable
Total Rejection	72%	27%	18%	72%
Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance	28%	73%	82%	28%
	100% (14)	100% (15)	100% (11)	100% (28)

Table 5.

HOW LIKELY DO YOU THINK IT IS THAT A MAJOR WAR WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL IN FACT OCCUR?

ATTITUDE TOWARD FALLOUT SHELTERS:	Very Unlikely	Fairly Unlikely	Likely
Total Rejection	55%	50%	72%
Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance	45%	50%	28%
	100% (29)	100% (32)	100% (7)

Table 6.

"OPTIMISM-PESSIMIST": COMBINED SCORE BASED ON RESPONSES TO "IS WAR INEVITABLE?" AND "HOW LIKELY IS NUCLEAR WAR?"

ATTITUDE TOWARD FALLOUT SHELTERS	Optimistic	Doubtful	Pessimistic
Total Rejection	44%	56%	67%
Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance	56%	44%	33%
	100% (34)	100% (16)	100% (18)

Table 7.

ATTITUDE SHELTERS	Personal Orientation			Collectivity Orientation		
	Optim.	Doubtf.	Pess.	Optim.	Doubtf.	Pess.
Total Rejection	33%	50%	58%	53%	68%	73%
Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance	67%	50%	42%	47%	32%	27%
	100%(15)	100%(10)	100%(7)	100%(19)	100%(6)	100%(11)

2. Salience of Civil Defense

Table 8.

LEVEL OF INTEREST (CD IN GENERAL)	River City	Miners-ville	Home-town	Factory-ville	New-town	Total Group
Indifference	50%	42%	43%	57%	43%	47%
Some Interest	43%	25%	43%	29%	36%	35%
Considerable Interest	---	25%	7%	14%	15%	12%
Great Interest	7%	8%	7%	---	6%	6%
	100%(14)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(68)

Table 9.

AMOUNT OF PREPARED-NESS (WORK-PLACE)	River City	Miners-ville	Home-town	Factory-ville	New-town	Total Group
Have shelter or plan shelter	7%	---	14%	---	---	5%
Disaster plan	7%	8%	21%	21%	---	13%
Warning system only	14%	17%	---	7%	(2)	12%
Records storage only	14%	---	7%	14%	---	8%
Passive cooperation (building marked)	---	---	21%	29%	---	12%
Nothing	58%	75%	37%	29%	(3)	50%
	100%(14)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	(5)*	100%(59)

* Since Newtown is a residential suburb, with most residents
working elsewhere, this question was only applicable to five
respondents.

Table 10.

AMOUNT OF PREPARED-NESS (HOME)	River City	Miners-ville	Home-town	Factory-ville	New-town	Total Group
Complete Shelter	---	8%	---	---	---	1%
Area Set Aside	---	---	---	7%	7%	3%
Considered Shelter; Rejected	23%	---	---	---	14%	7%
Nothing, no plans	77%	92%	100%	93%	79%	89%
	100%(13)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(67)

3. The Federal-Local Dichotomy

Table 11.

ATTITUDE TOWARD LOCAL CD PROGRAM	River City	Miners-ville	Home-town	Factory-ville	New-town	Total Group
Generally Unfavorable	7%	16%	14%	28%	7%	15%
Neutral or Uninterested	54%	16%	72%	72%	14%	46%
Generally Favorable	39%	68%	14%	---	79%	39%
	100%(13)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(67)

Table 12.

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT LOCAL CD PROGRAM	River City	Miners-ville	Home-town	Factory-ville	New-town	Total Group
Almost None	31%	18%	57%	43%	14%	33%
Vague and Inadequate	31%	18%	29%	36%	21%	27%
General but Adequate	31%	58%	7%	21%	44%	31%
Detailed and Precise	7%	8%	7%	---	21%	9%
	100%(13)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(67)

ATTITUDE TOWARD SHELTERS

Table 13.

ATTITUDE TOWARD LOCAL PROGRAM	Total Rejection	Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance
Unfavorable or Indifferent	73%	48%
Favorable	27%	52%
	100% (37)	100% (31)

KNOWLEDGE OF LOCAL PROGRAM	Total Rejection	Qualified Rejection	Neutrality; Acceptance
Very little	69%	60%	37%
Quite a bit	31%	40%	63%
	100% (36)	100% (15)	100% (16)

Table 14.

TYPE OF CD PROGRAM FAVORED (CONTENT)	River City	Miners-ville	Home-town	Factory-ville	New-town	Total Group
General Disaster (Shelters De-emphasized)	38%	67%	14%	22%	57%	39%
Combined Shelter-General Disaster	8%	8%	14%	7%	---	7%
Chiefly Shelter	16%	---	8%	---	7%	6%
Indifferent; could not specify	38%	25%	64%	71%	36%	48%
	100%(13)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(67)

ATTITUDE TOWARD SHELTERS

Table 15.

TYPE OF PROGRAM FAVORED (CONTENT)	Total Rejection	Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance
General disaster (No shelters)	51%	25%
Combined disaster- shelter	----	28%
Indifferent; could not specify	49%	47%
	100% (35)	100% (32)

ATTITUDE TOWARD LOCAL PROGRAM

PROGRAM FAVORED:	Indifferent; Unfavorable	Favorable
General disaster	27%	58%
Disaster- shelter	7%	19%
Indifferent; could not specify	66%	23%
	100% (41)	100% (26)

ATTITUDE TOWARD SHELTERS

Table 16.

ATTITUDE TOWARD LOCAL PROGRAM	Qualified Rejection; Neutrality; Acceptance		Total Rejection	
PROGRAM FAVORED:	Indifferent Unfavorable	Favorable	Indifferent Unfavorable	Favorable
General Disaster	6%	44%	40%	80%
Disaster-Shelter	25%	31%	---	---
Indifferent; could not specify	69%	25%	60%	20%
	100% (16)	100% (16)	100% (25)	100% (10)

Table 17. ATTITUDE TOWARD LOCAL PROGRAMS

KNOWLEDGE ABOUT LOCAL PROGRAM	Indifferent Unfavorable		Favorable	
	Very little	Quite a bit	Very little	Quite a bit
PROGRAM FAVORED:				
General Disaster	28%	17%	20%	67%
Disaster-Shelter	3%	33%	---	23%
Indifferent; could not specify	69%	50%	80%	10%
	100% (35)	100% (6)	100% (5)	100% (21)

Table 18.

TYPE OF CD PROGRAM FAVORED (ORGANIZATION)	River City	Miners- ville	Home- town	Factory- ville	New- town	Total Group
Local Volunteers	15%	25%	---	---	---	7%
Local Government	23%	25%	8%	13%	8%	12%
Local Direction- Federal Financing	---	---	---	13%	12%	6%
Combined Federal- Local Direction: Paid Federal Co- ordinators	39%	25%	8%	8%	8%	17%
Entirely Federal (Civilian Control)	---	8%	21%	21%	36%	18%
Entirely Federal (Military Control)	---	8%	8%	8%	---	4%
Indifferent; could not specify	23%	9%	55%	50%	36%	36%
	100%(13)	100%(12)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(14)	100%(67)

APPENDIX B

Community Leaders and Civil Defense Directors

A Comparative Analysis

Table 1. AGE	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Twenties	1%	2%
Thirties	19%	23%
Forties	32%	38%
Fifties	30%	23%
Sixty and over	18%	13%
No answer	----	1%
	100%	100%

Table 2. RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Protestant	71%	72%
Catholic	20%	24%
Other	6%	2%
None	3%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 3. CHURCH ATTENDANCE	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Weekly	58%	52%
Twice a month	6%	12%
Once a month	10%	8%
Holidays only	3%	13%
Almost never	20%	12%
No answer	3%	3%
	100%	100%

Table 4.

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE	Community Leaders (N = 119)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Regular Republican	40%	26%
Independent Republican	13%	16%
Regular Democrat	20%	18%
Independent Democrat	8%	16%
"Vote for the man"	18%	5%
No preference	1%	17%
No answer	---	2%
	100%	100%

Table 5.

RURAL-URBAN RESIDENCE (SIZE OF PRESENT COMMUNITY)	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
5,000 or less	---	---
5,000 - 50,000	72%	80%
50,000 and over	28%	19%
No answer	---	1%
	100%	100%

Table 6.

RURAL-URBAN ORIGINS (SIZE OF COMMUNITY WHERE LIVED UNTIL MID-TEENS).	Community Leaders (N = 119)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
5,000 or less	32%	2%
5,000 - 50,000	32%	91%
50,000 and over	34%	6%
No answer	2%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 7.

EDUCATION	Community Leaders (N = 119)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Grade school	3%	5%
Some high school	2%	9%
High school graduate	18%	37%
Some college	12%	28%
College graduate	24%	10%
Beyond college	41%	10%
No answer	---	1%
	100%	100%

Table 8.

GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY (NUMBER OF MOVES ACROSS STATE LINES)	Community Leaders (N = 119)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
None	24%	22%
One	11%	14%
Two or three	26%	42%
Four or more	39%	22%
	100%	100%

Table 9.

HAVE YOU EVER SERVED IN THE ARMED FORCES?	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
No	49%	33%
Yes	51%	67%
	100%(61)	100%(209)

WERE YOU EVER OVERSEAS WHILE SERVING?		
No	36%	23%
Yes	64%	77%
	100%	100%

Table 10.

NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS	Community Leaders (N = 119)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
None	---	9%
One or two	12%	31%
Three or more	88%	60%
	100%	100%

Table 11.

TYPE OF ORGANIZATION	Community Leaders (N = 119)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Veterans; military	9%	42%
Chamber of Commerce; Jaycees	47%	7%
Service Clubs (Rotary, etc.)	42%	20%
Fraternal Orders (Elks, etc.)	28%	46%
Church groups	21%	10%
Local government (including schools)	35%	8%
Charitable; health and welfare	37%	14%
Local and national business and professional	36%	33%
All other	42%	28%
None	---	8%

Table 12. Does your present position (job) satisfy most of the requirements of (the ideal job)?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Most of them	73%	52%
Some of them	18%	34%
Few or none	1%	11%
No answer	8%	3%
	100%	100%

Table 13. How important is it to you personally to get ahead in life?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Very important	23%	36%
Fairly important	64%	53%
Not very important	5%	8%
Very important	4%	1%
No answer	4%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 14. If you had your choice, which of the following would you most like to be?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Independent	34%	17%
Successful	27%	43%
Well liked	28%	38%
No answer	11%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 15. Would you say you are the kind of person who circulates among a lot of people in a lot of situations, or are you inclined to spend a good deal of time alone or with just a few people?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Circulate a lot	75%	66%
Just a few people	18%	30%
Mostly alone	7%	3%
No answer	---	1%
	100%	100%

Table 15 (a). Which would you say you prefer? Circulating a lot, or spending a good deal of time alone or with just a few people?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Circulate a lot	44%	58%
Just a few people	48%	37%
Mostly alone	8%	4%
No answer	---	1%
	100%	100%

Table 16. How important is it to you personally to be well liked for your own personal qualities?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Very important	31%	49%
Fairly important	57%	37%
Not very important	8%	10%
Very unimportant	3%	3%
No answer	1%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 17. The best government is the one
that governs least.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	52%	43%
Disagree	36%	46%
Uncertain	8%	9%
No Answer	4%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 18. Democracy depends fundamentally on the
existence of free business enterprise.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	79%	87%
Disagree	8%	5%
Uncertain	8%	5%
No Answer	5%	3%
	100%	100%

Table 19. The welfare state tends to destroy individual
initiative.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	76%	82%
Disagree	10%	9%
Uncertain	13%	7%
No Answer	1%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 20. Government planning almost inevitably results
in the loss of essential liberties and freedoms.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	45%	42%
Disagree	43%	41%
Uncertain	9%	13%
No Answer	3%	4%
	100%	100%

Table 21. Newspapers and magazines should be allowed
to print anything they want, except military
secrets.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	45%	51%
Disagree	39%	40%
Uncertain	12%	8%
No Answer	4%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 22. Police and other groups should have the power
to ban or censor certain books or movies in
their cities.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	45%	53%
Disagree	41%	40%
Uncertain	11%	5%
No Answer	3%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 23. Persons who "take the Fifth" (refuse to testify against themselves) are probably guilty, and should either be made to testify, or punished cuite severely for refusing to testify.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	32%	36%
Disagree	52%	50%
Uncertain	15%	12%
No answer	1%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 24. The public schools are not the proper place for prayers or religious observances.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	39%	23%
Disagree	47%	67%
Uncertain	11%	8%
No Answer	3%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 25 (a). Of the following issues, which <u>three</u>
do you feel are most important?

		Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
(a)	Communism in the U. S.		
	Not mentioned in top three	68%	48%
	Mentioned in top three	32%	49%
	Ranked, but not in top three	---	3%
		100%	100%
(b)	Danger of a world war.		
	Not mentioned in top three	67%	58%
	Mentioned in top three	33%	40%
	Ranked, but not in top three	---	2%
		100%	100%
(c)	Building fallout shelters.		
	Not mentioned in top three	100%	80%
	Mentioned in top three	---	17%
	Ranked, but not in top three	---	3%
		100%	100%
(d)	Juvenile delinquency.		
	Not mentioned in top three	80%	68%
	Mentioned in top three	18%	29%
	Ranked, but not in top three	2%	3%
		100%	100%
(e)	Education.		
	Not mentioned in top three	52%	50%
	Mentioned in top three	48%	49%
	Ranked, but not in top three	---	1%
		100%	100%

Table 25 (a) (Cont'd).

		Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
(f)	**Taxes.**		
	Not mentioned in top three	72%	76%
	Mentioned in top three	28%	21%
	Ranked, but not in top three	----	3%
		100%	100%
(g)	**Race Relations.**		
	Not mentioned in top three	41%	74%
	Mentioned in top three	59%	22%
	Ranked, but not in top three	----	4%
		100%	100%
(h)	**Unemployment.**		
	Not mentioned in top three	55%	68%
	Mentioned in top three	45%	30%
	Ranked, but not in top three	----	2%
		100%	100%
(i)	**Labor Relations.**		
	Not mentioned in top three	85%	77%
	Mentioned in top three	15%	20%
	Ranked, but not in top three	----	3%
		100%	100%

Table 25 (b). Comparative rankings, most important issue:

Community Leaders (N = 75)		Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)	
Issue	% No-mention	Issue	% No-mention
(1) Race Relations	41%	(1) Communism	49%
(2) Education	52%	(2) Education	50%
(3) Unemployment	55%	(3) World War	58%
(4) World War	67%	(4) Unemployment	68%
(5) Communism	68%	(5) Juvenile Delinquency	68%
(6) Taxes	72%	(6) Race Relations	74%
(7) Juvenile Delinquency	80%	(7) Taxes	76%
(8) Labor Relations	85%	(8) Labor Relations	77%
(9) Slums	95%	(9) Fallout Shelters	80%
(10) Mental Illness	96%	(10) Mental Illness	88%
(11) Fallout Shelters	100%	(11) Slums	94%

Table 26.   Under any circumstances, you simply can't trust the Communists.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	66%	72%
Disagree	16%	17%
Uncertain	13%	9%
No Answer	5%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 27.   A disarmament treaty would not be worth the paper it's printed on, because the Communists would break it whenever they wanted to.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	66%	76%
Disagree	13%	8%
Uncertain	17%	15%
No Answer	4%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 28.   Individual liberty and justice are not possible in socialist countries.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	50%	51%
Disagree	27%	25%
Uncertain	12%	21%
No Answer	11%	3%
	100%	100%

Table 29. The Communists are dead set on world conquest
          and will use any means to achieve it.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	67%	86%
Disagree	9%	6%
Uncertain	17%	6%
No Answer	7%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 30. A nuclear test ban wouldn't work, because the
          Communists would always find ways to cheat.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	45%	64%
Disagree	24%	14%
Uncertain	25%	19%
No Answer	6%	3%
	100%	100%

Table 31. Whatever anyone says, there are still plenty of
          Communists in high posts in the government.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	21%	36%
Disagree	37%	26%
Uncertain	35%	36%
No Answer	7%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 32. Steps should be taken immediately to outlaw the Communist Party in the United States.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	43%	57%
Disagree	29%	26%
Uncertain	20%	15%
No Answer	8%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 33. The U. S. has no moral right to carry its struggle against Communist to the point of risking the destruction of the human race.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	12%	10%
Agree mostly	15%	13%
Uncertain	7%	11%
Disagree mostly	19%	19%
Disagree	43%	45%
No Answer	4%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 34. The U. S. must be willing to run any risk of war which may be necessary to prevent the spread of Communism.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	37%	56%
Agree mostly	43%	33%
Uncertain	3%	3%
Disagree mostly	9%	6%
Disagree	7%	1%
No Answer	1%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 35. The real enemy today is no longer Communism but war itself.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Agree	9%	9%
Agree mostly	16%	6%
Uncertain	3%	5%
Disagree mostly	20%	14%
Disagree	47%	64%
No Answer	5%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 36. Do you believe that war is inevitable, or do
you think the human race will eventually find
a way to eliminate war entirely?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
War is inevitable	33%	39%
War will be eliminated eventually	62%	54%
No Answer	5%	7%
	100%	100%

Table 37. How likely do you think it is that we're in for
another big world war?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Very likely	3%	20%
Fairly likely	9%	20%
Even chance	27%	39%
Fairly unlikely	50%	18%
Very unlikely	8%	2%
No Answer	3%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 38. If a world war does come, do you think it's likely
          to happen in the next six months, the next year,
          or when?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Two years or less	4%	11%
2 - 5 years	12%	25%
5 - 10 years	23%	31%
10 years or more	20%	10%
Unlikely at all	31%	9%
No Answer or Contingency	10%	14%
	100%	100%

Table 39. Which two of the following do you personally count
          on as the most effective deterrent to war?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Offensive-Defensive	11%	34%
Offensive-Summit Talks	29%	12%
Offensive-U. N. Negotiations	17%	9%
Other	10%	10%
No Answer	33%	15%
	100%	100%

Table 40. Civil defense activities are nothing but a waste
of money and human energy that could be better
spent on waging the peace, such as disarmament
talks.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	7%	---
Agree	11%	2%
Disagree	51%	26%
Strongly Disagree	28%	71%
No Answer	3%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 41. The civil defense effort is creating a sense of
false security among the people.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	4%	1%
Agree	20%	3%
Disagree	60%	54%
Strongly Disagree	13%	40%
No Answer	3%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 42. A civil defense program will increase the
probability of war.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	1%	---
Agree	4%	1%
Disagree	62%	35%
Strongly Disagree	28%	63%
No Answer	5%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 43. A civil defense program will reduce the
probability of war.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	8%	30%
Agree	46%	49%
Disagree	31%	14%
Strongly Disagree	11%	5%
No Answer	4%	2%
	100%	100%

Table 44. Civil defense is a good thing because it creates
the impression of preparedness and determination
to resist aggression.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	15%	35%
Agree	55%	44%
Disagree	19%	7%
Strongly Disagree	3%	2%
No Answer	8%	12%
	100%	100%

Table 45. Civil defense has been too much neglected in
this country.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	15%	59%
Agree	44%	32%
Disagree	33%	4%
Strongly Disagree	3%	4%
No Answer	5%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 46. Critics of the government's civil defense policy should be watched for their possible Communist leanings.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	8%	14%
Agree	13%	32%
Disagree	46%	38%
Strongly Disagree	25%	15%
No Answer	8%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 47. There can be no adequate defense against nuclear attack.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	8%	1%
Agree	28%	7%
Disagree	46%	34%
Strongly Disagree	17%	57%
No Answer	1%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 48. Civil Defense should be abandoned, because even if civil defense measures were effective in saving lives, a nuclear war would make living on earth impossible for the survivors.

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	4%	1%
Agree	9%	1%
Disagree	51%	20%
Strongly Disagree	33%	77%
No Answer	3%	1%
	100%	100%

Table 49. In your opinion, does the building of fallout
shelters make the possibility of nuclear war
more or less likely?

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
More likely	5%	1%
Undecided; probably more likely	11%	2%
Undecided; probably less likely	44%	35%
Less likely	12%	55%
Irrelevant	24%	4%
No Answer	4%	3%
	100%	100%

Table 50. Suppose there were an actual nuclear attack. Would
you tend to agree or disagree with the following
statement regarding shelter strategy: "If you (or
your group) are already secured in your shelter and
others try to break in, they may be treated as un-
just aggressors and repelled with whatever means
will effectively deter their assault."

	Community Leaders (N = 75)	Civil Defense Directors (N = 316)
Strongly Agree	4%	15%
Agree	20%	23%
Undecided	30%	28%
Disagree	24%	22%
Strongly Disagree	17%	8%
No Answer or Contingency Response	5%	4%
	100%	100%

APPENDIX C

The Local Directors

A. Breakdowns by State Residence

Table 1. State Residence and Cooperation From County-City Government

A. "Have county supervisors in your area accepted responsibility for civil defense?"

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Yes	75%	55%	61%
No	16%	32%	21%
No Answer	9%	13%	18%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

B. "Has the city council in your community accepted responsibility for civil defense?"

Yes	77%	73%	58%
No	18%	18%	29%
No Answer	5%	9%	13%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

C. "From which of the following groups have you recruited the most volunteers for civil defense?"

Per cent checking local government personnel	88%	80%	67%
Per cent not checking local government personnel	12%	20%	33%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100% (107)

Table 2. State Residence and Program Effectiveness (I)

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Per cent reporting that their area has:			
(a) a survival plan based on both shelters and evacuation (189)	79%	54%	53%
(b) an emergency stock of drugs and medical supplies (153)	71%	41%	41%
(c) an emergency hospital (147)	69%	44%	34%
(d) a warning station manned 24 hours a day (162)	68%	59%	30%
(e) a fallout-protected emergency operating center (138)	52%	39%	43%
N = (316)	(77)	(132)	(107)

Table 3. State Residence and Programs Effectiveness (II)

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Per cent reporting that their area has:			
20 or more aspects of total program	44%	30%	24%
10 – 19 aspects	49%	62%	65%
Fewer than 10 or no answer	7%	8%	21%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

Table 4. State Residence and Percent of Population Shelter-Protected

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Percent reporting protection in their area for:			
30% or more	41%	26%	20%
Less than 30%	58%	52%	48%
No answer	1%	11%	32%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

Table 5. State Residence and Personal Shelter Protection

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Percent reporting have built or in process of building shelter	34%	21%	18%
Percent reporting designation of specific emergency area	52%	57%	36%
Percent no answer	14%	22%	46%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

Table 6. State Residence and Total Time in Civil Defense Work

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Less than 3 years	19%	30%	37%
3 - 5 years	17%	17%	17%
5 years or more	61%	50%	45%
No answer	3%	3%	1%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

Table 7. State Residence and Prior Volunteers Experience in
Civil Defense

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Percent reporting volunteers work prior to present CD post	62%	52%	45%
Percent reporting no previous volunteer work	38%	48%	55%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

Table 8. State Residence and Recruitment to Present CD Post

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Made formal application	26%	9%	5%
Asked by city government	30%	52%	34%
Asked by county government	23%	24%	10%
Asked by friend in CD	12%	9%	34%
Something else or no answer	9%	6%	17%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

Table 9. State Residence and Integration into Local Government

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Percent reporting participation in 3 or more activities	46%	36%	30%
Percent reporting participation in 1 or 2 activities	41%	50%	35%
Percent no answer	13%	14%	35%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

Table 10. State Residence and Professional CD Status

STATE:	A.	B.	C.
Paid, full-time	23%	7%	10%
Paid, part-time	44%	30%	9%
Unpaid, full-time	3%	7%	11%
Unpaid, part-time	22%	52%	64%
Can't be classified	9%	4%	6%
	100%(77)	100%(132)	100%(107)

B. Breakdowns by Professional Status in Civil Defense *

Table 1. Professional Status and Local Cooperation

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Percent reporting that the following groups in their area have accepted civil defense responsibilities				
A. Top elected officials	89%	88%	83%	72%
B. Commercial establishments	58%	58%	57%	42%
C. Local industries	69%	54%	65%	40%
D. County supervisors	83%	74%	74%	51%
E. City council	78%	80%	74%	61%
F. Clubs and social organizations	72%	64%	65%	51%
N =	(36)	(84)	(23)	(154)

* In the few tables to follow, the total case base is 297, rather than 316. Nineteen local directors reported that could not be classified in any of the four professional status categories.

Table 2. Professional Status and Program Effectiveness (I)

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Percent reporting that their area has:				
A. Survival plan based on shelters and evacuation	81%	67%	48%	53%
B. CD-owned trucks	61%	44%	35%	38%
C. Emergency stocks of drugs and medical supplies	75%	55%	48%	38%
D. An emergency hospital	81%	55%	35%	36%
E. An emergency rescue squad	89%	73%	70%	71%
F. Warning station manned 24 hours a day	86%	68%	39%	36%
G. Fallout-protected emergency operating center	58%	50%	48%	38%
N =	(36)	(84)	(23)	(154)

Table 3.   Professional Status and Program Effectiveness (II)

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Percent reporting that their area has:				
20 or more aspects of total program	72%	39%	26%	21%
10 - 19 aspects	28%	56%	65%	60%
1 - 9 aspects, or no answer	---	5%	9%	19%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

Table 4.   Professional Status and Percent of Population Shelter-Protected

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Percent reporting protection in their area for:				
30% or more	50%	31%	39%	18%
10% - 29%	28%	36%	22%	30%
1% - 9%	14%	27%	9%	31%
No Answer	8%	6%	30%	21%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

Table 5. Professional Status and Attitude Toward Shelter
Financing and Maintenance

"Who should be assigned primary responsibility
for financing shelters?"

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Federal Government	64%	60%	48%	44%
Private familites, local government, or other	30%	32%	48%	47%
No answer	6%	8%	4%	9%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

"Who should be assigned primary responsibility
for maintaining emergency readiness of shelters
and shelter supplies?"

	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Volunteers from the building to be served	44%	33%	26%	23%
Local CD staff	33%	33%	22%	33%
Someone else	17%	32%	35%	36%
No answer	6%	2%	17%	8%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

Table 6. Professional Status and Community Size

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Under 25,000	47%	78%	86%	90%
25,000 - 49,999	22%	13%	9%	6%
50,000 and over	31%	9%	5%	4%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

Table 7. Professional Status and Intra-Community Mixing

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Percent reporting they "circulate a lot"	84%	63%	74%	62%
Percent reporting they spend "considerable time alone" or with "just a few people"	16%	37%	26%	38%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

Table 8. Professional Status and "Life Goals"

"If you had your choice, would you prefer to
be independent, successful, or well liked?"

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Successful	58%	43%	35%	39%
Independent	19%	18%	35%	14%
Well liked	22%	35%	30%	45%
No answer	1%	4%	---	2%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

Table 9. Professional Status and "Simplicity-Complexity"

A. "In most disagreements, the right and the wrong
side of the argument is readily apparent."

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Agree	19%	30%	30%	40%
Disagree	67%	61%	48%	47%
Uncertain or no answer	14%	9%	22%	13%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

B. "Socialism and Communism are basically the
same thing."

	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Agree	19%	30%	30%	41%
Disagree	67%	60%	57%	45%
Uncertain or no answer	14%	10%	13%	14%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

Table 10. Professional Status and "Faith in Governments"

A. "Government planning almost inevitably results in the loss of essential liberties and freedoms."

	Paid		Unpaid	
	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Agree	28%	43%	39%	44%
Disagree	61%	?	43%	38%
Uncertain or no answer	11%	18%	18%	18%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

B. "In the long haul, the United States cannot really depend on its allies."

	Full-time	Part-time	Full-time	Part-time
Agree	17%	33%	35%	27%
Disagree	64%	46%	39%	44%
Uncertain or no answer	19%	21%	26%	29%
	100%(36)	100%(84)	100%(23)	100%(154)

C. **Breakdowns by Summary Index (Professional CD Status;**
   Occupational Situs; Previous CD Experience)

Table 1. Total Program Effectiveness

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Percent reporting that their area has:		
20 or more aspects of total program	85%	3%
10 - 19 aspects	14%	66%
Fewer than 10	---	30%
No answer	1%	1%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 2. Percent of Population Shelter-Protected

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Percent reporting protection in their area for:		
30% or more	42%	16%
10% - 29%	29%	23%
Less than 10%	14%	43%
No answer	15%	18%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 3. Specific Program Aspects

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Percent reporting that their area has:		
1. a survival plan based on shelters and evacuation	86%	58%
2. protection for vital records (shelter or alternate locations)	43%	12%
3. privately owned trucks available for emergency use	93%	73%
4. CD-owned trucks	71%	35%
5. emergency lines of succession for top elected officials	93%	62%
6. emergency food stocks for two weeks or more	57%	23%
7. emergency stocks of drugs and medical supplies	86%	31%
8. an emergency hospital	79%	23%
9. a warning station manned 24 hours a day	100%	35%
10. a shelter-protected emergency operating center	50%	19%
11. a RACES organization	79%	27%
N =	(14)	(26)

Table 4. Community Size

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Percent reporting residence in communities of:		
less than 5,000	29%	50%
5,000 - 24,999	14%	42%
25,000 - 49,999	22%	4%
50,000 or more	35%	4%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 5. Education

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Eleventh grade or less	7%	20%
High school graduate	29%	54%
Some college	36%	26%
College graduate or more	28%	---
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 6. Geographic Mobility

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Number of moves reported during lifetime, to date:		
0 - 2	14%	31%
3 - 5	63%	57%
6 or more	23%	12%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 7. Intra-Community Mixing

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Percent reporting that they:		
"Circulate a lot"	93%	50%
"Spend considerable time alone or with just a few people"	7%	50%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 8.   Organizational Memberships

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Percent reporting membership in:		
none or one organization	14%	24%
two or three organizations	36%	46%
four or more organizations	50%	30%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 9.   Job Satisfaction

"Does your present position satisfy most, some, or only a few of the requirements you consider important in an ideal job?"

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Most of them	64%	32%
Some of them	36%	39%
Just a few	---	24%
No answer	---	5%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 10. Life Goals - Aspirations

A. "If you had your choice, would you prefer to be independent, successful, or well liked?"

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Successful	64%	31%
Independent	29%	27%
Well liked	7%	42%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

B. "How important is it to you personally to be well liked for your personal qualities?"

Very important	36%	62%
Fairly important	50%	31%
Not very important	14%	7%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 11.   "Simplicity - Complexity"

A.   "In most disagreements between people, the right
and the wrong side of the argument are readily
apparent."

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Agree	29%	50%
Disagree	57%	31%
Uncertain	14%	15%
No answer	---	4%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

B.   Socialism and Communism are basically the same thing."

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Agree	---	35%
Disagree	79%	50%
Uncertain	14%	12%
No answer	7%	3%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

Table 12. "Trust - Mistrust" (?) Attitude Toward Communism

A. "In the struggle with Communism, there is no such
thing as an uncommitted country. They are either
with us or against us."

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Agree	36%	69%
Disagree	57%	23%
Uncertain	7%	4%
No answer	---	4%
	100%(14)	100%(26)

B. "Whatever anyone says, there are still plenty of
Communists in high places in government."

	High Status Professional	Low Status Volunteer
Agree	22%	35%
Disagree	64%	19%
Uncertain	14%	42%
No answer	---	4%
	100%(14)	100%(26)